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武器装备竞争性采购的产业组织研究

Research on Industrial Organization of Competitive Weapons Procurement

【作者】 乔玉婷

【导师】 曾立;

【作者基本信息】 国防科学技术大学 , 国防经济, 2012, 博士

【摘要】 武器装备竞争性采购对于提高装备建设的质量和效益具有重要作用。竞争性采购的顺利推进有赖于产业组织数量、规模、结构和能力的优化,需要产业组织的发展与之相适应。从事武器装备科研生产的产业组织随着国家经济体制和武器装备获取方式的变化而不断演进。本文从武器装备采购方式演变的维度将产业组织历史演进划分为三个阶段并对其进行述评。武器装备竞争性采购需要建立融入国家创新体系和国家工业基础的新型产业组织。竞争性采购通过降低承包商的机会主义行为和由于资产专用性可能获得的可占用性租金从而降低交易成本,并影响产业组织的形态、边界、组织创新和治理。与此对应,产业组织通过内部创新、组织治理和组织边界的合理控制降低其交易费用,提高组织效率,使其成为竞争性采购下组织选择的优先形式。本文以交易费用为切入点,遵循威廉姆森的“三分法”,从企业组织、中间性组织和市场组织研究武器装备竞争性采购的产业组织问题,构建本文分析框架。主要结论有:企业组织是面向武器装备竞争性采购的基本组织单元,具有典型的科层特性。竞争性采购对企业组织的影响路径主要包括对企业的竞争战略、企业边界、内部治理和投融资的影响。企业组织要通过持续的技术创新、组织革新与军民融合培育企业核心竞争力。竞争性采购对同质与异质企业的长期和短期边界、有形和无形边界具有不同影响。企业要根据自身核心竞争优势和特点选择恰当的企业边界,并以合适的方式融入企业网络组织。用“减法”思维对企业进行“瘦身”,形成“小实体、大网络”的格局。根据企业组织的资产专用性程度和企业所提供武器装备的重要程度实行不同的改制模式和股权结构。通过企业预算约束硬化、融资结构优化和投资理性化实现企业资本运行优化。将军民融合作为企业组织治理的重要方式。产业集群是一种介于科层企业组织和市场组织之间的中间性组织,是武器装备竞争性采购下的一种组织创新和政策工具。首先,本文运用主成分分析法以湖南省为例识别面向竞争性采购的装备制造业产业集群。结果表明湖南省在合成材料制造业集群、有色金属压延加工业集群、电子元器件制造业集群和其他通用设备制造业集群方面具有集群总体竞争优势,应延伸产业链,在武器装备的分包和配套层次为竞争性采购提供产业和技术支撑。其次,在定量识别装备制造业产业集群的基础上,本文构建GEMS模型,以湖南省军民两用特种材料集群为例,评价其产业集群的竞争力。结果表明该集群GEMS值为423.506分,具有较强竞争优势。但其本地和外部市场得分较低,存在一定的集群发展风险。最后,提出基于集群剩余的内部网络治理和基于价值链剩余的集群外部治理建议。军民融合是集群在竞争性采购下一种重要的治理方式,将产业集群的军民融合模式归纳为“依托型”、“互动型”和“嵌入型”。市场是一种交易性组织。理想的市场追求交易成本最小化,竞争性市场存在着降低交易费用耗散的趋势。有效竞争下“寡头主导,大中小共生”的市场组织是竞争性采购下市场组织的理想模式。交易费用是造成装备采购市场较高行政壁垒和结构壁垒的重要因素。潜在企业进入对军方有利。潜在企业进入的前提是其在装备市场获得的利润要能补偿进入的交易费用和对于专用资产投资引致的沉没成本。民用企业进入装备采购市场初期应主要以互补共生或合作竞争的形式,从而减少自身进入的交易成本。装备采购市场的垄断以及市场失灵需要政府管制。市场交易费用节约下武器装备竞争性采购的市场治理应通过改革军工集团的行政垄断、设计竞争保护“影子团队”、扶持和保护中小企业等方式培育竞争主体;弱化装备采购市场的市场壁垒和降低企业退出市场的沉没成本来构建装备采购的可竞争性市场。应明确政府定位,清晰管制边界;合并管制条文,提高管制绩效;丰富管制手段,防止管制“俘获”来规范政府管制行为。

