【作者】 王伟臣；

【导师】 何勤华；

【作者基本信息】 华东政法大学 ， 法律史， 2012， 博士

【摘要】 1955年，英国人类学家马克斯·格卢克曼在他的首部法律民族志——《北罗得西亚巴罗策人的司法程序》中，试图证明非洲本土的巴罗策习惯法同西方法律相比共性大于差异。两年之后，美国人类学家保罗·博安南提出相反观点，在他所出版的《提夫人的正义与审判》中认为，尼日利亚提夫人的“法律”与英美法相比存在着较大差异。为此他区分“民俗体系”与“分析体系”：西方法学固然发达，但它仍然是一种“民俗体系”，如果无视这一点，而把它当作“分析体系”来运用，势必导致对研究对象的曲解，从而陷入我族中心主义，将矛头直指格卢克曼。从而引发了此后两人长达30多年的学术争论。这就是英美法律人类学史上著名的格博之争。除了双方性格上的原因之外，如此漫长的争论似乎只有一种解释：无解。非洲本土法与西方法究竟共性大于差异，还是差异大于共性？能否以及怎样使用西方法律范畴来描述和分析非西方的法律制度？人类学是否有必要使用法学的研究方法？……格卢克曼和博安南曾经明确争论过或涉及到的这些问题，正是英美法律人类学一个世纪以来不断面对、至今仍未解决的困境之所在。全文共分四章，其中，前三章是按照事件的发生顺序对争论起因、经过、结束整个过程的梳理，第四章则是对争论分歧的剖析和总结。具体安排如下：第一章对争论发生的必然条件和偶然因素进行了详尽的考察。19世纪世界头号殖民家塞西尔·罗兹不仅为格卢克曼和博安南提供了田野调查的研究场地，还资助他们进入了英国人类学主流的学术圈；20世纪上半叶最具效率殖民策略的发明家弗雷德里克·卢格德则为他们进入田野提供了直接的动因，甚至为他们的研究提供了意义。除了马林诺夫斯基曾略微涉及过此问题之外，该领域之前并没有过类似的争论。但是1950年代的知识背景发生了新的变化：英美人类学启动人文科学转向，美国人类学文化相对论日趋完善，文化普遍主义改头换面，结构语言学正在对人类学发生影响。受美国文化相对论思潮的影响以及在第二语言习得方面上的天赋，博安南发动了这场争论，而他之所以选择格卢克曼作为批评对象，是因为后者的著作是该领域第一部以直接观察的案例材料为基础写就的法律民族志。作为一位出生于南非的俄裔犹太人，生活和仕途上的遭遇使得格卢克曼成为了一名激进的种族平等主义者，家庭的影响也给他带来了浓厚的法学情结，所以格卢克曼会以普遍主义的视角采用西方法学范畴。但受到批评多少有些冤枉，博安南的质疑也略显仓促。以上条件和因素共同决定了1950年代在英美法律人类学中出现了格卢克曼与博安南的争论。第二章按照文献的出版时间，力图中立客观地对格卢克曼和博安南所发表的与争论有关的论著进行了系统的梳理和解读，并按照内容及其相关度划分为四个阶段。首先是各自出版的法律民族志。由于未曾想到事后会遭到批评，所以《巴罗策人的司法程序》是格卢克曼理论和方法的“原生态”呈现。而《提夫人的正义与审判》也体现了博安南田野调查时期的学术理想。接下来这场争论真正拉开了序幕，从1959年到1968年的十年间，双方共发表了包括著作、论文、书评在内的12部/篇文献，且都是针对争论专门而作的著述。奥地利法律人类学会议的召开标志着这场笔墨官司的全面升级：两人同时与会进行了唇枪舌剑的当面论辩，使这场争论成为了英美法律人类学的焦点。不过由于论文提交与最终出版长达三年的间隔，被英美学者反复引用的此次会议的论文并不能反映出格博之争的全部。所以双方也无意停战。格卢克曼在两部著作的再版序言中对争论进行了反思，可惜两年之后撒手人寰，争论也就变成博安南一个人的独角戏。1989年博安南最后一次提及这场争论，标志着争论的彻底结束。通过对格博之争所涉文献的全面展示，本文认为，格博之争应该是关于西方法律与前工业社会法律共性与差异的分歧，西方法律范畴能否以及怎样研究前工业社会法律的争论。第三章探讨争论为什么结束，所以首先对争论结束的时间和标志进行了界定。1970年代以后，关注法律与社会之关系的过程研究已经成为了美国法律人类学的主要特点，这也标志着美国已经超越英国成为英语世界法律人类学的主导。而格卢克曼和博安南也受到了这种转向的影响。虽然在这一时期，他们的争论仍在继续，但已经不为学界所关注，这也意味着格博之争在学科意义上的结束。但争论的分歧并没有得到解决，胜负无法判断，双方陷入僵局。但是，格卢克曼和博安南通过他们的争论证明了英美法律人类学无法解决西方法律的自我表述问题，从而直接促成了该领域的研究由规则中心范式向过程主义范式的转移。汉语文献中经常可见所谓“法学家派”和“非法学家派”的说法，认为格卢克曼是前者的典型代表，而相对的，博安南则是后一派的领军人物。可是笔者追根溯源，从最早使用这对汉语概念的林端教授，到借题发挥的德国学者乌韦·韦塞尔，再到四次划分谱系却从未使用过“学派”这一称谓的英国学者西蒙·罗伯茨，发现英美法律人类学领域并没有这两派的对立。相关学者在对该问题的处理上难称学派，“非法学家派”也并未逃脱西方法学的阴影。在对格博之争从起因、经过到结束完整过程的系统梳理和全面展现之后，第四章对这场争论的分歧进行剖析，将其剥离为三重困境。首先呈现的是认识论困境，即怎样理解他者的法律。虽然格博之争处于法律人类学表征危机的萌芽阶段，但却体现了普遍和特殊的永恒难题。不过同宗教人类学所引发的合理性之争相比，格博之争在认识论上的反思不够自觉，因为双方的分歧集中表现于方法论困境，即怎样表达他者的法律。英美法律人类学在该问题上始终存在着主位和客位两种不同视角的截然对立，格博之争正是其典型体现。与经济人类学的实质与形式之争相比，虽然有着诸多相似之处，但是在研究规模、参与人数还是影响力上均体现了法律人类学的弱势地位。交叉还是分支？格博之争典型体现了英美法律人类学的身份困境。格卢克曼试图沟通人类学和法学，认为使用法学方法就能够促成学科交叉。但这只是人类学家对法律的法学研究，是一种“人类学”的法学。由于没有专属的研究方法，不会得到法学的认同，因而学科不可能实现交叉。博安南强调人类学的特殊性，主张人类学的方法，呼吁人类学家对法律的人类学研究，这才是真正意义上的法律人类学。但是由于没有发现具有普遍解释力的方法，加之失去了研究对象，使得法律人类学逐渐边缘化。与荷兰的由法学家所创建和传承的法律人类学相比，二者可谓殊途同归：都没有实现学科的交叉。在结论部分，文章援引萨特存在主义视角对“他者”问题的分析：正是由于他者意识的出现，自我意识才会显现。他者是自我的先决条件。换句换说，对他者的理解实际上直接揭开了人们对自我理解的角度和深度。笔者由此得出结论：只有本体论上的反思和困境才是格博之争真正有别于其他分支学科类似争论的特殊之处。这场争论通过对非西方法律的研究和讨论，实现了对西方自身法律的反思，打破了西方法律的高等性。虽然受到了法学的严重阻挠，但法律人类学为我们理解法律提供了另外一种视角。但是，人类学所面对的他者并不是“相对的他者”，而是列维纳斯所谓的“彻底的他者”或“绝对的他者”。其特点是他者绝不能还原为自我或同一。这是自我永远的本体论困境。而这也决定了与法学同出一门（西方知识体）的人类学不可能完成对西方法律的彻底反思。更多还原

