【作者】 肖绍平；

【导师】 邓超；

【作者基本信息】 中南大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2011， 博士

【摘要】 上市公司控制权转移是一种企业并购方式,控制权转移的过程实际上是不同的利益相关者通过相互竞争而争夺公司资源管理权的过程。随着我国有效的、定价标准统一的公司控制权市场的逐渐形成,我国上市公司控制权转移事件频繁发生。上市公司控制权转移已经成为上市公司扩大规模、实现战略目标的重要方式,因此,对于上市公司控制权转移的研究,无论对控股股东、上市公司管理层,还是证券监督管理部门都有着重要的理论与实践意义。本文以我国上市公司控制权转移问题为研究对象,在前人的研究基础上,综合运用文献分析法、定性分析与定量分析相结合的方法、规范分析与实证分析结合的方法,结合我国上市公司独有的制度背景,运用计量经济学分析工具对我国上市公司控制权转移的市场反应、控制权转移对公司业绩影响、控制权转移业绩变化的影响因素、上市公司控制权转移的价值、及如何规范控制权转移的政策路径等方面进行深入而系统的研究。以期为进一步改善我国上市公司治理、规范控制权市场、遏制控股股东对中小投资者的侵害、保护中小股东利益提供理论支持和政策建议。本文基于上市公司控制权市场理论、企业契约理论、委托代理理论、利益相关者理论、交易费用理论及产权理论等理论的理解,运用规范分析方法对我国上市公司控制权转移产生的制度背景、控制权转移现状、控制权转移动机、控制权转移特征等进行了探讨。研究认为,我国上市公司控制权转移的制度背景呈现以下特征：公司治理结构不健全,会计信息披露不完全,“二元”的股权结构及市场监管力量薄弱。我国控制权转移市场由于建立时间较短,在制度建立和运行中存在很多不规范之处,政府对控制权转移市场运行的行政干预过度,各方监管力量薄弱,使得我国上市公司控制权转移行为监管失控。本文对我国上市公司控制权转移的年度分布、控制权转移的时间特征、控制权转移的地区特征、控制权转移的行业分布等基本情况进行了统计分析。分析表明,上市公司控制权转移事件的时间分布并不均匀,第四季度控制权转移次数最多；上市公司控制权转移次数最多的10个地区分别是上海、广东(不包括深圳)、北京、四川、湖北、山东、海南、深圳、辽宁及湖南；上市公司控制权转移主要集中在投资、综合类、信息技术、贸易、机械设备、金属非金属、房地产、化工等行业：股权协议转让是目前我国上市公司控制权转移的最主要方式本文对控制权转移的总体市场反应和协议转让、无偿划拨、二级市场逐步收购等三种不同控制权转移方式下的市场反应进行了实证分析。研究表明：累计超额收益率(CAR)都是负数,且在前20天一直呈现直线式的剧烈下降趋势；全窗口期间(转移前20天到转移后20天)累计超额收益率下降达到了5%以上。这是因为我国上市公司控制权转移主要是无偿划拨或协议转让方式,投资者总以为这种控制权转移是一种寻租；尽管我国上市公司国有法人股缺乏流动性,控制权转移仍然引起了市场的积极反应。本文选择2007年符合条件的42家发生控制权转移事件的上市公司为研究对象,通过与配对样本公司2006年——2010年的平均资产盈利率、主营业务利润率、资产周转率及净资产收益率进行对比来分析上市公司控制权转移是否对公司的业绩产生影响。实证结果表明：公司业绩在控制权转移后的第一年有显著提高,但在第二年和第三年以后业绩提高不显著,即业绩只得到了短暂的改善而非长久提升。经统计分析发现,控制权转移公司的三项指标的均值和中位数都有一定的上升趋势,只是大部分指标落后于配对样本上升的速度,说明控制权转移后的上市公司仍需要很长一段时间才能追赶上行业的进度,而且业绩的提高是来源于经营效率和获利能力的提高。本文采用离散Log-logistic机会率来判断上市公司控制权转移的价值存在理性泡沫的问题。研究认为：用累积超额收益率衡量时,如果忽略反应中的泡沫成分,就会使得控制权转移创造价值偏大。同时,深市上市公司控制权转移前后的股票溢价仅为2%,大大低于沪市股票溢价的6%,股票的基本价值大大地低于控制权转移公告前的股价持续的增加值；在持续上升的时间和幅度上,沪市的上市公司(分别约60天,高达11%)分别比深市上市公司(分别约20天,约6.5%)高,而在反向修正幅度方面,沪市的(约4%)比深市的(约5%)低。总的来说,上市公司控制权转移能够为社会创造价值。本文对规范我国上市公司控制权转移措施进行了探讨,从我国上市公司股东、债权人、管理者和收购者四个成员的角度研究了如何进行控制权转移优化安排,最后就规范我国上市公司控制权转移的政策路径进行了探讨。研究认为：我国上市公司控制权的优化安排取决于上市公司股东、债权人、管理者和收购者四个成员之间的相对重要性和监管的有效性；规范我国上市公司控制权转移的措施应从优化证券市场环境、强化政府的监管、加强债权人对并购重组的参与程度、规范上市公司控制权市场等方面进行。更多还原

