【作者】 陈修德；

【导师】 梁彤缨；

【作者基本信息】 华南理工大学 ， 企业管理， 2012， 博士

【摘要】 高管薪酬历来是备受争议的话题之一。特别是由美国次贷危机引发的全球金融海啸全面爆发以来，华尔街金融机构高管获得动辄上千万美元的高额年薪和“突击分红”行为被推上舆论的风口浪尖；而中国上市公司高管“天价薪酬”与“零薪酬”并存的混乱景象也引起了社会公众的广泛关注。虽然有关高管基于其权力影响自定薪酬的报道频繁见诸报端，但中国学者对此鲜有论述。本文基于中国的制度背景，从管理层权力的视角，结合区域市场化的动态变迁过程对高管薪酬契约问题进行较为系统而深入的研究，以期为完善中国上市公司高管薪酬激励制度以及提高高管薪酬契约的有效性提供理论参考与经验依据。本文在理论综述与制度背景分析的基础上，提出中国上市公司的高管权力在市场化改革过程中得以逐步形成和扩大，且内生于“一股独大”和“内部人控制”等的公司内部治理缺陷为中国上市公司高管利用其权力影响薪酬契约的行为提供了足够的空间；而外部治理机制尚不健全又使得对高管权力寻租行为的监督难以到位。因此，本文根植于区域市场化非均衡的制度背景，探讨中国上市公司高管薪酬契约的管理层权力效应及其与区域市场化的交互效应，并进一步检验区域市场化对管理层权力与高管薪酬契约有效性之间关系的塑造效应，具有重要的理论与现实意义。本文首先以2004~2010年中国A股上市公司为研究样本，通过建立面板数据多元回归模型对管理层权力与高管薪酬之间的关系进行检验，研究发现：管理层权力与高管实际货币薪酬、实际在职消费、超额货币薪酬以及超额在职消费之间存在显著的正相关关系，即管理层权力越大，高管从企业获取的货币薪酬和在职消费金额越高，且其攫取的超额货币薪酬和超额在职消费等私有收益的金额也越高。但在不同所有制性质的企业中，高管运用其权力影响薪酬契约的具体形式具有一定差异，其中，地方国有企业和民营企业高管倾向于利用权力影响牟取更高的货币薪酬待遇；中央国有企业高管则倾向于获取更多的在职消费。其次，本文结合区域市场化的动态变迁过程，分别通过按区域市场化程度高低的分组检验和构建面板数据多元回归模型检验了高管薪酬契约中的区域市场化与管理层权力的跨层交互效应，亦即区域市场化对管理层权力与高管薪酬契约之间关系的调节效应。研究结果表明：由市场化改革催生的市场力量对管理层权力与高管薪酬之间的具体关联模式具有显著的调节作用；且此种调节作用主要是通过显著弱化管理层权力对高管薪酬的正向影响得以实现。进一步的研究还发现，在不同所有制性质的企业中，区域市场化塑造高管薪酬契约中的管理层权力效应的内容各有侧重，其中，市场力量对地方国有企业和民营企业高管基于权力影响谋求更高货币薪酬的自利行为具有更为明显的抑制效应；而市场力量对中央国有企业高管利用其权力影响牟取更多在职消费的行为具有更为理想的治理效果。再次，目前中国上市公司高管的实际薪酬具有一定的激励作用，但由于管理层权力的干扰，实际薪酬的激励效果在一定程度上被减弱。另一方面，高管超额薪酬基本上不具有实际激励效果，而且受管理层权力的影响，超额在职消费的负面价值效应变得更为明显。通过对实际薪酬的分解和结构性薪酬的研究发现：中国上市公司高管薪酬激励的有效性主要源自以不可操控性业绩为基础的激励性薪酬；建立在管理层权力和操控性业绩基础上的操纵性薪酬则表现出显著的负面价值效应。幸而，随着区域市场化程度的提高，不仅可以使得高管实际薪酬和激励性薪酬之于企业价值的正向敏感性得到不同程度的加强；而且超额薪酬与操纵性薪酬的价值削弱效应也会得到一定程度的抑制；更为重要的是推动区域市场化改革还可以有效缓解管理层权力对高管薪酬契约有效性的负面效应。由此揭示出市场化改革具有提升高管薪酬契约有效性的正面作用，且抑制和削弱高管薪酬契约中的负面管理层权力效应是其塑造薪酬契约有效性的主要途径之一。最后，本文着重从治理操纵性薪酬的角度探讨了提高中国上市公司高管薪酬契约有效性的具体策略。研究表明，通过采取减少政府对企业的干预和改善法律制度环境等区域层面的策略以及运用长期股权激励等多样化高管激励手段、将终极控制模式由垂直式转变为矩阵式、提高机构持股比例和提升外部审计质量等企业层面的策略都能够起到很好的抑制薪酬操纵的作用，进而提高高管薪酬契约的有效性。更多还原

