【作者】 邱艾超；

【导师】 李维安；

【作者基本信息】 南开大学 ， 公司治理， 2012， 博士

【摘要】 长期以来，行政型治理与经济型治理的二元并存是中国公司治理的典型特征之一。经过三十多年的发展，中国公司治理改革成效显著，经济型治理结构初步建立，公司治理模式正在从行政型治理向经济型治理渐进转型。然而在长期的计划经济制度及相对弱化的法律制度环境的影响下，企业的行政型治理依然存在并不断演化，其基本制度环境诱因和对企业绩效的复杂影响机理尚未全部厘清。在此背景下，本文结合中国公司治理转型的背景对行政型治理进行深入研究。一方面，中国公司治理从行政型治理向经济型治理的转型是“中国式公司治理理论”的提炼与升华；另一方面中国情境下所形成的行政型治理，是公司经营目标行政化、高管任免行政化和资源配置行政化的总结与归纳。从实践层面来看，行政型治理到经济型治理的转型既给中国企业提供了成长机会和动力，推动了绩效的提高；但是另一方面又带来了一定程度的治理风险和额外的治理成本，即经济型治理没有完全确立下的行政型治理消除造成的治理“真空”。从中国公司治理转型视角出发，对行政型治理这一特殊形态的研究涉及到以下研究问题：什么是行政型治理？行政型治理的理论基础、基本特性、内在运行机理是什么？内生于中国制度环境的行政型治理的基本制度环境诱因是什么？行政型治理在不同的治理阶段、不同的行政型治理强度下，对公司绩效的表现有无差异性？差异性的根源是什么？理论与现实的结合是研究逻辑的切入点。从文献研究看，总体上，相关研究更多的是停留在行政型治理的一般绩效方面，且对行政型治理的测度多是停留在“一维框架”和“地区层面”；相关研究对行政型治理的根源以及行政型治理在国有企业和民营企业中的差异性表现涉及较少。当前，国内外对于行政型治理的研究从文献数量、研究深度、理论系统的完整性等方面来看都存在一定的欠缺，需要进一步从制度环境的“型塑”性和行政型治理长期的历史绩效表现进行本土化、系统化。基于此，本论文的研究路线遵循如下步骤：提出问题→分析问题（理论基础和文献述评）→现状剖析（制度变迁与行政型治理演进）→制度环境与行政型治理的关系研究→行政型治理与公司绩效的关系研究→研究结论。首先，在提出研究问题的基础上，对“制度环境与治理模式”、“行政型治理的三个维度”、“行政型治理与公司绩效”的相关文献进行了述评；其次，在对传统行政型治理的内涵进行分析的基础上，本文指出了传统界定的局限性，并结合企业家的比较优势和系统理论对行政型治理进行了界定；再次，通过构建统一的制度演化分析框架，分析了中国的经济制度环境变迁以及行政型治理的演化，并将国有企业的的强行政型治理分为三个阶段：行政化配置阶段（1999-2001年）、内部人控制阶段（2002-2004年）、准经济型治理阶段（2005-2007年）；最后实证研究检验了制度环境与行政型治理以及行政型治理与公司绩效的关系。本文的内容安排按照由一般到特殊，由理论到实证的一般研究范式展开。全文主体分为七部分，第二章是文献述评部分，分别从一般路径和具体研究内容两个方面对相关文献进行了系统梳理，以总结行政型治理理论的规律和研究成果；第三章是行政型治理的内涵、特性与基本界定，为本文的实证检验奠定基础；第四章从历史和现实两个层面提炼和总结行政型治理演进的基本阶段；第五章和第六章为制度环境、行政型治理与公司绩效的理论分析与实证检验；第七章是全文的结论。通过构建强行政型治理指数与弱行政型治理指数，本文对两种不同的行政型治理进行了差异性测量，进而对国有企业1999-2007年4994个观测值以及民营企业2003-2007年1170个观测值进行了实证研究。研究发现，制度环境的差异性匹配“型塑”着中国的行政型治理，且每一治理阶段的制度协同性存在差异；行政型治理总体上与公司的市场绩效呈现负效应，但在某一个特定的治理阶段，国有企业的行政型治理与财务绩效呈现微弱的提升效应；民营企业的弱行政型治理在一定程度上有利于保护公司产权、规避地方政府的干预；国有企业党委书记董事会任职是行政型治理的典型表现之一，一方面，可以产生监督与制衡效应，抑制内部人控制；另一方面，党委书记的董事会任职在法律环境较成熟的区域，则易产生干预效应。相关研究结论对于公司治理实践和政策规制具有一定的启示。首先提示我们要辩证、客观地看待中国的行政型治理，不要采取“一刀切”和“非此即彼”的态度；其次是强化不同治理阶段制度环境建设的匹配性；最后是有效防范党委书记董事会任职所产生的干预效应。更多还原

