【作者】 应品广；

【导师】 徐士英；

【作者基本信息】 华东政法大学 ， 经济法学， 2012， 博士

【摘要】 我国《反垄断法》规定：反垄断委员会的首要职责是“研究拟定有关竞争政策”。然而，长期以来我国虽有竞争政策的实践，却无竞争政策的理念。更由于“竞争政策”是在《反垄断法》中予以规定的，导致实务界和学界都倾向于将竞争政策仅仅理解为“竞争法律”，而忽视了对于我国这样的转型国家而言，法律之外的体制改革和竞争推进同样是竞争政策的重要组成部分。实际上，竞争政策已经成为各国竞争法研究的重要内容，我国反垄断法实施遭遇的困难和阻力则进一步催生了竞争政策研究的必要性。另一方面，既已将竞争法研究上升到竞争政策的高度，就不得不考虑竞争政策赖以存在和实施的整体授权环境，特别是宪政环境。这不仅是因为竞争政策的产生、运行和目标定位都与一个国家的宪政机制和宪政文化密切相关，还因为竞争政策的实施关乎实施主体之间的分权问题（包括横向分权和纵向分权）、宪法中的“基本权利”（比如请愿自由和营业自由）的保障和平衡问题以及宪法中的“经济条款”（比如“经济制度条款”、“国有经济条款”和“所有制条款”）的解释问题。以此观之，不在竞争政策的框架内理解竞争法，就不能洞悉竞争法本身的局限性以及改良的方向；不在宪政的高度审视竞争政策，就很难把握作为经济政策重要组成部分的竞争政策是否符合民主宪政的需要。在此基础上，本文尝试构建竞争政策的宪政基本分析框架。该框架以竞争政策为分析对象，以宪政为分析视角，在竞争政策的框架内审视竞争法，在宪政的视角下看待竞争政策的产生、目标、实施和推进。对于反垄断法产生动力的考察发现：要不要出台反垄断法，可能受多重因素的影响；但是出台一部什么样的反垄断法法，却是主要受政治因素影响。对于反垄断法运行轨迹的考察发现：反垄断法尽管经常偏离既定轨道，但是仍然存在一个相对确定的轨迹，遵循某个中间平衡点呈钟摆式的偏离回归。上述现象印证了宪政视角下的“政治博弈”理论：竞争政策可以被理解为一个自我发展的政治博弈过程（生产者和消费者之间的政治互动），博弈力量的对比和授权环境的差异直接导致了反垄断法的内容及其运行的轨迹。突出反垄断法的“政治因素”并非否定其经济基础或社会基础，而是在承认后两者之重要作用的基础上，重新唤起对政治因素及其博弈力量的关注。对于竞争政策目标的考察发现：理论上存在一元论的效率主义、多元论的公共利益主义和终极目标论的消费者主义三种观点，并且后两者已经成为各国立法、执法和司法实践的官方立场和主流观点。尽管如此，仍有许多经济学家和知名学者主张一元论的效率主义。这并非简单的学术之争，而是隐含着重要的学术关怀。效率主义者们试图建立一元化的目标，防止法律实施的过度“政治化”，最大程度地避免竞争政策受到其他经济和社会政策的不良影响。然而，竞争政策本身的公共属性必然使它成为多元利益主体博弈的对象。在宪政视角下，目标之争是政策博弈的具体表现，多元化的目标也是民主社会的现实需求。竞争政策目标的消费者主义倾向，可以理解为是对理想和现实的一种调和：因为任何人都可以是消费者，将公共利益理解为消费者福利，不仅在一定程度上实现了单一目标远离政治干扰的诉求，同时也满足了多元利益主体的现实需求。对于竞争政策实施机制的考察发现：竞争政策的实施既涉及到纵向分权问题（中央实施与地方实施），也涉及到横向分权问题（公共执行与私人执行）。其中，竞争政策实施的纵向分权主要解决两个问题：第一，尽可能防止竞争政策实施的地方保护主义；第二，尽可能激励地方开展竞争执法和竞争司法。一个国家的授权环境（特别是国家结构形式）决定了一个国家采纳何种分权模式，以及竞争政策的地方化是否能够得到有效遏制。对于我国而言，建立竞争政策实施的中央执法系统和中央司法系统是理想方案，但是在当前授权环境下，更明智的选择是完善竞争执法地方授权机制，并严控司法地方化。竞争政策实施的横向分权则不仅关乎公共执行与私人执行之间的分权机制，还涉及公共执行内部的分权机制。公共执行在世界范围内存在着“机构多元化”和“手段多样化”的现象。由竞争主管机关和行业主管机关分享竞争执法权，不仅具有效率优势，也具有分权优势。同样的，私人执行也不仅仅是公共执行的“补充”，而是一种替代性的“分权”机制。单纯的公共执行或私人执行都不足以有效地实施竞争政策，它们的分工和合作才共同构成了一个有效的竞争政策实施体系。对于竞争政策实施难点的考察发现：政府反竞争行为的反垄断法规制涉及宪政层面的政府权力控制和基本权利保护问题；国有企业的反垄断法适用涉及宪法经济条款的解释以及保障经济自由和经济民主的问题。政府反竞争行为作为公权力和私权利相结合的产物，肇始于特定授权环境下政府干预市场的需求和私人（特别是利益团体）请愿权利的行使。因此对于政府反竞争行为的理解和规范，不仅应关注政府（包括立法、执法和司法机关）行为，还应关注私人请愿行为。前者要取得合法性，必须获得法律的明确授权、不侵犯宪法上的基本权利并满足公共利益的需求。后者要取得合法性，则需要在不同宪法自由权（请愿自由和营业自由）中取得平衡。但是不管怎样，对于政府反竞争行为是否“正当”的判断，不能建立在是否存在实体权力（利）以及程序是否合法的基础之上，而是建立在对市场效果的综合考察之上。对于政府反竞争行为的规范，也不能仅仅依靠行政法和反垄断法，而是需要积极寻求“竞争推进”的手段，逐步缓解和消除不利于自由竞争的制度安排。此外，国有企业在理论上是作为特殊的公共机构而存在的，但是我国长期将国有企业定位为利润最大化的工具，导致国有企业取得了不公平的“竞争优势”，使其更有“动机”和“能力”实施反竞争行为。在此情况下，反垄断法不可能平等适用于所有企业。而且，宪法中的“经济制度”条款和“国有经济”条款与反垄断法的适用存在内在冲突，使得如何理解和适用宪法条款成为影响竞争政策实施的重要因素。在此背景下，应将国有企业改革的目标重新定位为构建“非营利性公法企业”，并建立国有资产的宪政治理结构，由立法机关而非行政部门代表“全民”行使国有资产的所有权。与此同时引入“竞争中立政策”，消除国有企业因所有制而产生的竞争优势，并通过有利于竞争政策的宪法解释获得宪政支持。对于竞争政策推进理念和措施的考察发现：“竞争推进”是单纯竞争执法之外实现竞争政策目标的“另一条道路”，旨在通过竞争宣传、竞争咨询、竞争审查和竞争评估等制度影响政府和社会公众，营造“竞争有益于经济”的社会共识。但是，竞争推进的有效性与竞争政策在一个国家经济政策体系中的地位、国家高层的支持力度、立法或政策的明确要求以及竞争推进机关所掌握的资源和能力等因素密切相关。在我国整体授权环境并不是非常有利于竞争政策发展的情况下，在立法上赋予竞争主管机关（包括享有竞争执法权的行业主管机关）竞争推进的职能异常重要。与此同时，通过竞争执法带动竞争推进、通过“能力建设”提升实施能力、通过鼓励社会组织和消费者组织的发展培育能够与垄断力量相抗衡的社会力量，也是我国竞争推进的可行路径。需要明确的是，中国特殊的政府主导型经济发展模式决定了竞争推进的重点对象必然是政府本身。与此相应，中国竞争推进的主要目标应该是推动竞争咨询制度乃至竞争审查制度的建立。总而言之，竞争政策的宪政分析框架提供了两大视角：一是从“从授权环境（特别是宪政环境）看竞争政策”；二是“用宪政理念分析竞争政策”。从这两大视角出发分析竞争政策的产生、目标、实施和推进，得出了一些与传统反垄断法分析不同的结论。该视角及其结论至少在以下两个方面具有现实意义：第一，对于学界而言，可以抛弃不切实际的“理想主义”，考虑如何在特定授权环境下最大化地实现竞争政策的公共价值；第二，对于执法者而言，可以抛弃过于僵化的“现实主义”，考虑如何通过关注竞争政策的公共价值和提升自身能力引导授权环境的渐进式改变。更多还原

【Abstract】 The China’s Anti-monopoly Law provides that the Anti-MonopolyCommission’s primary responsibility is to study and draft related competition policies.However, for a long time there were only practices of competition policy but no ideaof competition policy in China. Moreover, for the reason that the concept ofcompetition policy appears in the Anti-monopoly Law, legal practitioners andscholars are inclined to regard competition policy merely as competition law, whileignoring that system reform and competition advocacy are also important parts ofcompetition policy, especially for countries in transition such as China. In fact,competition policy has been an important part of competition law study all around theworld. The difficulties and obstacles encountered during the enforcement of China’sAnti-monopoly Law