【Abstract】 1955, the British anthropologist Max Gluckman in his first legalethnography——The Judicial Process among the Barotse of Northern Rhodesia,deliberated his attempt in proving that similarities between Barotse customary law inlocal Africa and Western law prevailed when compared with their difference, Which,Two years later, was opposed by the American anthropologist Paul Bohannan in hisJustice and Judgment among the Tiv. He believed that differences reflected appears tobe far more than similarities between the Tiv law of Nigeria and Anglo-American law.Thus he distinguished between folk system and analytical system: Western law is verydeveloped, but it is still a folk system, if we ignore this and use it as analytical system,will inevitably lead to misinterpretation of the research,and thus fall intoethnocentrism. He directed the criticism towards Gluckman, which has given rise totheir debate for over30years since then. This is just called the famousGluckman-Bohannan debate in Anglo-American legal anthropology.Apart from reasons arising from of the disposition of two sides, only oneexplanation is capable of accounting for such a long debate: no solution. There werestill issues having been explicitly debated by Gluckman and Bohannan Whethercommonality is superior to differences, or Vice Versa between African local law andWestern law? Whether and how to use the Western legal category to describe andanalyze non-Western legal systems? Whether methods applied by Law are entitled to the study of Anthropology?..., which are the embarrasments that Anglo-Americanlegal anthropology have been facing with no resolution sofar for a century.This dissertation is divided into four chapters, of which the first three chaptersaims to introduce the entire process, in accordance with the order of events on thecauses，passage, and finality of the debate; fourth chapter focus on the analysis andsummary on controversy. Specific arrangements are as follows:A detailed investigation of the inevitable and causal factors in the first chapter.Cecil Rhodes, the world’s top colonial in the19th century, provided a research area forGluckman and Bohannan in order for fieldwork, but also helped them level up into themainstream academic circles of British anthropologist; in addition, Frederick Lugard,the inventor of the the most efficient colonial policy in the first half of20th century,granted a direct motivation, even the value for their research. Apart fromMalinowski’s slight involvment in this issue, this field had not previously haddispute as it used to be. However, new changes had taken place in the academia of1950s: Anglo-American legal anthropology switched itself to humanities, theory ofrelativity of American anthropology culture was gradually perfected, culturaluniversalism appeared with a totally brand new image, structural linguistics wasexerting the effects on anthropology.Subjected to the influence of American cultural universalism, plus genious insecond language acquisition, Bohannan launched the debate. He targeted his criticismtowards Gluckman just because the literature by the latter was the first-published legalethnography based on observed cases in this field. Suffered from the his life andcareer, Gluckman, as a South African-born Russian jew, became a radical of racialequality with deep law complex brought by his family. Therefore, universalisticperspective tends to be brought by him to Western legal category. But it is injustice forhim to be criticized by Bohannan, and the latter’s challenge is also somewhat hasty.Above conditions and factors determinied the Gluckman-Bohannan debate occurredin the Anglo-American legal anthropology.In accordance with the publication date of the document, Chapter II made aneutral and objective analysis and