【作者】 艾林；

【导师】 曹国华；

【作者基本信息】 重庆大学 ， 技术经济及管理， 2013， 博士

【摘要】 盈余管理是公司管理层利用其职业判断和规划交易等多种手段，对公司盈利等项目内容进行的调节，以达到各种目的的机会主义行为。盈余管理行为虽然在短期内满足了公司管理层的需要，带来了短期的市场效应，但长期以来一方面其改变的结果使部分利益相关者的经济利益受到损失，另一方面损害了公司财务报告的中立性。与一般行业上市公司相比，商业银行同样存在盈余管理的动机和需要，而且由于商业银行在经营产品与资本结构方面存在特殊性，这就使得商业银行的盈余管理行为同样存在特殊性。而且，由于商业银行在金融行业中的重要地位，使得其盈余管理行为会导致包括引发金融危机等的更加恶劣的后果。因此，本文从商业银行治理理论及商业银行财务理论相融合的层面出发，以中国商业银行盈余管理行为为研究对象，在构建中国商业银行盈余管理计量方法及测度盈余管理程度的基础上，将中国商业银行盈余管理行为的经济后果，以及降低中国商业银行盈余管理行为的方法纳入统一的研究框架中，进而为客观评价及正确监管商业银行盈余管理行为提供政策建议。全文共分为七章。第一章，绪论。作为全文第一章，本章首先提出本文研究的主要背景及理论与现实意义；其次阐述了本文研究目的、主要研究内容及技术路线；再者对本文研究方法进行了界定；最后提出本文研究的主要创新之处。第二章，文献回顾与借鉴。作为研究的基础，本章对主要相关文献进行了回顾。考虑到商业银行具有一般行业公司共性，本章首先对一般行业上市公司盈余管理的相关文献进行回顾，主要包括对盈余管理的概念及动机等文献回顾以及盈余管理计量方法的文献回顾；其次主要针对商业银行盈余管理相关文献进行了回顾，主要包括对商业银行盈余管理计量方法的文献回顾及对商业银行盈余管理与商业银行特征的相关文献进行回顾，同时对一般性行业上市公司盈余管理行为与商业银行盈余管理行为的异同进行分析。第三章，中国商业银行盈余管理程度测度。本章研究发现：首先，本章利用异常贷款损失拨备计量以及避免盈余损失计量中的三种计量商业银行盈余管理的方法测度了中国商业银行盈余管理程度并进行统计分析，认为中国商业银行存在一定程度上的盈余管理行为，具体而言，各年度中国商业银行盈余管理分布较稳定，并没有出现较大幅度波动，而且各性质商业银行均具有一定程度的盈余管理行为；其次，本章基于行为金融视角，利用前景理论对中国商业银行盈余管理行为进行了研究，发现前景理论可以解释中国上市商业银行盈余管理行为，具体而言，在盈余水平低于阈值的商业银行盈余管理行为表现为风险喜欢状态，而在高于阈值的商业银行盈余管理行为表现为风险规避状态，而且盈余阈值参照点以上的商业银行的收益与风险间的关系更平缓，而在参照点以下的商业银行的收益与风险间的关系更陡峭；再者，本章对中国商业银行季度盈余管理行为进行了测度，并检验了季度盈余管理行为是否具有信息含量，发现中国商业银行同样存在一定程度上的季度盈余管理行为，从时间分布来看，盈余管理行为广泛的分布在不同年度的不同季度中，而从季度盈余管理的性质分布来看，不同性质的商业银行均存在一定程度的季度盈余管理行为，而且ANOVA方差分析和Kruskal-Wallis H的检验结果表明商业银行不同季度的盈余管理均值具有显著差异，进一步研究发现，中国商业银行盈余管理的信息含量也具有季度差异性，其中三季度和四季度的盈余管理行为可以解释股价变动，表明中国商业银行更加会利用三季度财务报告和年度财务报告进行盈余管理。第四章：中国商业银行盈余管理行为的经济后果。本章研究发现：首先，本章实证检验了商业银行盈余管理程度对经营绩效的影响，发现商业银行盈余管理程度与经营绩效间存在显著地负相关关系，即商业银行盈余管理程度越高，其经营绩效程度会越差，可见中国商业银行的盈余管理行为损害了经营绩效的提升；其次，本章实证检验了商业银行盈余管理程度对现金股利政策的影响，发现商业银行盈余管理程度与现金股利间同样存在显著地负相关关系，即商业银行盈余管理程度越高，其现金股利分配倾向与现金股利分配力度就越低，也就是说商业银行盈余管理程度越高，那么就越不倾向分配现金股利，而且分配的每股现金股利程度也越低，可见中国商业银行盈余管理行为也损害了其分配现金股利的行为。第五章，如何降低中国商业银行的盈余管理行为。本章研究发现：首先，本章实证检验了中国商业银行社会责任与盈余管理的关系，研究发现，商业银行社会责任与盈余管理间存在显著地负相关关系，即履行社会责任越好的中国商业银行，其盈余管理程度越低，此结论验证了本文的“道德标准说”，认为商业银行会从道德标准出发，或以道德标准约束自身行为，更加重视履行社会责任的道德观；其次，本章实证检验了审计行为与商业银行盈余管理的关系，研究发现，审计行为与商业银行盈余管理间存在显著地负相关关系，具体而言，若商业银行给予会计师事务所审计费用额度越高，选择的会计师事务所为国际四大会计师事务所以及选择了新任会计师事务所时，商业银行盈余管理程度就越低，反之商业银行盈余管理程度越高，可见审计行为在一定程度上降低了商业银行盈余管理行为，会计师事务所能够为证券市场普通投资者把关，降低商业银行盈余管理行为。第六章，政策建议。本章根据前文的经验证据，提出了相应的政策建议。针对前文经验证据的结果，本章认为一方面应加强商业银行社会责任观念，并提升商业银行社会责任水平，另一方面应强化外部审计职责，提升中国审计市场的竞争力；同时，本章认为还应从内外部加强对商业银行的监管，从内部应完善商业银行治理体系，发挥内部监管效应，而从外部应明晰外部监管部门职责，制定相关政策进行约束。第七章，研究结论与研究展望。本章总结以上各章节研究结论，并提出本文研究存在的局限性，以及提出进一步后续研究的相应设想。与以往研究相比，本文研究的创新之处体现在以下几方面：从研究对象来看，已有对于盈余管理进行研究的文献，基本上都是对一般行业上市公司盈余管理行为的研究，但是鲜有文献对商业银行盈余管理行为进行系统梳理研究的，尤其是鲜有文献的相关研究内容会在这一系统框架下较为深入的展开。因此，本文以中国商业银行为研究对象，系统的对中国商业银行的盈余管理行为进行研究，一方面可以丰富盈余管理的相关研究，另一方面也可以客观的评价中国商业银行的盈余管理行为。从研究方法来看，已有的测度中国商业银行盈余管理程度的方法，一种是利用测度一般上市公司盈余管理程度的Jones模型或Jones修正模型，另一种则是利用商业银行坏账比例的单一指标方法，然而这两种方法并不能综合反应商业银行经营特性与盈余管理特性。而虽然近年来已有文献已经利用商业银行异常贷款损失拨备计量的方法开始计算商业银行盈余管理程度，但这种方法的适用度依然较小。因此，本文参考并改进已有文献，在考虑商业银行盈余管理的操弄对象与操弄特性的基础上，利用异常贷款损失拨备计量与避免盈余损失计量的三种方法作为测度商业银行盈余管理的计量方法。尤其是本文系统的利用避免盈余损失计量的两种方法系统的对中国商业银行的盈余管理程度进行了测算。从研究内容来看，已有对于中国商业银行盈余管理行为进行研究的文献，大都是对于商业银行盈余管理行为的某一个方面进行研究。而本文一方面系统的测度了当前中国商业银行的盈余管理现状，并对商业银行实施盈余管理的行为进行了行为金融学的解释，另一方面验证了中国商业银行盈余管理的经济后果与降低商业银行盈余管理的方法。从研究内容得到的结论来看，本文一方面发现盈余管理行为是会损害商业银行以及中小股东利益的，会降低商业银行的经营绩效，而且导致中小股东无法获得现金股利的收益，另一方面发现商业银行的盈余管理行为是可以被降低的，可以通过内部的提高商业银行社会责任和通过外部的严格审计行为的方式，降低商业银行的盈余管理程度。更多还原

