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货物原产地规则研究

Study on Rules of Origin of Goods

【作者】 邓永军

【导师】 周洪钧;

【作者基本信息】 华东政法大学 , 国际法, 2012, 博士

【摘要】 论文分为五章,第一章是对货物原产地规则的概述,论述了货物原产地规则的基本理论,包括货物原产地规则的概念、分类、主要内容等。原产地规则是指任何国家或地区为确定货物原产地而实施的普遍适用的法律、法规和行政裁决。目前,世界上大部分国家将货物原产地标准分为两大类,即完全获得标准和实质性改变标准。完全获得标准是指用以判断货物完全在某一国家内生产或制造的标准。符合完全获得标准的货物又称完全原产货物,不包含任何从第三国进口或来源不明的原材料和零部件。由于此类货物只涉及一个国家,技术上容易判断和界定,世界各国分歧较小。实质性改变标准通常包括税则分类改变标准、从价百分比标准及制造或加工工序标准三种具体标准。原产地规则最主要的分类方式是根据是否与优惠待遇直接关联而分为优惠性原产地规则和非优惠性原产地规则。第二章是关于WTO《原产地规则协定》的论述。长期以来,原产地规则缺乏多边纪律约束,各国各行其是,原产地规则从一种中性的海关技术措施演变为实施贸易保护主义政策的工具。乌拉圭回合将原产地规则纳入到谈判内容,并最终通过了《原产地规则协定》,扩大了多边贸易体制的约束范围。本章对《原产地规则协定》的宗旨与原则、定义与适用范围、实施原产地规则的纪律、争端程序安排、原产地规则的协调等问题进行了论述。《原产地规则协定》仅适用于那些非优惠性商业政策领域,将那些用于契约性或自主性的优惠性原产地规则排除在外。优惠性原产地规则仅制定某些纪律。原产地规则国际协调的谈判从1995年7月开始,原计划应该在3年之内完成,但由于各国对于与非优惠性原产地规则相关的诸多贸易政策立场差异大,对制订货物特定原产地规则的尺度有不同的主张,到2011年12月,协调工作仍未完成。第三章是关于普惠制货物原产地规则的论述。本章介绍了欧盟、美国、加拿大、日本等国的普惠制原产地规则。普惠制原产地规则是各给惠国关于受惠国出口产品享受普惠制待遇必备的条件的规定,是普惠制的重要组成部分和核心。为了确保普惠制关税优惠待遇仅给予在发展中国家生产、收获和制造,并从发展中国家出运的产品,各给惠国都制定了相应的原产地规则,用以衡量受惠国的出口产品是否可以取得普惠制的原产地资格。在当前的国际实践中,一般是由各给惠国根据本国的立法程序,分别制定各自的普惠制原产地规则,给惠国拥有相当大的自由裁量权和决定权。如许多国家规定了给惠国成分,但涉及敏感产品时,却排除其适用,如日本对皮革产品、纺织品、鞋帽类产品就不适用给惠国成分规则。严格地说,国际上现行的普惠制原产地规则实际上就是各给惠国各种不同的普惠制原产地规则的简单凑合,受惠国毫无发言权,受惠国为了获得关税优惠,只能是被动地接受这些普惠制原产地规则,给惠国为保护国内相关产业,利用原产地规则设置种种条件和限制,使普惠制的实际利用率大大降低。许多发展中国家,特别是最不发达国家,在国际贸易中越来越被边缘化。第四章论述了区域贸易安排中的货物原产地规则。WTO多哈回合谈判陷入僵局,区域经济一体化加速发展,在区域贸易协定中,原产地规则占据了核心的位置。其原因在于,原产地规则可以确保在本区域内发生“实质性改变”的产品(而不是通过某个成员国简单地转运到区域内的产品)得到优先市场准入资格。如果没有原产地规则,则来自第三方国家的产品可以随意进入区域内,从而使区域经济一体化的意义大打折扣。本章主要论述NAFTA和泛欧的优惠原产地规则,这两种原产地规则都对于其它区域协议的原产地规则产生了巨大的影响。泛欧的产品特定规则有章号和品目号两个层次。另外,还用“ex”符号来标记特定产品。而NAFTA产品特定规则有品目号、子目号和项目号三个层次。泛欧原产地规则对于农产品的产品特定规则相对严格一些。而NAFTA规则对于纺织品、服装和机动车产品有更多的限制性要求。NAFTA规则基本上是遵循税号改变原则,一般不采用制造或加工工序来决定原产资格。第五章分析了中国货物原产地规则,并对中国原产地规则的完善提出了一些建议。中国原产地规则立法起步晚,立法水平不高。中国应结合本国的产业发展战略、产品在本国市场及对外贸易中的地位、产品的市场潜力、产品的竞争程度等,在制定原产地规则时,充分利用制造或加工工序标准,完善货物原产地规则,以达到调整产业结构,促进产业升级的目标。

