【作者】 周双红；

【导师】 岳意定；

【作者基本信息】 中南大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2011， 博士

【摘要】 作为一个农业大国,“三农”问题是我国目前乃至今后较长一段时期内亟待解决的重大问题。而农村经济和农村社会事业的发展,离不开农村金融的推动和支持。提升农村金融发展水平,发挥金融的核心作用,已成为一个重要的课题。基于农村金融的因果特性、多重反馈特性、非线性特性和系统惯性特性等系统特性,本文从系统科学的视角对农村金融系统进行研究,在此基础上,探讨导致农村金融、农村经济和农村社会相互作用的机理和改进对策。首先,针对本文的研究对象,根据系统模型的设定原则和农村金融主要影响因素,将农村金融系统划分为农村金融发展子系统、农村经济子系统和农村社会事业子系统等三个子系统。并且根据农村金融系统各因素的计量关系和系统动力学原理,构建农村金融系统动力学模型。模型拟合检验结果表明,本文构建的系统动力学模型所有误差都在允许范围内,模型精度较高,达到了实证分析的要求。其次,收集相关数据,对农村金融系统动力学模型进行实证分析和政策模拟仿真。三个子系统实证分析结果表明：1、农村金融发展水平在2010年之前处于上升阶段,2010年之后趋于下降,导致其下降主要原因是农村金融总量相对农村GDP增长速度较为缓慢。即农村金融发展没有和农村经济增长形成良性互相促进发展,农村经济增长并没有带来农村金融的同步发展。2、农业GDP和农业GDP增长率呈上升态势,而乡镇企业增加值的疲软影响了农村经济的进一步发展。3、我国农村社会事业发展水平处于良好的上升势头,这与农村经济和农村金融发展趋势一致。说明了随着我国农村经济和农村金融的不断发展,对农村社会事业具有显著的促进作用。通过对农村金融系统的整体分析,可以发现,我国农村各个子系统发展主要受农村金融水平的制约。其主要表现是农村金融发展水平没有随着经济总量的增长而得到相应的提升,而农村金融发展水平的下降反过来又进一步制约了农村经济发展和社会事业发展。然后,从农村金融系统相关利益方的微观策略入手,分析各利益相关方的博弈均衡,为提升我国农村金融发展水平提供逻辑依据。博弈均衡表明：在完全假设条件下,农户会选择不还款而得到更高收益,使得博弈无法达到共赢均衡；在具有制约条件下,采用法律制约会增加农村金融机构的法律诉讼成本,采用担保约束时,会增加农户的贷款成本,也无法实现双赢的博弈均衡；在信用制约条件下,政府构建信用体系一方面可以保证农户按期还款而又不增加农村金融机构的负担,另一方面也减轻了农户的贷款成本,只要在农户贷款后进行扩大生产收益大于贷款利息的情况下,就可以实现三方共赢的博弈均衡；在不完美信息下,政府、农村金融机构和农户三方博弈存在两个共赢的完美贝叶斯均衡。在农户按期归还贷款的概率超过0.5时,即使不存在信用体系的约束,也能实现三方共赢博弈均衡。当政府选择构建信用体系时,能否实现共赢的博弈均衡取决于信用体系的惩罚力度,即对违约农户惩罚的概率和惩罚的力度。只有当信用体系对违约农户的惩罚力度大于农户拒绝还贷的收益,才能实现共赢均衡。最后,根据实证分析和博弈分析结果,提出以下五点对策建议提升我国农村金融水平：1、深化农村金融发展子系统的作用；2、促进农村金融系统相关方的利益平衡；3、引导和规范农村非正规金融机构的发展,多元化发展农村金融体系；4、鼓励农村金融产品创新,保障农村经济发展所需的金融服务；5、完善农村金融法律制度,构建有力的信用体系。更多还原

【Abstract】 As a large agricultural country, the "three rural" issue remains a major problem to be solved at the present even in the future for a long period of time. However the rural economy and rural social undertakings cannot be separated from the promotion and support of the rural finance. Enhancing the level of financial development in rural areas and enabling finance to play its central role have become an important issue. Based on the causal features of rural finance, multi-feedback characteristics, nonlinearity, and system features such as inertial system characteristics, this article researches on rural financial system viewing from the perspective of system science and it explore the mechanism of the interaction among rural finance, rural economy and the rural society.Firstly, specific to the object of the study in this article and according to the setting principles of system model and the main factors affecting rural finance, rural financial system is divided into three subsystems such as the subsystems of rural financial development, rural economy and rural social undertakings. Based on the measurement of various factors of rural financial system and system dynamic relationships, this article builds a rural financial system dynamics model. The model fitting test results show that the system dynamics model, with all errors are within the allowable range, owns a high accuracy that ensures it meets the requirements for an empirical analysis.Secondly, relevant data is collected to empirical analysis and policy simulation about the rural financial system dynamic model. Empirical analysis results of the three subsystems show that:1. the level of financial development in rural areas before2010was on the rise while it tended to decline after2010. The cause of this going down is the growth rate of rural finance is slower comparing to that of rural GDP. Namely, the rural financial development and rural economic growth haven’t been complimentary for each other.2. The agricultural GDP and agricultural GDP growth rate trend to go upward, while the weakness of rural enterprises’added value has affected the further economic development of rural economy.3. The level of China’s rural social development is in a good upward trend, which complies with the trend of the rural economic growth and rural financial development. It proves that the continuous development of China’s rural economy and rural finance plays a significant role in the promoting of rural social undertakings. Through overall analysis on the rural financial system, it can be found that each subsystem is mainly restricted by the rural financial level in rural development. The main manifestation is that rural financial development level did not correspond to the growth of the rural economy. While a decrease in the level of rural financial development in turn to further restrict the development of rural economy and social development.Thirdly, the game balance of the various stakeholders to provide a logical basis for the development of China’s rural finance is analyzed. Game balance shows that under the complete assumptions, farmers will choose not to repay searching for a higher income, so the game can not achieve a win-win balance; Under restricted conditions, legal constraints will increase the litigation costs of rural financial institutions, and the use of security constraints will increase the borrowing costs of farmers, so the win-win game equilibrium can not be achieved either; Under the credit constraints, on one hand, the government can build a credit system to ensure that farmers repay their loans without increasing the burden on rural financial institutions. On the other hand, it can also reduce the farmers borrowing costs, as long as the benefits that farmers get from the expanded production harvest loans from banks can exceed the loan interest to pay, the three-person strategy equilibrium can be achieved; When information is incomplete, in the game made up of the government, rural financial institutions and farmers, there are two perfect Bayesian equilibriums. If the possibility for farmers repay the loan on time exceeds0.5, the three-person strategy equilibrium can be achieved even with no credit system constraints. When the government chooses to build a credit system, the chances of gaining a win-win game equilibrium depend on the enforcement of punishment from the credit system. That is, the probability of being punished and the extent of punishment for farmers’breach of contracts. The mutual-gain equilibrium can be reached only when penalties for breach of contracts exceed the benefits that farmers can get from refusing refused to repay the loan proceeds.Finally, according to the result of the empirical analysis and game theory, this article puts forward five policy proposals to enhance China’s rural financial level.1. Deepening the role of the rural financial development subsystems;2.Futher balancing the interests of stakeholders in rural financial system;3. Guiding and regulating the informal financial institutions and developing the rural financial system from multiple aspects;4. Encouraging innovation of rural financial products and ensuring the needed finance system of rural economic development.5. Improving the rural financial law system and building a powerful credit system.更多还原