further show the need for competition policy study. On the otherhand, once we research competition law in the height of competition policy, we haveto consider the overall authorizing environment of competition policy, especially theconstitutional environment. This is not only because competition policy’s goals andoperation are closely related to a country’s constitutional mechanisms andconstitutional culture, but also because the enforcement of competition policy relatesto the separation of powers between enforcement bodies (including horizontalseparation of powers and vertical separation of powers), the security and balance offundamental rights in the Constitution (such as freedom of petition and freedom to dobusiness), and the interpretation of economic terms in the Constitution (such as theterms related to economic system, state-owned economy and ownership).Therefore, only within the framework of competition policy, we can recognizethe limitations of competition law and seek improvement method. Similarly, if we donot study competition policy in the height of constitutionalism, it is hard to judge if the competition policy, as an important part of economic policies, is in line with theneed of constitutional democracy. On this basis, this paper attempts to build afundamental constitutional analysis framework for the competition policy. By treatingthe competition policy as analysis object and the constitutionalism as analysisperspective, this framework looks at competition law within the scope of competitionpolicy and analyzes competition policy’s birth, goals, enforcement and advocacy fromthe perspective of constitutionalism.The research to the driving force of the Anti-monopoly Law finds that, theintroduction of competition law may be affected by multiple factors, but what kind ofcompetition law was introduced is mainly influenced by political factors. The researchto the operation track of the Anti-monopoly Law finds that, despite the law oftendeviated from the established track, it still followed a relatively fixed trajectory anddeviated and returned under an intermediate point such as pendulum. The abovephenomenon confirms the political game theory in the constitutional perspectivewhich regards competition policy as a self-development political game process (thepolitical interaction between producers and consumers). Under this theory, thebalance of game powers and the differences of authorizing environment directly resultin the content of competition law and its running track. However, it is noteworthy thatthe highlight of competition policy’s political factors is not to negate the economic orsocial basis that give rise to competition policy. On the contrary, it is to re-arouse theconcern of political factors and game forces on the basis of recognizing theimportance of economic factors and social factors.There are mainly three views in theory with regard to the goals of competitionpolicy. The first theory believes that the efficiency is the only goal of competitionpolicy (the efficiency doctrine). The second theory considers that the goals ofcompetition policy are diverse but all can be summarized as public interest (the publicinterest doctrine). The third theory deems that the consumer welfare is the ultimategoal of competition policy (the consumer welfare doctrine). In practice, the latter twohave become mainstream views in many countries. Nevertheless, there are still manyeconomists and eminent scholars advocate the efficiency doctrine of competitionpolicy. This is not a simple academic dispute, but implies an important academicconcern. Supporters of the efficiency doctrine are trying to establish a unified goal toprevent competition law enforcement influenced excessively by politics and avoidcompetition policy subject to the adverse effects of other economic and social policies. However, as one of public policies, competition policy will inevitably become theobject of game launched by multi-stakeholders. Under the constitutional perspective,the disputes of goals are concrete manifestation