【Abstract】 Corporate control transfer of the listed companies is one kind of enterprise mergers and acquisitions. The process of control right transferring is that different interested stakeholders competing with each other for the right of corporate resources management. Along with the corporate control market gradually being formed, which is effective and using unified pricing standard, events of corporate control transfer in Chinese listed company will occur frequently. Transfer of control has become an important way for a listed company to expand and realize its strategic target. Therefore, no matter for the controlling shareholders, listed company’s managements, or for the securities regulatory authorities, the study on the corporate control transfer has great theoretical and practical significance.This paper researches on the corporate control transfer of Chinese listed company, based on previous research results, integrated using document analysis method, qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis methods, also the combination method of practices analysis and empirical analysis. Combining with the unique institutional background of China’s listed companies, this paper uses the econometric analysis tools to make an in-depth and systematic study on the market reaction of corporate control transfer, the performance impact of corporate control transfer, the effective factors affecting corporate control transfer performance, the value and the policies of how to regulate the corporate control transfer. Then it can provide theoretical support and policy advice to further improve the governance of listed companies, regulate the market for corporate control, curb the violations of controlling shareholders over minor investors, and to protect minor shareholders’ interests.Based on the understanding of listed company control market theory, contract theory, principal-agent theory, stakeholder theory, transaction cost theory and property theory, this paper analyses the system background of corporate control transfer, the current situation, motivation, and characteristics of corporate control transfer. The study suggests that the system background of listed company corporate control transfer shows the following characteristics:corporate governance structure is not perfect, accounting information discloses incompletely, dual-ownership structure, and the market supervision is weak. The establishment of the control transfer market is short, there are many irregularities in the system and operation, the over administrative intervention by government and weak supervision, which caused the supervision of corporate control transfer out of control.This paper makes a statistical analysis about the year distribution, date characteristics, areas and industrial distribution of corporate control transfer of Chinese listed company. It shows that the dates of corporate control transfer are not uniformity, and most of the transfers are happened in the fourth quarter. The top10areas of corporate control transfer events are Shanghai, Guangdong (excludes Shenzhen), Beijing, Sichuan, Hubei, Shandong, Hainan, Shenzhen, Liaoning and Hunan. The corporate control transfer of Chinese listed company are mainly concentrated in investment, information technology, trade, machinery equipment industry, metal and nonmetal, real estate and chemical industries, etc. Transferring through equity agreement is currently the main way to transfer the control in China’s listed companies.This paper makes an empirical analysis of the overall market reaction of corporate control transfer and the different market reaction when transferring in different ways of agreement transfer, free transfer, and acquired control right gradually in secondary market. The research finds that the CAR is negative, and it drops heavily in line in the first20days. During the full window time (20days before and20days after the transfer), the CAR has decreased more than5%, which is due to the investors suppose the transfer is looking for lease when most of the transferring in China is in free or in agreement way. Despite the lack of liquidity in state-owned legal person shares of listed companies in China, control transfer still caused a positive response from the market.This paper chooses42listed companies that happened control transfer in2007as the research objects. It analyses whether the transferring will bring the impact on company performance through comparing the indicators including return of average assets, return of sales, asset turnover and ROE with that of the paired sample companies from2006-2010. It proves that performance of the companies increased significantly in the first year after transferring, but this trend not continued in the second and third year, which means the performance is only improved temporarily but not last long. According to the analysis, the average and median value of the three indicators of control transfer company have a definite upward trend, but most indicators are behind rising speed of paired sample companies, which explains the transferred company needs a rather long time to catch up with industry speed, also the improvement of performance is resulting from the higer operational efficiency and profitable ability.This paper uses the discrete Log-logistic opportunity rate to judge the existed rational bubble in the transferring value. It suggests that when measures in CAR, the transferring value will be more if ignore the existed bubbles during transferring. At the same time, the share premium is only2%during the control transferring of companies listed in Shenzhen Stock Exchange, which is far more below6%in Shanghai Stock Exchange. Here we notice that the intrinsic price of share is far more below the constant increase value before the announcement for transferring. Considering the time and magnitude of rising, that of companies listed in Shaihai(60days,11%) are higher than the companies listed in Shenzhen(20days,6.5%). But in the reverse correction level,4%of Shanghai’is lower than5%of Shenzhen’. In all, the control transfer of listed companies can create value for society.Finally, this paper discusses the measures to regulate the control transferring, and makes the research on how to optimize the transfer arrangements from the view of shareholders, creditors, managements, and buyers. It also discusses the policies and paths of regulating the corporate control transfer. The study shows optimized arrangements of controlling rights of listed companies in China depend on relative importance and effectiveness of supervision between the listed company shareholders, creditors, nanagements and buyers. The measures for the regulation of China’s listed company control transfer would come from these aspects: optimize stock exchange market environment, strengthen the supervision of government and participation of creditors in the merger project, standard market for corporate control, etc.更多还原