【作者】 孙章杰；

【导师】 傅强；

【作者基本信息】 重庆大学 ， 技术经济及管理， 2013， 博士

【摘要】 自2000年以来，在中国经济高速发展、“双顺差”的背景下，人民币汇率问题引发了热烈的争论。中国经济有显著的二元结构特征，且央行的干预行为明显，但是目前人民币汇率的研究涉及二元结构和央行的政策抉择的工作较少。本文主要研究了二元结构和央行最优目标下的政策选择对人民币汇率的影响，其基本逻辑结构：（1）由于二元结构的存在，人民币汇率的走势不同于传统的理论预测，即所谓“人民币汇率之谜”，二元结构对人民币汇率的走势应该产生很大的影响；（2）央行由于二元结构引起的市场失灵而干预市场，解决市场失灵问题，寻求最优的发展路径，央行的干预行也为会影响汇率的走势；（3）央行最优目标的政策抉择，可分为内部市场的最优干预和外部市场的最优干预。内部市场的最优干预是指央行在经济增长和通货膨胀之间的最优抉择，外部市场的最优干预指央行干预外汇市场，即央行在汇率波动和外汇储备之间的最优抉择。本文的研究主要内容及特点：①应用非线性模型研究了二元结构对人民币汇率的影响。目前的文献将二元结构和B-S效应分别进行研究，无法从二元结构的角度，解释B-S效应是否存在内在机制。现有研究虽然发现结构转型削弱了B-S效应，但是没有指明B-S效应和二元结构内在的、定量关系。由于二元结构的存在，在一国经济追赶的过程中，劳动供给弹性大，导致劳动生产率、工资率和一国价格水平之间的传导效率不高，出现实际汇率长期保持稳定、甚至贬值的现象。本文将二元结构和B-S效应纳入到一个统一的框架下，采用Hansen的非动态面板门限模型，研究了处于不同二元结构门限值下的B-S效应，揭示了B-S效应随二元结构变化而变化机制。研究结果有助于解释“人民币汇率之谜”和近年来“用工荒”与人民币汇率升值的内在关系。研究发现B-S效应存在基于二元结构“双门限效应”，中国2001年二元结构跨过了第一门限值，其后逐渐接近第二门限值。2001年之前B-S效应不显著，也即B-S效应不存在，然而这期间贸易条件恶化、开放度的上升和货币供给的增加，推动人民币实际汇率贬值，就出现所谓的“人民币实际汇率之谜”。2005年以来，贸易条件、开放度和政府支出较为稳定，货币的供给量相对增长。人民币实际汇率的趋势升值，表明随着二元结构的改善，劳动生产率的传导效率提高，特别是“用工荒”导致工资上涨，是人民币汇率升值的内在原因之一。②通过拓展的Ronald Shone动态开放宏观经济模型，研究央行内部干预行为对人民币汇率的影响。中国社会二元结构的现状、隐性失业和双顺差的特点，不符合现有理论关于均衡汇率的假设，现有文献在央行最优目标下的汇率研究，只是对人民币升值路径的推演，不涉及央行最优目标下人民币均衡汇率的研究，更没有涉及到均衡汇率区间和央行最优政策选择对人民币均衡汇率边界影响的分析。本文假设中国央行的内部市场干预，是在一定的通货膨胀目标下追求最大经济增长，同时要求内、外市场均衡，表现在均衡汇率方面，即在经济增长和通胀的最优决策函数下，追求内外同时均衡的汇率。通过建立动态开放宏观经济模型，利用动态规划和贝尔曼方程推导出了人民币汇率表达式，在一定的资本管制系数下，研究了央行最优目标下的政策选择对人民币汇率的影响，并测算了人民币均衡汇率区间，研究工作的优点在于不仅要求内外同时达到均衡，而且要求央行的成本最小或者效用最大。研究发现：央行的政策选择影响了人民币均衡汇率边界，资本项目的开放步伐是适宜的；超前的资本开放或僵硬的资本管制，都会造成人民币均衡汇率的较大失衡；资本项目进一步调整，已具备的较适宜的宏观经济环境；1994以来央行的相机抉择政策，就人民币均衡汇率来看是行之有效的，没有造成人民币均衡汇率失衡。③应用区间二次偏好损失函数，研究央行外部市场的最优干预对人民币汇率的影响。本文假设外部市场的最优干预指央行在汇率波动和外汇储备之间的最优抉择。央行连续的线性干预会带来很大的政策成本和政治成本，所以理论上央行应该存在非连续、非线性的干预，也即存在非对称干预区间。目前的文献中使用的标准的二次损失函数，只能刻画央行对外汇市场的连续线性干预行为，无法描述央行的非线性和区间偏好。为此，本文应用区间二次偏好损失函数，通过泰勒级数展开式建立人民币汇率波动门限模型，利用GMM方法，计量央行在人民币汇率管理中的波动门限，分析了我国央行干预外汇市场的机制和方式，解释了我国央行干预外汇市场的行为偏好和人民币汇率目标区间，研究了央行干预偏好、汇率波动和外汇储备之间的相互关系，分析了央行的区间干预对人民币汇率的影响。结论显示：央行存在非对称干预行为，且使人民币汇率在一个较小的、非对称的区间内波动，且央行存在一定程度“害怕升值”趋向；2005年7月以来，央行的非对称干预减弱，人民币汇率波区间对称性增强；央行的非对称干预，一定程度造成了外汇储备的激增。更多还原