of policy competition and the diversegoals are the practical needs of a democratic society. It can be understood as ablending of the ideal and reality by defining the goals of competition policy asconsumer welfare. Because anyone can be consumers, such a treatment will achievethe demands of a single goal being away from political interferences and meet thepractical needs of multiple stakeholders.The enforcement of competition policy involves not only vertical separation ofpowers (central enforcement and local implementation), but also horizontal separationof powers (public enforcement and private enforcement). The vertical separation ofcompetition policy enforcement powers needs to consider how to stimulate the localenforcement of competition policy while at the same time preventing the localprotectionism of competition policy enforcement. The authorizing environment(especially the form of state structure) of a country determines the decentralizedmodel of powers and if the localization of competition policy can be effectivelycurbed. For China, it is an ideal solution to establish a central law enforcement systemand central judicial system for competition policy enforcement. However, under thecurrent authorizing environment, it is a more informed choice to improve current localauthorization mechanisms of competition law enforcement and strictly control thelocalization of judiciary system. The horizontal separation of competition policyenforcement powers is not only related to the separation of powers between publicenforcement and private enforcement, and also involves the internal separation ofpowers among public enforcement bodies. The public enforcement responsibilities ofcompetition policy are share by multiple departments all over the world and the meansof public enforcement are plentiful. It will not only generate efficiency advantages butalso checks and balances advantages to let competition authorities and industryauthorities share the responsibility of competition policy enforcement. Similarly,private enforcement is not just a supplement of public enforcement, but an alternativedecentralization mechanism. Pure public enforcement or private enforcement can notbe adequate to the effective enforcement of competition policy. The division andcooperation of public enforcement and private enforcement constitutes an effectivecompetition policy enforcement system.The competition law regulation to the government anti-competitive conducts involves constitutional control of government powers and protection of fundamentalrights. Meanwhile, the competition law regulation to state-owned enterprises relates tointerpretation of economic terms in the Constitution and the protection of economicfreedom and economic democracy. As the product of the combination of public powerand private rights, the government anti-competitive conducts are originated from thedemand of asking the government to intervene the market and the exercise of petitionright by private sectors (in particular interest groups) under specific authorizingenvironment. Therefore, the premise of understanding and regulation of governmentanti-competitive conducts is to concern both the government behaviors (includinglegislative act, law enforcement and judicial decisions) and private petition behaviors.The former to obtain legitimacy must obtain the explicit authorization of the law, doesnot infringe the fundamental constitutional rights and meet the needs of the publicinterest. The latter to obtain legitimacy needs to strike a balance between differentconstitutional rights (such as petition freedom and business freedom). However, inany case, the judgment of whether the government anti-competitive conducts areproper should be based on the comprehensive study of market effects rather than thereality that relative powers or rights are legal in form and exercised according to legalprocedures. Further, the regulation of government anti-competitive conducts can notrely solely on administrative law and competition law, but needs to actively seek themeans