【作者】 张翀；

【导师】 龚艳萍；

【作者基本信息】 中南大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2012， 博士

【摘要】 在当今知识产权主导的技术环境中,技术标准与专利技术的结合成为电子、通讯等高科技产业内的发展趋势。在这一背景下,技术标准的通用性与专利技术的私权性成为一对基本矛盾,贯穿标准化实施的始末。标准一经制定,标准厂商必须获得关键专利技术的让渡或许可方能进行生产和销售,否则将面临严厉的专利侵权赔偿。由于上述基本矛盾的存在,从20世纪90年代至今,在相关产业内关于标准化技术许可的纠纷和争议就从未终止,技术许可的规制函待完善；另一方面,作为WTO的主要成员国,我国已经充分融入了世界性的标准化进程。而且,我国企业一般作为专利技术的被许可方,属于技术后进者。在多层次的技术溢出条件下,如何适时地调整许可和研发策略,以实现自身的技术积累,是当前我国高新技术企业急需解决的问题。针对这两方面,本文展开了全面和细致的研究,具体可分为三个研究板块：(1)奠基性研究。首先介绍了知识产权与技术标准结合的研究背景,以及技术标准化实施中存在的专利丛林和专利劫持两类问题。针对以上问题,引出合作性技术标准化的组织形式和各自的职能。标准一经制定,相关专利权人往往凭借其市场力的提升,索取远高于自身专利技术价值的费用。有鉴于此,SSO为了规范标准技术市场提出了披露规则和FRAND规则。本文着重分析了在事后专利劫持、双边许可协商和事前技术竞争等经济情境下FRAND规则的多重含义。最后,以各种情境下专利权人和标准用户之间的制衡关系为基础,提出进一步的政策建议。(2)模型研究。在前一阶段的研究中,将技术许可的改进方向确定为事前许可协商。在同质投资的观点下,通过一个序贯投资模型刻画了事前协商下许可双方的收益和投资激励,并导致了双边劫持的结果。为了优化许可程序,进一步考察了事前许可协商的实施对研发和生产的影响；并确定了有效率投资下事前协商的适用范围。研究得出以下结论：(1)事前协商下联合预期盈余提高,对厂商的劫持被克服；(2)短期实施提高厂商投资和技术价值,事前协商可行；长期实施导致研发阻滞,事前协商可行性较差。在技术标准化的实施中,普遍存在着技术领先者对后进者的技术溢出。在合约理论的框架内研究了标准化技术许可的演进：采用一个双边序贯投资模型刻画了许可双方在单向许可下的得益和投资激励,并导致了劫持的后果。之后,基于后进者对核心技术进行局部改进的假设,引入回馈许可机制,并分别考察这一制度下许可双方的收益和研发状况。研究指出：(1)由于后进者谈判力的提升,领先者愿意与之进行交叉许可；(2)上述劫持被克服,后进者的投资和研发激励均得到提高。最后,对后进者提出了进一步的政策建议。(3)实证研究。这一部分的研究任务是映证模型研究中提出的结论和相关的政策建议。首先,通过采集四个标准制定组织(SSO)披露的专利信息,并以专利引证的方法研究了相关技术在前后相继的3个代际间的绩效,并与非代际标准作比较。随后,对GSM国际性标准展开案例研究,从技术标准的演进和技术偏转两个方向进行论述。案例研究充分证实了双向许可对技术集群的偏转作用。至此,模型研究中的研究假设和主要研究结论都得到了证实。在本研究的最后,建立了标准化技术评价体系。基于前期的研究成果,模拟当下大型SSO中的标准化技术的演变过程,给出技术评价的基本步骤和应用模式；最后,将实证数据导入模型,完成一份算例分析。该模拟实验对于标准化实施中的技术后进者有重要的参考价值和指导意义。更多还原

【Abstract】 In a intellectual property-dominated technological environment,the combination of technological standard and patented technology becomes the developing trend in the IT industry. In this case,the compatibility of technological standard and the exclusiveness of patented technology are the two sides of the basic contradiction which runs through the the enforcement of standardazation from the beginning to the end.Ocne the standard is set,the standard manufacturer have to be lisensed by the holder of the essential patent,or he is not allowed to do producing and selling against the stanardised product.For the sake of the above matter,the disputes for the licensing of standardised technology in IT industry have never been ended since the1990s.Thus,the means of the licensing is ineed need to be modified.On the other hand,as a key member of WTO, China has already fully got involved in the global standarzation,and the chinese enterprise always acted as a patent licensee.In a multilevel technology spillover envirment, how to adjust the way of lisencing and R&D strategy,so as to achieve its own techonology accumulation,is becoming more and more urgent for the chinese high-tech enterprise. With these facts,this paper have done a comprehansive and detailed research about the two problem,and the research is organised as follows:1.Fundamental research. The combination of IP and technological standard was firstly introduced as the research background, and then patent thicket and hold up as the troubles in the enforcement of standardization. With regard to such troubles, the organizational forms of collective standardization and their respective functions were discussed.Essential patent holder was tend to exact royalty much higher than its intrinsic value,once the standard was setted.On that account, SSO requested for IP disclosure and FRAND licensing.Based on the latest foreign research,the various meanings of FRAND licensing were studied in detail in the context of ex post hold-up, bilateral licensing negotiation and ex ante technology competition.Finally, further policy suggestion was provided according to the checks and balances between patent holder and standard user in those contexts.2.Model research. In the previous part,ex ante negotiation was identified as a proper way to better technology lisensing. A model of sequential investment was applied in the sense of homogeneous investment,firstly characterizing the profit and investment incentive of the two licensing parties, and then resulting in double hold-up which was lack of efficiency for the licensing in some case. To optimize the licensing procedure, the effect of the enforcement of ex ante negotiation on both development and manufacture was invetisigated,and the applicability of ex ante negotiation under the efficient investment was confirmed.It is showed that (1)the joint expected surplus increases in the ex ante negotiantion,and the manufacturer’s hold-up is solved (2)the short-term enforcement enhances the manufacturer’s investment and the value of technology, ex ante negotiation is feasible;the long-term enforcement causes R&D deterrence, ex ante negotiation is less feasible.In the enforcement of technological standarzation,there always exists technology spillover between technology leader and follower. Accordingly, some follower tends to achieve its own technology accumulation and further innovation through technology licensing. Therefore this paper attempts to make a contractual study on the course of technology licensing:a model of sequential bilateral investment was applied in the sense of incomplete contrct, firstly characterizing the profit and investment incentive of the two parties in one-side licensing,and then resulting in hold up.By the assumption that the core technology was modified by the follower,the back-grant licensing was introduced,and the two parties’ profit and R&D were investigated respectively.3. Empirical study. This part of research is designed to verify those conclusions that was proposed in the model research.First,the patent information was gethered from4standard setting organizations (SSO) during the patent disclosure.Then, by using the method of patent citation,the performance of those patented technology was investigated in3successive standard period.Secondly,GSM international standard was investigated in a case study,in which the evolution and the shift of standardised technology was respectively taken as research dimension.In the case study,the effect of double-side licensing on the shift of techonology was fully confirmed.In the last part of the research,a performance appraisal system for periodical standardised technology was established.The eovolution of the standardised technology was stimulated by tracing its form,then the basic procedure and application mode were provided.Finally,a calculation example was finished.The performance appraisal system is very practical and useful for the technilogy follower in the enforcement of standardazation.更多还原