节点文献

不可转让性与不可转让规则的经济理论

A Economic Theory of Inalienability and Inalienability Rule

【作者】 李启航

【导师】 陈国富;

【作者基本信息】 南开大学 , 政治经济学, 2012, 博士

【摘要】 经济学的核心在于对交易机制与市场的研究,这一核心地位已经近乎于一种信仰,令后续的研究者对现实中广泛存在不可转让的对象本能的视之为特例或者悖论。但回顾包括经济学在内的诸多社会科学的研究成果可以发现,对于特定对象不可转让的相关研究,一个轮廓正在逐渐形成。本文试图建立一个基于个人知识的经济学研究框架,对现有的研究进行框架内的整合与统一,并在此基础上,分析法经济学内不可转让规则的来源、效率与后果。这一研究为既有研究形成统一的研究思路和方法,另一方面,通过对于不可转让的研究,能够诱导出对于个人知识、市场与交易更为清晰的认识,并提供一个新的视角。本文大致可分为两个部分,理论层面上的分析主要用来构建“不可转让性—不可转让规则”的概念体系,另一部分是案例与实证研究,作为对前面理论的一种运用和验证。理论体系建立于“斯密—哈耶克—肖特”的研究链条之上,说明不可转让性是一种内在而非外部施加的属性,道德与分立的知识,两个相互关联的本源导致了不可转让性。道德要求“人”和社会准则的相关对象不可转让,而分立知识的不可获取(或者不可经济的获取)意味着价格体系无法反映对象的真正价值。个人知识的表现形式是复杂的,由于人的有限性,个人知识的分散和个人理性的不足时刻限制着市场机制的效率,而道德的要求令这种效率更加难以满足。不可转让性内在要求市场交易之外的其他治理机制或者制度体系对交易对象进行定价、转让或实现权利保护,不可转让规则正是这种思想的法律体现形式的一种。不可转让规则重点用来控制外部性和道德不允许的交易,这很大程度上体现了父爱主义的精神。案例与实证研究重点分析了三类有所差异而又相互关联的不可转让对象:基于不可分离个人知识的人力资本;基于分立知识与道德而不可定价的对象;作为默会知识的制度要素。对于人力资本,一般的解决方式是建立企业,用企业科层型长期契约来替代市场短期契约,这一替代的目标是最大化与人不可分离的个人知识在生产中的利用效率。对于不可定价对象,判断的标准是对象交易并不违反道德伦理,且市场能够实现对分立个人知识的充分集中,不可转让规则可以起到一个次优方案的作用。对于的制度要素,不可转让规则代表了其他市场的稳定与良好运行,本文以投票权为例进行了实证研究。

【Abstract】 The core of economics is researching on exchange mechanisms and the market,and it was so close to a belief that subsequent researchers naturally regard thenon-transferable object widely existed in real life as special cases or the paradox. Butreview of social scientific research achievement, including the results of economics,can be found that a research framework is formed gradually for the study of specificnon-transferable objects. This dissertation attempts to establish an economics researchframework based on personal knowledge, integrate and harmonize existing researchwithin the framework, and analyzes foundation, efficiency and consequences ofinalienability rules in economic analysis of law on this basis. This study forms unifiedresearch thought and methods of existing research, on the other hand, helps to form aclearer understanding of personal knowledge, markets and exchange mechanismsinduced by the study of inalienability and provides a new perspective.This dissertation can be divided into two parts. One part is theoretical analysis,and the other is case study and empirical research. Theoretical analysis is mainly usedto build " inalienability—inalienability rules" conceptual system. The other part is asan application and validation for the previous theory.Theoretical system is established on the study chain of "Smith—Hayek—Schotter" to explain that inalienability is an intrinsic property rather than a propertyexternally imposed. Morality and "divided knowledge", which are two interconnectedorigin, lead to inalienability. Morality requires related objects of "person" and socialnorms should not be transferred, but non-availability (or not economical accessibility)of "divided knowledge" means that price system can not reflect the true value ofobject. Manifestations of personal knowledge are complicated, due to the limitationof human beings, dispersion of personal knowledge and the lack of individualrationality always restrict the efficiency of the market mechanism, while moralrequirements make it more difficult to satisfy this efficiency. Inalienability internallyrequires other governance mechanisms or system in addition to market transactions inorder to price, transfer of the transaction object, or to realize the rights protection.Inalienability rules are precisely one kind legal form of the above thought. Inalienability rules focus on controlling externality and the transactions that are notallowed by morality, which is reflected the spirit of paternalism to a great extent.Case study and empirical research focus on the analysis of three different butinterrelated non-transferable objects: human capital based on inseparable personalknowledge, the object which can not be priced due to "divided knowledge" andmorality, and system elements used as a tacit knowledge. For human capital, thegeneral solution is to establish an enterprise and use hierarchical long-term contract toreplace the short-term market contract. The goal of this alternative way is tomaximize utilization efficiency in production of personal knowledge which can notbe separated from person. For the object which can not be priced, the yardstick is thatthe transaction does not violate ethics and the market can achieve full concentrationof the discrete personal knowledge, which means inalienability rules can play the roleof a sub-optimal solution. For the system elements, inalienability rules represent astable and good operation of the other markets. In this dissertation, the right to vote isused to make an empirical analysis on it.

  • 【网络出版投稿人】 南开大学
  • 【网络出版年期】2014年 07期
节点文献中: 

本文链接的文献网络图示:

本文的引文网络