【作者】 孙广林；

【导师】 王健；

【作者基本信息】 哈尔滨工业大学 ， 交通运输规划与管理， 2013， 博士

【摘要】 城市公共交通价格策略整合是提高交通资源配置效率的有效手段，利用公交价格联动策略的协同效应调控公交需求与供给之间的平衡，已成为公交运营实践和公交价格理论研究的热点问题。公交系统运营中，由于公交价格结构体系不合理或公交资源市场配置的“失灵”，导致公交需求分配与公交资源配置出现偏差，影响公交主体效用和公交服务的社会福利水平。本文从公交价格主体行为决策出发，利用公交价格联动策略调控公交需求与供给的平衡。针对我国城市公交系统中公交价格策略与公交主体行为、公交价格策略时间演化规律和公交价格策略效果评价存在的问题，本文从公交价格主体间递阶结构关系和公交价格传导机制出发，分析公交运营者间竞争与合作的价格博弈策略和策略收益，通过优化不同公交价格间比价关系，影响公交需求结构；结合公交运营主体、公交价格策略集合，确定价格联动策略和独立策略收益函数基础上，建立公交价格联动策略演化博弈模型，揭示公交价格联动策略演化路径和演化稳定策略。此外，围绕公交价格联动策略，采用系统动力学方法仿真公交价格联动策略对公交需求和供给变量的时间累积效果，选取机动车大气排放物指标衡量公交价格联动策略对城市大气环境的改善作用。以交通行为理论为基础，分析公交出行者方式选择行为、运营者之间的竞争与合作行为，以及公交管理者对运营者公交运营准入、服务水平、票价的市场管制行为，形成公交主体间的层次关系，表现为公交管理者位于上层约束公交运营者竞争与合作行为，并考虑和引导公交出行者主体行为；公交运营者与公交出行者之间为相互影响、相互制约的递阶层次关系。由此给出公交运营者价格策略集合和价格策略收益函数的定义。此外，进一步分析公交价格传导机制，揭示公交价格联动策略的生成机理，包括公交价格传导路径和传导方式。针对公交运营者与出行者之间领导者-追随者的博弈关系，采用双层规划理论，以公交系统运营社会福利最大化为目标，公交管理者对公交价格管制为约束条件作为上层规划模型；下层模型出行者效用最大为目标，公交企业服务能力、服务水平管制和公交系统需求均衡为约束条件，建立双层规划模型优化公交系统价格结构，明晰公交价格联动策略对公交系统社会福利和公交出行者行为决策的影响，以及对公交需求均衡分配调控的效果。采用遗传算法和模拟退火算法设计启发式算法求解公交价格联动体系优化模型，以广州市常规公交、BRT、地铁三种公交方式相平行的线路为例，验证模型的实用性，以及算法的准确性和计算效率。基于演化博弈理论，综合公交价格联动和独立策略集合，以及各策略收益模型，构建公交价格联动策略演化博弈模型，刻画采用价格联动策略与价格独立策略公交运营者群体双方相互学习的速度和方向，分析不同公交价格策略演化博弈结果中稳定点的存在性。以广州市常规公交和BRT运营者群体为例，应用公交价格联动策略演化博弈模型，分析不同公交运营者群体初始规模和需求条件下公交价格策略演化路径和演化稳定策略。采用系统动力学方法，以公交价格联动体系优化对公交系统供需静态均衡的影响结果为基础，围绕公交价格联动策略建立公交需求子系统和公交供给子系统间正、负反馈回路，利用广州市交通调查数据标定模型参数和校核模型的准确性，仿真公交价格联动策略对公交需求和公交供给影响的动态变化趋势和时间累积效果。通过公交供、需变量与小客车数量之间的函数关系，获得公交价格联动策略对机动车主要排放物减排的效果，衡量公交价格联动策略对城市大气环境改善的作用。本文针对城市公交价格策略，利用效用理论、博弈理论和系统科学的研究成果，以公交主体决策行为分析为基础，对公交价格联动体系进行了优化，通过建立公交价格联动策略演化博弈模型，描述采用不同价格策略公交运营者群体双方相互学习的速度和方向，应用系统动力学方法仿真与评价了公交价格联动策略对城市大气环境改善的作用。以上研究成果不仅能够完善公交价格策略优化和演化博弈理论研究的不足，同时对城市公交价格策略整合、公交资源的有效配置和实现公交优先发展具有重要的理论意义和实践价值。更多还原

【Abstract】 The integration of public transport price strategies is an effective way to improveallocative efficiency of traffic resource. It is transit operating and price theory researchfocuses that using transit price linkage strategy is to maintain equilibrium betweentransit demand and supply. In operating, the inrratonality of transit price structuresystem and market failure of transit resource allocation may lead to the incoordinationbetween transit demand and supply, or transit participator utility and social welfare. Thispaper aims to gain equilibrium between transit demand and supply by transit pricelinkage strategy in an angle of behaviors of transit participator.This paper models the game strategies and strategies’ payoff between partners oftransit system and optimizes the transit price linkage system to balance transit demandon modes with the problems in researches of transit paticipators’ behavior, strategyevolution game and strategy evaluation. Based on price strategy set and strategy payoff,evolution game model is advanced to identify the evolution process and results of pricestrategies. Furthemore, transit price stretegies are extended to transit system to developthe System Dynamic model for measuring the atmospheric environment improvementof transit price linkage strategies.Analysising the behavior of traveller, competing and coorperating between transitoperators, control policies in transit market is to present the hierarchical relationshipamong paticipators with traffic behavior theory. In other words, with the travellerbehaviors, the optimization of transit operating strategies can achieve the maximizationof operators under transit price control and service level control conditions. Moreover,transit price transmission machanism is defined to represent the generation mechanismof price linkage strategy, including transit price transmission routes and transmissionmodes.The bi-level programing theory is used to describe the leader-follower relationshipbetween operators and travellers. The upper level aims to for maximize the socialwelfare of transit operating with constrains on price control; constrains of lower levelare service capacity, service level and demand equilibrium with utility maximization oftraveller. The effect of price linkage strategy on social welfare, demand distribution andtraveller behavior is determined by bi-level model. Genetic Algorithm and SimulatingAnnealing algorithm are adopted to solve the optimization model. The experience studyof Guangzhou bus, BRT and metro, verifies the practical applicability of model andaccuracy and computational efficiency of algorithms.Evolution game model of transit price strategy is developed to present the learningspeed and direction between operators with differ price strategies and find the evolutionstability strategy in transit strategy set by evolution game theory. The volution game model is used on bus and BRT network of Guangzhou to discussing the evolutionprocess and results of price strategies under different demand conditons.Based on static equilibrium between transit demand and supply by the optimizationof transit price linkage system, system dynamic is used to simulate the vriation trendand accumulative effect of transit demand and supply after calibrating parameters andchecking model accuracy with traffic survey data of Guangzhou. The relationshipfunction, among transit demand, supply and car flow, obtains the emmission dropped ofvehicle major pollutions as results of price linkage strategy to evaluate the improvementof atmospherics evironment.This paper aims to optimize transit price structure system and identify the course ofevolution and evolutionary stability strategy of transit price strategies with the researchachievements of utility theory, game theory and system science. Furthermore, theimprovement of atmospheric environment is measured by system dynamic analysis oftransit price linkage strategy. The researches can not only make up for the deficiency ofthe transit price optimization theory, but also provide the theory and experience forintegrating transit price strategies, the allocating transit resource and developing transtpreferentially.更多还原