【Abstract】 Executive compensation has always been a controversial issue with wide concern. Espe-cially since the global financial crisis erupted, the high annual salary easily up to ten milliondollars of Wall Street financial institutions’top executives and the “surprise bonus” behaviorhave been suffered in the teeth of the storm. However, in Chinese listed companies, the coex-isted “sky-high salary” and “zero pay” scene of confusion has also drawn public attention.Although stories appear frequently in the press exposing executives influence self-dealingcompensation based on their power, Chinese scholars have rarely discussed about it. Based onthe unique institutional background of Chinese listed companies, from the perspective ofmanagerial power, this paper research on executive compensation contract more systematicand in-depth combined with the regional marketization dynamic change process for the firsttime, to further refine the executive compensation incentive system for Chinese listed compa-nies and provide a theoretical reference and empirical evidence to improve the effectivenessof executive compensation contract.On the basis of the theoretical and institutional background analysis, this paper suggeststhat due to the “predominant of one” and “insider control” and other defects of internal cor-porate governance mechanisms, an excellent opportunity is offered for executives of Chineselisted companies to exercise their power to influence self-dealing compensation. At the sametime, external governance mechanisms are not perfect so that to supervise the executives’rent-seeking behavior is more difficult to deal with. Therefore, based on managerial powertheory, discussing the managerial power effects of Chinese listed companies’ executive com-pensation contract to some extent has theoretical and realistic foundation.Firstly, we apply the sample of the Chinese listed companies during2004to2010, andtests the relationship between managerial power and executive compensation by constructingmultiple regression model based on panel data. The result shows that managerial power hassignificant positive relation with executives actual monetary remuneration, the actual perks,excess monetary compensation and excess perks. In other words, the greater the managerialpower, the higher the amount of monetary remuneration and perks and the amount of excessmonetary compensation and excess perks of private benefits.Secondly, this paper also from the perspective of economy transformation, studies the in-fluence of regional market-oriented reforms on the relationship between the managerial powerand executive pay incentives and their effectiveness, by statistical group comparison andbuilding a panel data multiple regreesion model. We found that market forces spawned by the market-oriented reforms significantly own the role of shaping the specific association be-tween managerial power and executive pay and mainly achieved by significantly weaken thepositive effect of managerial power on executive compensation. A further study finds that, inthe different context of ownership, market-oriented reforms have focused on the content ofshaping the power effect in the executive pay incentives. Specially, in the local state-ownedenterprises, market forces have much more significant inhibitory effect to influence the be-havior of executives grab the monetary private benefits using their power; while in the centralstate-owned enterprises, market forces have better governance effect to influence executivesobtain the behavior of perks and other non-monetary private benefits using their power.Thirdly, now in Chinese listed companies, executive compensation incentive has a cer-tain of validity, but the managerial power will weaken the incentive effect to a certain extent,and show a negative effect characteristics. Based on structural pay, this study finds that theeffectiveness of executive compensation incentives mainly due to non-handling perfor-mance-based pay; handling performance-based pay based on managerial power shows a sig-nificant negative effect. Considering market-oriented reforms factors, market forces can sig-nificantly strengthen the sensitivity between the executive pay or incentive pay with the en-terprise value; the value effect of managerial power and manipulation pay also weaken in themarketization process. Therefore, market-oriented reforms enhance the role of executivecompensation incentive validity, suppress and weaken the negative effect of managerial powerin the compensation contract, which is the main way to shape the effectiveness of the com-pensation contract.Lastly, from the perspective of governance manipulation compensation, the paper dis-cusses specific measures to improve the effectiveness of executives incentive pay for Chineselisted companies. It finds that using the diversified executive incentives methods, such aslong-term equity incentives, changing ultimate control strategy from vertical to the matrix,increasing the percentage of institutional ownership, taking enterprise-level improvementstrategy, such as enhance external audit quality, lowering governmental intervention degree,improving regional level strategy, such as legal and institutional environment can have greateffect of restraining compensation manipulation and strengthening compensation contract va-lidity.更多还原