【作者】 郭勇峰；

【导师】 薛有志；

【作者基本信息】 南开大学 ， 公司治理， 2012， 博士

【摘要】 企业战略和战略管理理论经过半个多世纪的发展，已经形成了战略理论丛林。然而，企业战略理论在近些年似乎遇到了瓶颈，其以人格化企业为基本分析单位的研究范式难以准确回答诸如企业战略为什么会存在，企业战略的根本性质是什么这样的问题。本文遵循主流企业理论的研究范式，将企业看作是各种生产要素投入者之间的契约束，以交易或契约为基本分析单位，探讨了企业战略的基本问题。本论文的研究目的是，以交易或契约为基本分析单位，根据企业理论、交易成本经济学、代理理论以及其他相关理论，结合传统的企业战略及战略管理理论的研究结论，概括出企业战略的内涵，探明企业战略存在的原因，掌握企业战略的根本性质，探寻出企业战略的治理效应；在为企业战略理论做出贡献的同时，最终指导企业战略管理和公司治理的实践活动。本论文以理论研究为主，实证研究为辅。在理论研究的过程中，第三章是本文逻辑框架的核心，这一章结合第一章的研究背景和第二章的理论回顾及对企业战略内涵的界定着重论证了企业战略的起源问题，提出企业战略的两个根本性质：组织理性和可靠承诺，并初步探讨了企业战略的治理效应。在第三章的基础上，本文的第四章和第五章分别论证了企业战略的组织理性和可靠承诺的性质；第六章则从战略制定和战略实施两个方面论述了企业战略过程的治理效应。本文的实证研究目的是为了进一步检验理论研究归纳和演绎的结论。在第七章，本文首先用内容分析法分析了研究样本的正式战略陈述的内容，证实了企业战略陈述确实体现了组织理性和可靠承诺的根本性质；其次，本文用统计分析法和回归分析法检验了企业战略对企业代理成本及经理与股东的激励相容的影响，以及企业战略实施结果对企业价值及经理离职的影响。通过实证研究，本文进一步证实了理论研究的大部分结论。本文的第一个研究结论解释了企业战略存在原因。以交易或契约为基本分析单位，本文认为企业的中心签约人或经理在事前考虑自身及其他签约人的理性确定未来资源配置的决策、目标和计划并作出承诺，能够在企业之内形成共同目标，产生理性预期并促进信息传递，从而减少经理的卸责或敲竹杠行为，降低管理成本。所以，本文认为企业出现之后，企业战略之所以会出现的原因是，企业战略能够节省管理成本（在企业内部组织资源所花费的成本）。根据对企业战略起源的分析，本文第二个结论认为企业战略的根本性质是组织理性和可靠承诺。在现代公司中，由于企业战略在事前形成，所以在战略形成过程中经理不得不接受来自股东、董事会和其他利益相关者的影响，公司各利益相关主体会达成战略共识。战略共识的达成源于企业各相关利益主体之间不仅仅存在利益分歧，更重要的是存在利益一致性，战略共识体现了组织理性的性质。企业的组织理性代表了企业组织中各种相关利益主体理性利益的协调和折衷。虽然企业各利益主体因为组织理性而达成了战略共识，但资源配置的实际权威仍然掌握在经理手中，所以要保证组织理性的达成，还需要经理对未来资源配置的决策、目标和计划作出承诺。由于对经理的激励机制和监督机制的存在，增大了经理违约的成本，强化了对违约的惩罚，所以战略承诺具有可靠性，可靠承诺是企业战略的另一根本性质。本文的第三个结论认为，公司治理是确保股东获得满意的剩余收益，维护经理和其他利益相关者的正常利益，促进公司核心机构内外部契约达成的机制。企业战略的组织理性能够提高经理与股东的激励相容程度，减少剩余损失；企业战略的可靠承诺，能够为董事会提供监督经理的工具，降低监督费用和保障支出；因此，企业战略能够降低代理成本，促进契约达成，发挥治理效应。具体来说，企业战略过程的治理效应可以体现在战略制定和战略实施两阶段的过程中，表现在战略过程可以促进股东权益保护、提高董事会效率、（在一定程度上）替代激励机制、引入利益相关者关系治理以及强化外部治理机制等方面。本文的创新体现在三个方面：第一，突破了传统企业战略理论以企业为基本分析单位，假设企业人格化的研究范式，而以交易或契约为基本分析单位，探讨企业的战略问题，因此很容易深入探讨企业战略的起源、企业战略的根本性质等基本问题；第二，突破了传统企业战略理论以竞争优势解释企业战略起源的做法，把企业看作是契约束，以节省管理成本来解释企业战略的产生原因，显然能够摆脱传统战略理论在解释战略起源方面的困境；第三，突破了传统企业战略与公司治理关系的论述中片面强调公司治理影响战略的观点，提出企业战略能够发挥治理效应的观点。更多还原