【Abstract】 Earnings management is a kind of opportunistic behavior that managers use methodslike professional judgment and planning transactions to alter some items like earnings to achievevarious purposes. Though earnings management satisfies the needs of company management in theshort term, in the long run, it will, on the one hand, make part of stakeholders suffer profit loss andon the other hand, hurt the neutrality of corporate financial reporting. Compared with other listedcompanies of ordinary industries, commercial banks also have their needs and motivations forearnings management and it is the particularity of product management and capital structure thatbrings the earnings management in commercial banks particularity as well. Moreover, becausecommercial banks enjoy important status in financial industry, their behavior of earningsmanagement will result in serious economic consequences such as financial crisis.Thus, this thesis first combines commercial bank governance theories and financialtheories, and takes earnings management of commercial banks as the object of study;then based on the construction of measuring methods and measuring levels of earningsmanagement, this thesis presents a research framework that includes the economicconsequences of earnings management and the approaches to restrain earningsmanagement, which will provide objective evaluation and policy suggestions onappropriate supervision on earnings management. This thesis is divided into sevenchapters.Chapter one: Introduction. In the first chapter, the main background, theories andpractical significance of this study are introduced; then the research objectives, maincontents and technical line of this study are explained. Also, in this chapter, this thesisdefines the research methods and finally presents the major innovations of this study.Chapter two: Literature Review. As the basis of study, in this chapter, the literaturereview is conducted. Considering that commercial banks have common characters ofordinary industries, in this chapter, the thesis reviews some relevant literatures aboutearnings management in listed companies of ordinary industries, including reviewingthe literatures about the concept, motivation and measuring methods of earningsmanagement; then the thesis reviews literatures about the earnings management ofcommercial banks, including literatures about measuring methods and characteristics ofearnings management in commercial banks. Meanwhile, the thesis analyzes thesimilarities and differences of earnings management between listed companies of ordinary industries and commercial banks.Chapter three: Measurement of Level of Earnings Management of CommercialBanks in China. The research findings in this chapter are as follows: first, this thesisuses three measuring methods to measure the provision of abnormal loan losses andavoidance of earnings to measure the level of earnings management of commercialbanks in China; meanwhile, it conducts statistic analysis which tells that there isearnings management at a certain level of commercial banks in China; to be specific,the distribution of annual earnings management of commercial banks in China appearsstable without obvious fluctuation and commercial banks of all kinds have managedearnings to some extent. Second, proceeding from the perspective of behavioral finance,the thesis adopts the Prospect Theory to conduct study on earnings management ofcommercial banks in China and finds out that earnings management can be explained byProspect Theory; to be specific, when the level of earnings is below the threshold, theearnings management of commercial banks in China appears to be in a phase of risktaking while the opposite case appears to be in a phase of risk avoidance. The relationbetween earnings and risks of a commercial bank of which earnings is above thethreshold is more stable while that of the opposite case is much cliffy. Meanwhile, thethesis measures the quarterly earnings management of commercial banks in China andexamines if there is any information content in it, which