【Abstract】 With the rapid and stable development of the Chinese economy, the issue of theRMB exchange rate is becoming one of the hot spots of international economics.Especially since2000, under the context of China’s rapid economic development andthe "double surplus", there is a heated debate of the RMB exchange rate. There is thedistinctive feature of the Chinese economy that is the dual structure and central bankintervention. However there are a few studies which involve the impact of the dualstructure, the central bank intervention and central bank policy choices on the RMBexchange rate. With the improvement of the dual structure, the structure of economicvariables has also undergone a change.Based on this, this paper works on the effect of the dual structure and the centralbank’s discretion of the optimal goal on the RMB Exchange Rate. Its basic logicstructure is as follows:(1) because of the dual structure, the trend of the RMB exchangerate is not in line with traditional theoretical predictions, that is "The puzzle of theRMB exchange rate ". There is the impact of the dual structure on the RMB exchangerate.(2) In order to gain the maximum benefit, it is necessary for the central bank tosolve the market failure by the discretion, which is there is discretion of the centralbank’s optimal target.(3) The discretion of the central bank’s optimal target is dividedinto the optimal decision of the internal market and the optimal decision of the externalmarket. The optimal decision of the internal market is the central bank’s optimal choicebetween the economic growth and the inflation,The optimal choice of the external market refers to the central bank intervention inthe foreign exchange market which the central bank makes a decision between thefluctuation of the exchange rate and the foreign exchange reserves.(4)With theimprovement of the dual structure, the economic variables will change. So the impact ofthe economic variables will change.The main research results are as follows:①this paper employs the non-linear model to investigate the impact of the dualstructure about the RMB exchange rate.Until now, there is a few study of the B-S effect which involves the dual structure.In the process of a country’s economy to catch up, there is a Great uncertainty of theB-S effect because of the changes in labor supply. The wage rates do not increase with the improvement of the labor productivity because of the existence of the dual structurein the developing economies. There is no appreciation pressure of the real exchange rateif the growth of wage rate is not synchronized with it of the labor productivity. Theprice index of a country will sharply rise when the growth of the wage rate issynchronized with it of the labor productivity. There is an uncertainty about the overallprice level when the growth rate of the wage rate is less than it of the labor productivity.However the overall price level will decline if the money wages remain unchanged.Therefore, the real exchange rate is constant and even the devaluation may occur.In order to reflect the BS effect change mechanism with the changes in theeconomic variables，effectively capture changes in the structure of the economicvariables of the BS effect and explain "The puzzle of the RMB exchange rate ", thispaper employs the non-dynamic panel threshold model of Hansen to analyze theconduction efficiency of the labor productivity on the wage rate in the dual structure andstudy the threshold effect of B-S.With the dual structure change, this article reveals the internal mechanism of theB-S effect change and the BS effect exist inherent reason from the perspective of thedual structure which explains “The puzzle of the RMB exchange rate” by Lu Feng. Thisarticle also reveals the intrinsic relationship between the appreciation of the RMBexchange rate and the recent "Labor shortage" and investigates the impact of the dualstructure on the RMB exchange rate.②By expanding the model of Ronald Shone, we explores the optimal objectivefunction of the central bank to studies how the discretion of the central bank’s optimaltarget effecting the RMB exchange rate.There is the market failure because of the dual structure. To this end, it is necessaryto solve market failure by taking a discretionary policy. It is inevitable that thediscretionary policy operations affect the exchange rate.By expanding the model of Ronald Shone, we explore the optimal objectivefunction of the central bank. We derive the equation of the RMB equilibrium exchangerate by employing a dynamic programming and Bellman equations. We investigate theimpact of the discretionary policy operations under the central bank optimal target andestimate the zone of the RMB equilibrium exchange rate.There is the market failure because of the dual structure. To this end, it is necessaryto solve market failure by taking a discretionary policy. It is inevitable that thediscretionary policy operations affect the exchange rate by the central bank.By expanding the model of Ronald Shone, this paper explores the optimal objectivefunction of the central bank. We derive the equation of the RMB equilibrium exchangerate by employing a dynamic programming and Bellman equations. We investigate theimpact of the discretionary policy operations under the central bank optimal target andestimate the zone of the RMB equilibrium exchange③we use of the asymmetric loss function to study the central bank’s optimaldecision of the external market effecting the RMB exchange rate.There are a lot of policy costs and political costs because of the central bank oflinear intervention. Therefore, there is an asymmetric zone of intervention which thecentral bank discontinuously nonlinearly intervene the foreign exchange market.However the standard quadratic loss function can only characterize the linear target ofthe central bank which can not describe the nonlinear and zone preferences of thecentral bank in the foreign exchange market.This is the first use of the asymmetric loss function to study the mechanisms andmethods the central bank’s intervention and investigate the behavioral preferences ofcentral bank’s intervention in the foreign exchange market and the RMB exchange ratetarget zone. We analyze the relationship among the central bank interventionpreferences, fluctuations in exchange rates and foreign exchange reserves and theimpact of the central bank’s asymmetric intervention.更多还原