【Abstract】 Competitive procurement of weapons is significant for improving the quality andeffectiveness of the weaponry. Whether the progress of competitive procurement ofweapons is smooth depends on optimization of the size, structure and capacity of thedefense industry organizations. Therefore, competitive procurement of weaponsrequires corresponding development of industrial organization.Industrial organizationwhich works on researching and producing weapons is evolving with the changes of thenational economic system and the form of weapon procurement. From the dimension ofcompetitive procurement, the history of defense industrial organization is divided intothree stages. Competitive procurement of weapons requires the system of R&D andproduces into the national innovation system and the defense industrial base into abroader national industrial base, and establishes a new defense industrial organizationbased on the national innovation system and industrial base.Competitive procurement reduces transaction costs by lowering the contractor’sopportunistic behavior and reducing occupy rent due to asset specificity, and affects theform of industrial organization, boundaries, organizational innovation and governance.Correspondingly, the industrial organization reduce their transaction costs thoughinternal innovation, organizational governance and the reasonable control oforganizational boundaries, so as to become a priority selected form of organizationunder the competitive procurement of weapons. Lower transaction costs of the industrialorganization means the enhancement of organizational efficiency. Therefore, followingWilliamson s "trichotomy" of industrial organization, the thesis builds the frameworkfrom business organizations, intermediate organizations and market organizations fromthe perspective of transaction costs. The main conclusions are:Firm organizations are the basic organizational unit of the competitive procurementof weapons, with a typical bureaucratic characteristic. The pathway of competitiveprocurement of weapons affecting on firm organizations concludes the impact onenterprise’s competitive strategy, corporate boundaries, the impact of corporategovernance and corporate investment and financing. Firm organizations need tocultivate the core competitiveness of enterprises through continuous technologicalinnovation, organizational innovation and civil-military integration. According to theircore competitive advantages and features, firm organizations choose the appropriatecorporate boundaries and suitable manner to corporate into network organization.According to the thought of "subtraction" to “downsize”, firm organizations entityboundaries shrinking and the virtual control of the border expanding, it forms thepattern of “small entities, complicate network”; through inter-firm network relationshipsfirm organizations lower transaction costs and are access to resources and knowledge within the network. According to the degree of asset specificity and importance, firmorganizations implement a different mode of restructuring and ownership structure.Though hardening of enterprise budget constraints, optimizing financial and investmentstructure, firm organizations optimize the capital operation. Civil military integration isan important way of corporate organizational governance.Industry cluster is an intermediate organization between hierarchical firmorganization and market organization, which is an organizational innovation and policyinstruments under competitive procurement of weapons. First, the thesis use method ofprincipal component analysis to identify the equipment manufacturing industry clusterin Hunan Province. The results show that Hunan Province has advantage on syntheticmaterials manufacturing cluster, non-ferrous metal rolling processing industry cluster,the electronic components manufacturing cluster and other general equipmentmanufacturing industry cluster. These industry clusters should extend the industrialchain and provide the industry and technical support for the competitive procurement ofweapons supporting level. Secondly, on the basis of the quantitative identification ofthe manufacturing industry cluster, the thesis builds GEMS model to evaluate thecompetitiveness of industry cluster and give an example on dual-use specialty materialscluster in Hunan Province. The results show that the value of cluster s GEMS is423.506points. Hunan Province has strong advantage on dual-use specialty materialscluster. Carbon-carbon composites, high-performance molybdenum and molybdenumalloy bar cluster have a competitive advantage in the nation. However, the clusters values of local market and external market are low, which exists certain risk on clusterdevelopment. Finally, the thesis put forwards internal network governance which isbased on surplus of cluster and external governance which is based on surplus of valuechain. Because of technical factors, asset versatility, transaction cost savings, externaleconomic, Civil military integration is an important form of governance undercompetitive procurement. There are the civil-military integration models of“relying”,”interacting”and “insering”.Market is a trading organization. The ideal market should pursue to minimizetransaction costs. Competitive markets exist the trend of reducing transaction costsdissipation.” The oligarch-led, medium and small symbiotic” model is the ideal modelof market organization under competitive procurement. The market of weaponsprocurement has high administrative barriers and structural barriers. Transaction costsare important factors to cause entry barriers. The entry of potential enterprises canincrease the supply of weapons and lower price of weapons. The premise of potentialenterprises to enter is the profit which is able to compensate for the transaction costsand sunk costs resulting from investment in dedicated assets. Therefore, Governmentshould reduce market barriers and transaction costs of entry. Civilian enterprises shouldbe complementary symbiosis or cooperation-competition forms of access so as to reduce the obstruction of the reign of monopoly enterprises, while reducing their owntransaction costs to enter. Monopoly and market failure of the market of weaponsprocurement need be regulated. Market governance of competitive procurement ofweapons under market transactions cost savings should cultivate competitive bodiesthrough the reforming of the military industrial organization, designing competition toprotect "shadow team" and supporting and protecting small and medium enterprises. Itshould establish contestable market through weakening market entry barriers andreducing sunk costs of withdrawing weapons market. Government position and controlborder should be clear. Government should merger control provisions to improve thecontrol performance and enrich control means to prevent control captured so as toregulate the behavior of government regulation.

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