tells that there is quarterlyearnings management at a certain level of commercial banks in China. In terms ofdistribution of time, earnings management extensively appears in different quarters ofdifferent years; and in terms of distribution of qualities of quarterly earningsmanagement, commercial banks of all kinds have earnings management at a certainlevel. Moreover, the testing results obtained from variance analysis of ANOVA andKruskal-Wallis H prove that the mean values of earnings management of commercialbanks in different quarters are of significant differences; and the further study revealsthat the information contents of earnings management of commercial banks in Chinaalso have quarterly otherness, and earnings management of the third and fourth quarterscan explain the stock price change, which indicates that commercial banks in China arelikely to utilize the financial report of the third quarter and the annual one to manageearnings.Chapter four: The Economic Consequences of Earnings Management ofCommercial Banks in China. The research findings in this chapter are as follows: first,through empirical test, the thesis verifies a negative correlation between the level of earnings management and business performance; in other words, the higher the level ofearnings management is, the worse the business performance will be, thus, the earningsmanagement impedes the promotion of business performance. Second, throughempirical test, the thesis verifies that the level of earnings management has influence oncash dividend policy, which reveals a negative correlation between the level of earningsmanagement and cash dividend; to be specific, the higher the level of earningsmanagement is, the lower tendency and lower amount of cash dividend distribution willbe, which means that if the level of earnings management of a commercial bank is high,then this bank is more likely not to distribute cash dividend and the degree ofdistribution of cash dividend per share is low. Thus, the earnings management ofcommercial banks in China also impedes cash dividend distribution.Chapter five: How to Restrain Earnings Management of Commercial Banks inChina. The research findings in this chapter are as follows: first, through empirical test,the thesis verifies that there is an obvious negative correlation between earningsmanagement and social responsibility of commercial banks; in other words, the betterperformance in social responsibility is, the lower the level of earnings management willbe, which proves the “Moral Standard Theory” presented by this thesis and indicatesthat commercial banks will place more emphasis on moral outlook of performing socialresponsibility by taking moral standard as premise or restraining their behaviors withmoral standard. Second, the thesis verifies that there is an obvious negative correlationbetween audit and earnings management; to be specific, the higher the audit expenselimit of accounting firms is, say, the top four international accounting firms ornewly-appointed accounting firms, the lower the level of earnings management will beand vice versa. Thus, to some extent, audit restrains earnings management ofcommercial banks, for those accounting firms are able to guide ordinary investors instock market and reduce earnings management of commercial banks.Chapter six: Policy Suggestions. Based on the previous studies, in this chapter, thethesis provides relevant policy suggestions which, on the one hand, indicate that theawareness of performing social responsibility should be strengthened and performancein social responsibility should be enhanced; on the other hand, the external audit dutyshould