【作者】 陈静；

【导师】 李敏强；

【作者基本信息】 天津大学 ， 系统工程， 2012， 博士

【摘要】 本文主要围绕我国优秀运动员流动的机制优化问题展开研究，首先针对我国优秀运动员流动的形式和流动的制度进行了分析，然后对我国优秀运动员流动制度与机制的激励相容进行了分析并确立了运动员流动机制优化的目标，继而基于委托-代理理论构建了博弈模型对运动员的薪酬契约定价进行了分析，并通过动态博弈模型分析了运动员流动过程中流动各方的行为偏好，运用混合策略博弈模型分析了影响运动员流动的因素，利用合作博弈模型研究运动员流动过程中流动各方利益分配的问题，最后提出了机制优化设计建议。具体地来说，论文的主要研究内容及创新点如下：（1）采用机制设计理论的思想与方法研究运动员流动问题。在比较分析中外运动员流动制度、构建运动员流动所应达到目标的基础上，对我国优秀运动员流动制度与机制的激励相容进行了分析，并从制度设计者的角度，通过博弈分析提出了机制优化建议。为在市场与行政双重调控机制并存的背景下促进我国竞技体育运动员流动、激励各方行为达到国家利益目标提供了理论依据与实践指导。（2）以委托代理理论解释了体育局、体育俱乐部等运动员组织与运动员的关系本质，建立了应用于运动员薪酬契约定价的运动员组织与运动员之间的委托代理模型。分析了对称信息和非对称信息情况下，地方体育局或俱乐部与运动员的最优薪酬契约，讨论了运动员在两种情况下的的努力程度、产出、收益以及净损失，在保障运动员净损失最小的条件下，确定了合理的分配比例区间，为地方体育局或俱乐部制定运动员契约定价提供了决策参考，为发挥运动员契约定价在运动员流动中的激励、制约调节机制提出了理论依据与操作方法。（3）以博弈论为工具建立了以优秀运动员、运动员现所属组织和流动目的组织为博弈主体的动态博弈、混合策略博弈和合作博弈模型。在分析我国优秀运动员流动中国家体育总局、运动员组织、运动员等流动各相关方利益目标及行为偏好的基础上，将政府体育主管部门从博弈主体中分离，还原其机制设计和制度维护者的角色定位，并基于三方主体的收益对他们的策略选择进行了分析，依据纳什均衡解找出注册优先权是影响流动三方主体进行策略选择即影响我国优秀运动员实现流动的主要因素，提出综合考虑风险不对称和成本投入不对称的利益分配模型，并进行了数值模拟分析。为提出促进运动员流动的机制优化设计建议提供了依据。更多还原

【Abstract】 This thesis is about the study of System Optimization of Excellent Chinese Athletes Flow (abbreviated as SOECAF). Firstly, with an analysis of the form and system of excellent Chinese athletes flow, the goal about SOECAF is set based on the incentive compatibility of the regime and system of athletes flow. Secondly, a game model and payment contract pricing are constructed on the theory of Principal-agent.Finally, some suggestions of System Optimization are given through the analysis of the factors that influence the athletes flow based on the Mixed Strategy Game, and the distribution of interests of all participants. The main ideas of this thesis are as follows:A. It is a study of athletes flow but with the method of Smart Market. The incentive compatibility of the regime and system of athletes flow is analyzed through a comparison between the system and the goals of construction of athletes flow home and abroad. Besides, some suggestions of System Optimization are given based on the Game Theory from the standpoint of the system designer, which is theoretically and practically significant in stimulating competitions of Chinese athletes flow and encouraging all participants involved in the game to the national interests.B. Principal-agent Model applied in payment contracts pricing between athletes organization and athletes is constructed with an illustration of the relationship among sports administration, sports clubs and athletes with the theory of Principal-age. The optimal compensation contracts between the local sports administration/clubs and athletes are analyzed against the background of symmetric-asymmetrical information. A further discussion of how athletes work, the output investment ratio, profits, and net loss in both situations is made. Moreover, to reduce the net loss to a minimum, the reasonable allocation proportion is worked out. All these discussed above will be both a decision-making reference for the local athlete administration/clubs in setting athlete contract pricing and a theoretical and practical guidance in how to encourage athletes in the flow and to restrict regulation mechanism.C. Dynamic Game, Mixed Strategy Game, and Cooperative Game are set with excellent athletes, the organizations they are now in and will flow to as the principal parts on the Game Theory. Through the analysis of profit allocation concerning about the General Administration of Sport of China, athlete organization, and athletes, it is strongly suggested that the General Administration of Sport of China be separated from the subjects of the games and its role as a system designer and protector be regained. According to Nash Equilibrium, it is revealed that Registered Priority is the main factor that influences the athletes flow. Numerical simulation analysis is made on a comprehensive consideration of risk and cost investment asymmetry, thus to provide a guidance in how to reach SOECAF.更多还原