【Abstract】 Over the years, the typical characteristics of Chinese CorporateGovernance is the coexistence of Administration Governance andEconomic Governance. The reform of Chinese corporate governanceachieves remarkable success for the stages of more than30years.Specifically, the Economic Governance is in the condition of preliminaryestablishment; then the Chinese model of governance is experiencing thetransition from Administration Governance to Economic Governance.However, the firm’s Administration Governance is still exists for a longtime and evolves unceasingly, because of the long-term planned economysystem and no-mature legal environment in China. In this context, thispaper studies on Administration Governance with combination of thetransition background of Chinese corporate governance. On one hand, thetransition from Administration Governance to Economic Governance in China is the typical extraction and distillation of "Chinese-style corporategovernance theory"; on the other hand, the Administration Governance inChinese context is the summary of the realities including theadministrative objectives, administrative appointment and administrativeresource allocation. From a practical point of view, the transition fromAdministration Governance to Economic Governance provide the growthopportunities and power in China; but on the other hand, this transitionmeans a certain degree of governance risk and controlling costs, whenEconomic Governance is not fully established. From the perspective ofcorporate governance transition, we should focus on AdministrationGovernance including the following research questions: Specifically,what is the Administration Governance? what is the theoretical basis,basic characteristics and the inherent operational mechanism ofAdministration Governance? What is the environmental incentives ofChinese system of Administration Governance? What is the difference between Administration Governance and firm performance in differentgovernance stages, and under different administrative intensity? What isthe root of the difference?The logical starting point of studies is the combination of theory andreality. On the whole, more research is stuck in the administrative aspectsof performance, and administrative-based measures of governance. Theyare mostly focus on the "one-dimensional framework" and "regionallevel". These research failed to find the difference of AdministrationGovernance for different types of firms. However, there are significantdifferences in the degree of state-owned firms and private firms. Atpresent, the domestic and international research for AdministrationGovernance have a big lag in terms of the number of documents and thedepth of theoretical integrity. So, we should further these studies in theview of localization, systematic and depth.Based on these points, this study follows the following steps: analyzing the problem→ask questions (theoretical foundation andliterature review)→realities analysis (institutional transition and theAdministration Governance evolution)→study the relationship ofinstitutional environment and Administration Governance→study therelationship of Administration Governance and firm performance→conclusion. As far as the research path concerned, Firstly, we review thebasic literatures based on the research questions, including theinstitutional environment and Administration Governance, the threedimensions of Administration Governance and the AdministrationGovernance and firm performance. Secondly, this paper has defined theAdministration Governance, which combined with entrepreneurial theoryof comparative advantage and system theory based on the analysis of thelimitations of the traditional Administration Governance, Thirdly, webuild a unified analytical framework to analyze the transition of China’seconomic and administrative-type; ultimately, we divide the Strong Administration Governance into three models: the stage of administraivestructures(1999-2001), the stage of internal control(2002-2004), the stageof Economic Governance. Finally, we focus on the level of empiricalresearch, including the relationship between the type of institutionalenvironment and Administration Governance; and the relationshipbetween Administration Governance and firm performance.This paper is organized in accordance with the paradigm, which isfrom general to the specific and from theory to empirical research. Ingeneral, the main text is divided into seven parts. The second chapter isthe literature review section, which received the related literaturerespectively, from the general and specific research paths to summarizethe mains points and provide a theoretical base and research platform; thethird chapter is the connotation of the Administration Governanceincluding characteristics and measurement analysis to provide the basedfoundation of empirical work; Chapters V and VI is the theoretical analysis and empirical testing of the institutional environment,Administration Governance and firm performance; Chapter VII is theconclusion.In summary, this study constructed the index of StrongAdministration Governance and Low Administration Governance; thenwe measured theses difference for1999-2007stages of SOES and2003-2007stages of private firms. The main conclusions of this studyshows that the different institutional environment is "shaping" theChinese Administration Governance; furthermore, there is the differentenvironment-matching in each stages. Generally, AdministrationGovernance has the negative effect on market performance, but in aparticular historical period, the Strong Administration Governance ofSOEs has the weakly positive effect. Additionly, the Low AdministrationGovernance of private firms could protect firm property and balancelocal interventions. The party secretary holding posts in the board of directors can develops supersivision and balances effect to inhibit internalcontrol; however, this structure can produce the intervention effect in thearea of mature legal environment.Consequently, the conclusion of this study has strong effect onpolicy recommendations. First of all, we should hold the objective viewon Administration Governance in China; furthermore, we shouldstrengthen synergies to construct the institutional environment; finally,we should effectively prevent the intervention effect, which is producedby the party secretary holding posts in the board of directors.更多还原