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我国非正规金融规制研究

Research on China’s Regulation of Non-formal Financial

【作者】 车丽华

【导师】 陈晓红;

【作者基本信息】 中南大学 , 管理科学与工程, 2012, 博士

【摘要】 近年来,非正规金融在我国的规模越来越庞大,在经济发展中的地位越来越重要,由此而引发了理论界和实务界对其高度关注。非正规金融为我国的经济增长和社会福利增加产生了巨大贡献的同时,又不断地发生非正规金融的重大违法犯罪案(事)件,对社会和经济的安全稳定产生巨大的威胁,由于没有专门调整非正规金融的法律法规,因此在实际操作中不可避免地存在一系列的问题,极易引发民事和经济纠纷。完善相关法律制度建设已成为促进非正规金融健康发展,维护良好金融秩序的最大问题,出于防范金融风险与稳定金融秩序的考虑,在这样的现实背景下,认真研究非正规金融规制问题就变得十分重要而迫切。首先,论文在理论研究的基础上,选取了美国、日本、孟加拉国和台湾地区进行了规制实践和经验借鉴。论文对我国非正规金融及规制现状分析,明确了非正规金融包括了民间直接借贷、合会、民间集资、私人钱庄、地下票据市场、银中、银背和典当等形式,由于对非正规金融法律规范的不足,导致了非正规金融的不少缺陷,主要包括规范性差、扰乱金融秩序、威胁社会稳定、扩大社会差距等。我国现有的法律体系对非正规金融的规范极不到位,而且更多的倾向于将其视为正规金融信贷的对立面而采取封堵和打压的态度,使得非正规金融转入地下运行,从而滋生许多社会问题。其次,论文探讨了非正规金融规制的内在机理,重点分析了非正规金融的供需平衡失调和非对称信息对于政府规制的微观影响。一是采用博弈论构建非正规金融的供需主体之间借贷行为博弈模型,分法制规制、担保人和抵押或质押三种情况下建立博弈模型,证明了规制介入的必要性。二是探讨基于信息不对称的非正规金融规制博弈模型,信息不对称会导致贷款前的逆向选择和贷款后的道德风险,逆向选择可能导致最没有还贷意愿的人取得贷款。三是基于三方博弈模型运用传统静态博弈支付矩阵对双方的逆向选择问题进行了分析,提出了规制介入情况下非正规金融的博弈模型,证明规制介入能够有效解决资金需求主体进行非正规金融的道德风险问题,进一步证明了监督体系、法律政策和审核机制三个规制途径,能够有效解决资金需求主体进行非正规金融时的逆向选择问题。再次,论文实证验证了非正规金融规制的外在效应。从非正规金融的直接效应和规制介入对于非正规金融的间接效应两个层面出发进行分析,将资金提供者、政府规制与资金需求主体融资三者结合起来。问卷发放的对象主要是北京、上海、浙江、湖南地区中小企业或者个体经营户。通过实证数据分析得到结论:一是非正规金融的直接效应,实证研究表明资金提供者对资金需求主体融资具有直接的正面作用。二是规制介入对于非正规金融的间接效应,政府规制对于资金提供者向资金需求主体融资的转化具有显著的促进作用。三是证明了资金需求主体在审核机制下很难通过非正规金融直接进行融资。最后,论文进一步提出了完善我国非正规金融规制的建议。明确了非正规金融规制应放松对非正规金融的审核管制,遵循管制的安全性、效率性与公平性以及重视对非正规金融风险的预警监管等基本原则。提出了建立健全非正规金融的区别规制体系和优化非正规金融发展的政策环境等规制建议。非正规金融体系规制必将对改进我国的金融监管提供重要的决策依据,因此从经济实践和法律理论研究方面来看,深入系统地研究非正规金融的内在运作机理,从而深刻地认识其外部效应,基于不同性质、规模的非正规金融进行差异化的规制制度设计,在我国现阶段具有极其重要的意义。

【Abstract】 Non-formal finance in China’s increasingly large scale, In recent years,in economic development is becoming increasingly important, thus triggering the theorists and practitioners of their attention. Non-formal financial for China’s economic growth and social welfare has created an enormous contribution to the increase, they also continue to place non-formal financial events of major crimes, social and economic security and stability have an enormous threat, as no special adjustment of non-formal financial laws and regulations, so in practice there is inevitably a series of problems, can easily lead to civil and economic disputes. Improve the relevant legal system has become an informal financial health development, and maintain good financial order, the biggest problem, for the prevention of financial risks and stabilize the financial order of consideration, in the context of this reality, carefully study the problem of non-formal financial regulation becomes very important and urgent.First, the paper based on the theoretical study of China’s informal financial and regulatory status quo analysis.the paper selected papers of the United States, Japan, Bangladesh and Taiwan were regulatory practice and learn from experience. Clear non-formal, including a private direct financial lending, RCAs, non-governmental funds, private banks, underground paper market, silver, silver back, and pawn, etc., because of the non-formal lack of financial laws and regulations, resulting in non-formal financial many shortcomings, including poor standards, disrupt the financial order, threatening social stability, expand social gaps and so on. China’s existing legal system on a very informal financial regulation in place, and more inclined to credit it as the antithesis of the formal financial closure and the pressure to take the attitude, making the non-formal financial underground operation, which the breeding of many social problems.Secondly, the paper examines the informal financial regulation of the internal mechanism. Focused on analyzing the non-formal financial imbalance between supply and demand and asymmetric information for the micro impact of government regulation, the first use of game theory to build non-formal financial lending practices between supply and demand in the main game model, sub-legal regulation, guarantors and mortgage or pledge three case to establish the game model to prove the need for regulatory intervention. At the same time of asymmetric information-based non-formal game model of financial regulation, asymmetric information before the loan would lead to moral hazard and adverse selection after the loan, adverse selection, repayment will not cause most people to obtain loans. Papers based on three game models the use of traditional static game payoff matrix on both sides of the adverse selection problem is analyzed proposed regulatory intervention case of non-formal financial game model, that regulatory intervention can effectively solve the funding needs of the main non-formal financial moral hazard problem, further evidence of the supervision system, legal policy and regulatory review mechanism three ways to effectively address funding needs for non-formal financial body when adverse selection problem.Then, the paper empirical validation of non-formal financial regulation of the external effects. From the direct effects of non-formal financial and regulatory intervention for the indirect effect of non-formal financial analysis of two levels of departure, the funders, government regulation and financing of the three main funding needs together. Questionnaires is intended primarily for Beijing, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Hunan SME or individual households. Data analysis by empirical conclusion:the direct effect of non-formal financial, empirical research shows that demand for capital funding are the main financing has a direct positive effect. Second, non-formal regulatory intervention for the indirect effects of financial, government regulation for the capital needs of the main providers of financing to fund the conversion of a significant role in promoting. And proves the main demand for funds by the audit mechanism is difficult to directly finance non-formal financial.Finally, Further proposed improve China’s informal financial regulation recommendations, a clear non-formal financial regulation relaxation of non-formal financial audit control, control of security, efficiency and fairness and the importance of the informal financial risk monitoring of the basic principles. Proposed the establishment of a sound difference between non-formal financial system regulation and optimization of non-formal financial development policies and environmental regulation proposals.Non-formal financial system regulation is bound to improve China’s financial supervision to provide the basis for decision making lies, so from an economic practice and legal theory in terms of depth and systematic study of the internal operation of informal financial mechanisms to deep understanding of its external effect, based on different nature and scale of informal finance in differentiated regulation system design, in the present stage is extremely important.

  • 【网络出版投稿人】 中南大学
  • 【网络出版年期】2012年 12期
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