interpretation on the literature related to the Gluckman-Bohannan debate, and is divided into four stages in accordance with thecontent and its relevance. In the first stage-----their respectively published legalethnography, The Judicial Process among the Barotse manifested itself in originalform of Gluckman’s theories and methods as result of not forseeing the consequentdenouncement while Justice and Judgment among the Tiv reflected the academic idealof the Bohannan in the fieldwork period.as the consequence. The next stage just pullsup the curtain of such debate. From1959to1968, both sides published12literatures,including books, papers, book reviews, and those are designed for specializedpublications.The conference of legal anthropology in Austria means the escalation of battle ofwords: they debated fiercely in person, which made this debate focus of theAnglo-American legal anthropology. However, due to a three-year interval betweenthe papers presented and that eventually published, the papers in the conferencerepeatedly referenced by Anglo-American scholars can not truly reflect what is allabout Gluckman-Bohannan debate. The two sides has no intention to cease thedisagreement after the conference. Gluckman made a reflection in the preface ofsecond edition his two classics. He, unfortunately, died two years later. Thus thisdebate became a drama in which Bohannan perform only by himself. In1989,Bohannan has mentioned the dispute for the last time, which indicated the end of thelast stage. Through a comprehensive display of the literature of theGluckman-Bohannan debate, this thesis argues that the dispute should involvecontroversy over similarities and differences between Western law and law ofre-industrial society, and argument on whether and how the Western legal categorycan analyze the law of re-industrial society.The third chapter discussed the reasons of the end of the debate. It, in the fisrplace, define time and sign of the end of dispute. Since the1970s, the researchconcentrating on the relationship between the law and society has featured ofAmerican legal anthropology, which means that America has surpassed Britain andbecame the leader in legal anthropology in the English-speaking world. Gluckmanand Bohannan were also affected by this shift. In spite of the continuing of the debate during this period, it is no longer regarded as the focus in the academics, also meaningthe termination of Gluckman-Bohannan debate in the sense of discipline, while thedivarication in the debate has not been resolved. Neither was winner with an impassereached. Dramatically, Gluckman and Bohannan’s debate proved the inferiority ofAnglo-American legal anthropology on resolving the self-expression probles of theWestern law, thus directly contributing to the shift from the rule-centered paradigm tothe processual paradigm in this field.The so-called jurisprudence school and non-jurisprudence school are oftenvisible in Chinese literature. Gluckman was the typical representative of the former,while Bohannan was the leader of the latter. But I traced from Professor Lin Duan, theearliest user of those Chinese concepts, to Uwe Wesel, a German scholar who greatlyexaggerated this issue, and to Simon Roberts, a British scholar who never used thetitle though he made four division, finding that there was no antagonism of the twofactions in Anglo-American legal