of competition advocacy in order to gradually alleviate and eliminateinstitutional arrangements that are not conducive to free competition. In addition,state-owned enterprises in theory are regarded as special public institutions. But inChina, state-owned enterprises are always deemed as a tool for profit maximization,which makes them obtain unfair competitive advantages and possess more motivationand capacity to carry out anti-competitive behaviors. In this case, competition law cannot be applied equally to all enterprises. Moreover, the economic system terms andthe state-owned economy terms in the Constitution have inherent conflicts with theAnti-monopoly Law, which makes the understanding and application of constitutionalprovisions become important factors that affect the enforcement of competition policy.In this context, the objective of the state-owned enterprises reform should berepositioned to build non-profit public law enterprises and to establish a constitutionalgovernance structure for state-owned assets under which the legislature rather than theexecutive exercises the ownership of state-owned assets on behalf of all people. At thesame time, it is proposed that the competitive neutrality policy being introduced to eliminate the competitive advantages of state-owned enterprises due to the ownershipand the Constitution being explained in favor of competition policy.Competition advocacy is an alternative way to achieve the goals of competitionpolicy except in addition to competition law enforcement. It aims to create a socialconsensus that competition is good for economy by affecting the government and thepublic through means such as competition publicity, competition advices, competitivereview and competitive evaluation. However, the effectiveness of competitionadvocacy depends a lot on the authorizing environment of a country, especially thestatus of competition policy among a country’s economic policy system, the supportof national leaders to competition policy, the clear requirements of competitionadvocacy in relevant laws and policies and the available resources and capacity of thecompetition advocacy authorities. In the case that China’s overall authorizingenvironment is not very conducive to the development of competition policy, it isextremely important to confer the competition authorities (including industryauthorities possess the power to enforce competition laws) powers to carry outcompetition advocacy functions in legislation. At the same time, it is also a viablepath for China to promote competition policy through ways of enforcing competitionlaws, enhancing the capacity of law enforcers and encouraging the development ofsocial organizations and consumer organizations to foster the social forces competingwith monopoly powers. Nevertheless, it should be clarified that the focus ofcompetition advocacy in China is the government itself because of the specialgovernment-led model of economic development. Corresponding to this, theobjectives of Chinas competition advocacy is to promote the establishment ofcompetitive advisory system and competitive review system.In short, the constitutional analysis framework of competition policy providestwo perspectives: the one is to see competition policy from the perspective ofauthorizing environment (especially the constitutional environment); the other is toanalyze competition policy from the perspective of constitutional ideas. By analyzingcompetition policy from the two perspectives, some different conclusions can beobtained. These two perspectives and their conclusions are practically meaningful inthe following two aspects: First, for the academia, the unrealistic idealism can beabandoned and consider how to maximize the realization of public values ofcompetition policy under specific authorizing environment; for law enforcers, therigid realism can be abandoned and consider how to promote progressive changes of authorizing environment by paying attention to public values of competition policyand enhancing law enforcement ability.更多还原