be strengthened to increase competitiveness of Chinese audit market. Meanwhile,the thesis suggests that supervision on commercial banks should be strengthened in bothexternal and internal aspects; internally, the governance system of commercial banksshould be completed to exercise internal supervision effect while externally, the duty of external supervision bodies should be clarified to draw up relevant policy for restraint.Chapter seven: Research Conclusions and Prospects. In this chapter, the previousresearch conclusions are summarized, and the limits of this thesis and design offollow-up study are presented.Compared with previous studies, the innovations of this thesis are as follows:In terms of the targets of study, those literatures that studied earnings managementare mostly taking the earnings management of listed companies as the target withoutpaying any effort to studying or systematically combing earnings management ofcommercial banks, and the research contents also fail to be explained deeply under suchframework. Therefore, taking Chinese commercial banks as the targets of study, thisthesis systematically studies the earnings management of commercial banks, which, onthe one hand, enriches the relevant study on earnings management, and on the otherhand, objectively evaluates the earnings management of commercial banks in China.In terms of research methods, there are two methods of measuring the level ofearnings management of commercial banks in China. One is Jones Model or JonesModified Model that are used to measure earnings management of ordinary listed banks;the other is to utilize the single index of dead account ratio of commercial banks. Bothmethods, however, fail to comprehensively reflect the business characters andcharacters of earnings management of commercial banks. Though, in recent years, someliteratures have adopted the measuring method of provision of abnormal loan loss tomeasure the level of earnings management in commercial banks, the feasibility of thismethod is relatively small. Thus, this thesis refers to and improves the previousliteratures, and based on the consideration of objects and characters of manipulation ofearnings management of commercial banks, this thesis uses three methods of measuringprovision of abnormal loan loss and avoidance of earnings losses to measure the level ofearnings management of commercial banks. Particularly, this thesis uses two methodsthat are used to measure avoidance of earnings losses to systematically measure thelevel of earnings management of commercial banks in China for the first time.In terms of research contents, the previous literatures that studied earningsmanagement of commercial banks in China are mostly centering on one certain aspectof earnings management of commercial banks in China. On the one hand, this thesissystematically measures the current state of earnings management of commercial banksin China and explains that behavior with behavioral finance; on the other hand, thisthesis verifies the economic consequences of earnings management and the methods used to restrain earnings management. In terms of the conclusions derived fromresearch contents, on the one hand, this thesis finds out that earnings management willharm the interest of minority shareholders and commercial banks, and the operatingperformance will be debased, which will result in that minority shareholders can’t getprofit from cash dividend; on the other hand, this thesis proves that earningsmanagement in commercial banks can be restrained by internally strengthening theperformance of social responsibility of commercial banks and external strict audit.更多还原