anthropology. Relevant scholars can not be called"school" in the handling of the issue, non-jurisprudence school also did not escapedthe shadow of the Western law.After the systematic analysis and comprehensive demonstration of the cause,passage and close of Gluckman-Bohannan debate, the fourth chapter explored theissues of the debate, and split it to into three-layer dilemma. The top one is theepistemological dilemma: how to understand the other law. Although the debate wasin the embryonic stage of the representative crisis of legal anthropology, it reflectedthe eternal problem of general and special. Compared with the debate on theresonableness aroused by religionary anthropology, Gluckman-Bohannan dabate haslittle self-examination on the epistemological consciousness, because the divaricationbetween the two sides focused on puzzlement of methodology that how other laws canbe shown up. There always exist two sharply different perspectives of emic and etic inAnglo-American legal anthropology, which typically embody itself as the debate.Compared with the essential-formal debate in economic anthropology, there are manysimilarities, but it also reflected the vulnerability of legal anthropology in size ofresearch, number of participants and the force. Cross or branch? Gluckman-Bohannan debate typically reflected the identitydilemma of Anglo-American legal anthropology. Gluckman tried to tie anthropologywith law in a communicative way. He believed that using the legal method isbeneficial to interdisciplinarity. But it is a legal research only applied byanthropologist on, is a kind of anthropologic law. Since there was no proprietaryresearch methods, it will not be recognized, thus it could not achievedinterdisciplinarity. Bohannan stressed the particularity of anthropology, advocatedanthropological methods, called for a anthropological research by anthropologist onthe law. This is the true meaning of legal anthropolog, but found no method with theuniversal explanatory power, coupled with the lost of research objects, and legalanthropology increasingly marginalized. Compared with the Netherlandish legalanthropology established and succeeded by jurist, two different routes but in the sameresult: did not crossed disciplines.In conclusion, this paper cited Sartre’s existential perspective on the analysis ofthe other: Due to the emergence of his consciousness, self-consciousness will emerge.The other is a prerequisite for ego. In other words, understanding of the other actuallyopened the angle and depth of people’s self-understanding. The author concluded thatself-examination and dilemma on the ontology are the only difference fromGluckman-Bohannan debate to the similar debate in other branch subject. This debatemade reflections on Western law and broke highness of Western law through the studyand discussion of non-Western law. Although seriously obstructed by law, legalanthropology offered another perspective for us to understand the law. However, theother faced by anthropology is not the "relative other", but the "complete other" or"absolute other" called by Levinas. Its character is that the other must not revert totheir identity or the same. This is always the ontological predicament of selfness. Andthis decides that anthropology of which come from the same body (Westernknowledge) with law, can not made a radical self-examination of Western law.更多还原