【Abstract】 After more than half a century’s development, a jungle of strategictheories has been formed with regard to firm strategy and strategicmanagement. However, in recent years, the firm strategy theories seem tohave encountered a bottleneck—the traditional paradigm which takes apersonified firm as the basic analytical unit seem to be incapable ofgiving a satisfying answer to such questions as why firm strategy existsand what its nature is. This thesis follows the mainstream paradigm of thetheory of the firm, viewing the firm as a bundle of contracts amongvarious investors who input production factors; and taking not apersonified firm but transaction or contract as the basic analytical unit itexplores the basic issues of firm strategy. Therefore, this thesis, takingtransaction or contract as the basic analytical unit, and based on theTheory of the Firm, Transaction Cost Economics, Agency Theory and other relevant theories, together with findings from the firm strategy andstrategic management theories, aims to summarize the concept of firmstrategy, seek evidence for its existence, grasp its nature and investigateits governance effects; and ultimately to guide the practice of strategicmanagement and corporate governance as well as to contribute to thetheory of firm strategy.This thesis is mainly a theoretical research supplemented by anempirical research. In the theoretical research, Chapter3is the core of thelogical framework. By combining the research background in Chapter1and the literature review and definition of firm strategy in Chapter2,Chapter3focuses on exploring the origin of firm strategy, proposing twoaspects of its nature—organizational rationality and credible commitment,and investigating the governance effects of firm strategy. On the basis ofChapter3, the two aspects of nature of firm strategy—organizationalrationality and credible commitment are demonstrated respectively in Chapter4and Chapter5; while in Chapter6, the governance effects ofthe firm strategy process are discussed from the two stages of strategyformulation and strategy implementation. The empirical research of thisthesis is to further test the inductive and deductive conclusions from thetheoretical research. In Chapter7, firstly, by analyzing the officialstatement of the strategy in the study samples by means of contentanalysis, this thesis confirms that the statement of firm strategy indeedreflects the nature of organizational rationality and credible commitment;secondly, statistical analysis and regression analysis are used to examinethe impact of firm strategy on the agency costs in companies and on theincentive alignment between managers and shareholders, and the impactof the outcome of strategy implementation on corporate value andmanagers’ turnover. Through empirical study, this thesis further confirmsmost conclusions of the theoretical research. The first conclusion of this thesis explains the reason to theexistence of firm strategy. By taking transaction or contract as the basicanalytical unit, this thesis believes that the central party to the contractsor the managers of the firm will ex ante consider the rationality of theirown and other contractors’ to determine the future decisions, objectivesand plans regarding resource allocation and make commitmentssubsequently, which helps form a common goal and a rationalexpectation within the firm, and facilitates the transmission ofinformation, thereby reducing managers’ shirking and holdup behaviorsand decreasing the management costs. Therefore, this thesis believes,after the appearance of the firm, the reason to the existence of firmstrategy lies in the saving of management costs—costs spent onorganizing resources within the firm.Based on analysis about the origin of firm strategy, the secondconclusion of this thesis is—the nature of firm strategy lies in organizational rationality and credible commitment. In moderncorporations, since a firm’s strategy is formulated ex ante, managers haveto accept influence from shareholders, the board of directors and otherstakeholders in formulating the strategy, thus the final strategy would bea consensus among all corporate stakeholders. The reason to therealization of such a consensus lies in the fact that among all types ofstakeholders, there is not only interest divergence, there is also and moreimportantly, interest consistency, therefore a strategic consensus reflectsthe organizational rationality. The organizational rationality impliescoordination and compromise of rational interest among all stakeholdersof the firm. Although the strategic consensus is reached among allstakeholders under the dynamism of organizational rationality, the actualauthority of resource allocation is still rested in the managers; therefore,to guarantee the realization of organizational rationality managers stillneed to make commitments to future decisions, objectives and plans regarding resources allocation. Since the presence of the incentive andsupervision mechanism on managers can increase their default cost andstrengthen penalties for their breach of the contracts, the strategiccommitment is credible; therefore credible commitment constitutesanother aspect of the nature of firm strategy.The third conclusion of this thesis believes that corporategovernance is the mechanisms that ensure shareholders get satisfyingresidual earnings, managers and other stakeholders get normal interestsand the contracts inside and outside the corporate core structure can bereached. The organizational rationality aspect of firm strategy canimprove the extent of incentive alignment between managers andshareholders and then reduce the residual loss; the credible commitmentaspect of firm strategy, on the other hand, can provide the board ofdirectors a tool to supervise managers, thus reducing both the monitoringexpenditures and the bonding expenditures; therefore, the firm strategy can reduce agency costs, promote the realization of the contract, andexert governance effects. Specifically, the governance effects of the firmstrategy process can be reflected in two stages—strategy formulation andstrategy implementation, which shows that the firm strategy process canpromote the protection of shareholders’ interests, improve the efficiencyof the board of directors, substitute the incentive mechanisms (to acertain extent), introduce the governance of stakeholders’ relationship,and strengthen the external governance mechanisms.The innovations of this thesis lie in three aspects: First, this thesisbreaks through the paradigm of traditional firm strategy theory whichtakes the firm as the basic analytical unit by assuming a personified firm,but discusses the strategic issues of firms by taking transaction orcontract as the basic analytical unit, making it easy to profoundly studysuch basic issues as the origin of firm strategy as well as its nature.Second, this thesis breaks through the practice of traditional firm strategy theory which attributes the origin of firm strategy to competitiveadvantage, but views the firm as a contract bundle and attributes theexistence of firm strategy to saving of management costs, thus apparentlyget out of the plight of traditional theories in this regard. Third, this thesisbreaks through the traditional perspective in discussing the relationshipbetween firm strategy and corporate governance which places one-sidedemphasis on impact of corporate governance on firm strategy, arguingthat firm strategy can also exert governance effcets.更多还原