【Abstract】 The paper consists of five chapters. The first chapter gives a brief discussion ofthe basic theory of rules of origin. Rules of origin are defined as those laws,regulations and administrative determinations of general application applied by anystate or region to determine the country of origin of goods. Rules of origin shallprovide for the country to be determined as the origin of a particular good to be eitherthe country where the good has been wholly obtained or, when more than one countryis concerned in the production of the good, the country where the last substantialtransformation has been carried out. There is little difference concerning the criterionof the wholly obtained goods. The criterion of substantial transformation includesthree concrete criteria: change in tariff classification, ad valorem percentages,manufacturing or processing operations. In relation with preference-giving or not,rules of origin can be classified into two category: nonpreferential and preferentialrules of origin.The second chapter discusses the WTO Agreement on Rules of Origin. Theabsence of a clear and binding multilateral discipline in the field of rules of origin hasbeen one of the reasons for opening the way to the utilization of rules of origin as atrade policy instrument. The growing concern over trade policy implications of rulesof origin ultimately generated efforts that matured into the long-awaited multilateraldiscipline. The WTO Agreement on Rules of Origin breaks new ground, but it onlyimplies in the nonpreferential field, including all rules of origin used innonpreferential commercial policy instruments, such as in the application of:most-favored-nation treatment under Articles I, II, III, XI, XIII of GATT1994;anti-dumping and countervailing duties under Article VI of GATT1994; safeguardmeasures under Article XIX of GATT1994; origin marking requirements under Article IX of GATT1994; any discriminatory quantitative restrictions or tariff quotas;government procurement and trade statistics. The Harmonization Work Program(HWP) of the nonpreferential rules of origin established pursuant to the WTOAgreement on Rules of Origin should have been completed by July1998. At the timeof this writing, the final agreement is still pending. The preliminary results of theHWP extended over three volumes, encompassing more than2,000pages andthousands of product-specific rules of origin. A much-needed cleaned-up version ofthe text has recently appeared with320pages. Different member has differentconsiderations. The U. S. wished not to use the results of the HWP to determine originin the context of antidumping and countervailing proceeding. On the other hand,many members wished the results be equally used for all purposes.Chapter three analyses the rules of origin in Generalized System of Preferences(GSP). The idea of preferential tariff rates in the markets of industrialized countrieswas presented by the first Secretary-General of UNCTAD, Raul Prebisch, at the FirstSession of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in1964. Theidea of the GSP was ultimately adopted in New Delhi, in1968, in the context ofUNCTAD II. Developing countries are granted preferential tariff treatment in themarkets of developed countries under the GSP, in order to help them increase exportearnings, promote industrialization, and accelerate rates of economic growth. TheGSP is a nonreciprocal and nondiscriminatory system of preferences in favor ofdeveloping countries. Drafting a uniform set of origin rules to be applied to thedifferent GSP schemes of preference-giving countries was the principal aim of theSpecial Committee on Preferences, at its second session. Hence, the SpecialCommittee decided to establish the working Group on Rules of Origin with the task ofinitiating consultations on technical aspects of the rules of origin with the objective ofpreparing draft origin rules to be applied uniformly in the GSP system.There weremany discussion and debates in drawing up the uniform rules of origin in the GSPsystem. The preference-giving countries did not agree uniform rules, wanting itdecided autonomously. In1974, all GSP schemes had entered into force (UNCTADdocument TD/B/442). Each preference-giving country set its own GSP rules of origin. The reform of the UNCTAD secretariat carried out in1996during UNCTAD IX inMidrand (South Africa) eliminated all UNCTAD standing committees including theSpecial Committee on Preferences and its subsidiary bodies, namely, the SessionalCommittee on Rules of Origin. Since then, the international trading community lostthe only intergovernmental forum to discuss GSP rules of origin.Chapter four examines the rules of origin of goods in regional trading agreement.Rules of origin are clearly at the very core of regional economic integration schemesbecause they ensure that preferential market access will be granted only to goods thathave actually been “substantially transformed” within the area, and not to goods thatare produced elsewhere and simply transshipped through one of the countriesparticipating in the scheme. In the absence of rules of origin it would not be possibleto discriminate against imports from third countries, so the significance of regionalintegration would be drastically diminished. This chapter mainly discusses theNAFTA and the Pan-European preferential rules of origin. When preferential rules oforigin are drafted in the context of any FTA, the NAFTA and the EU approached indealing with preferential rules of origin are largely dominating and influencing thescene.Chapter five analyses the rules of origin of goods in China, and gives somesuggestions for the perfection of China’s rules of origin of goods. There is a great lagbetween China’s rules of origin and the rules of origin of the U.S and EU. The rules oforigin in China did not draw much attention until very lately. The legislation of rulesof origin in China is still at a relatively low level. China should modify its criterion ofmanufacturing or processing operation to optimize the industrial structure and realizeindustry upgrading.

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