【作者】 喻玲；

【导师】 徐士英；

【作者基本信息】 华东政法大学 ， 经济法学， 2012， 博士

【摘要】 从西方主要工业国家的实践看，主要生产部门的市场集中度处于一个不断攀升的趋势，以跨国公司为代表的寡头企业不但在一国经济部门占有绝对优势，而且也成为该国经济竞争力的标志。故而，培育具有较强国际竞争力的大企业大集团，提高一国产业的市场集中度，对该国市场整体运行绩效的提升有着举足轻重的作用。尽管以哈佛学派和芝加哥学派为代表的不同产业组织理论对市场结构、企业行为、市场绩效之间的作用激励、影响因素等存在不同认识，但是“必须借助反垄断法来规范企业行为，限制垄断力量的发展，保持市场适度竞争”，以及“市场结构决定企业行为，企业行为影响市场绩效”是他们普遍的认识。然而，在反垄断法实施过程中，“规范寡头行为”（动作）与“规范的寡头行为”（结果）之差异常常被忽视，“合理的市场结构→规范的企业行为→理想的市场绩效”的逻辑关系错误地简化为“反垄断法规范企业行为→理想的市场绩效”。于是，在反垄断法发展早期，反垄断法规制效果往往被无限放大，执法机构倚重反垄断法本身（一元模式）完成对寡头的规制。其结果是，有着“总是游走在违法边缘”行为偏好的寡头容易被执法者“错杀”或者“漏杀”，反垄断法的威慑效果不理想。反垄断执法一度成为企业（包括寡头）成长的巨大障碍，进而影响了公众对反垄断法的价值评价。为克服反垄断规制寡头一元模式存在的弊端，规制者不得不从事前进行防范、事中进行监控、事后进行合理救济等全方位的角度进行制度供给。反垄断立法、执法、司法中大量引入经济、道德、伦理、文化等因素，这些因素相互作用，极大丰富了反垄断法对寡头的规制“工具箱”，一元模式完成向多元模式的转向。这种转向有着坚实的实践基础，是一个规制者不断平衡社会变动的制度需求过程。这种转向还有着深厚的理论基础，它既体现着作为上层建筑的法律对经济关系变化的回应性，也体现着作为规制方式的反垄断法对不同规制对象、不同行为选择恰当规制工具的回应性。在多元模式生成的“赢者生存”的战争中，规制者在制度供给方面也做了许多艰辛的努力。这些努力，喜忧参半。有的制度大获成功，如宽恕制度、合规制度；有的黯然退场，如引入规制替代者制度。从各国反垄断规制寡头制度与实践来看，那些生存下来的制度有着惊人的“趋同性”。在走向“更好规制（better regulation）”的时代，学习这些经验，努力促成反垄断法规制寡头多元模式在中国的生成，是中国作为后发地区制定反垄断相关法律制度的所具有的“后发优势”，也是中国实现“培育有国际竞争力的大企业大集团”战略，提升寡头垄断市场绩效的可行之径。更多还原

【Abstract】 From the development and practice of main western industrialized countries, therehas been a rising trend of concentration of major productive sectors. A large number ofmultinational corporations as the representative of oligopolies hold overwhelmingadvantages in these countries’ economic sectors, and become the sign of their nationaleconomy competence. Therefore it is believe that forming and cultivating large enterprisesand groups with strong international competitiveness and improving the nation’s industrialconcentration plays a significant role in the overall market performance of a nation.Although prominent theories of industry organization from Harvard School and ChicagoSchool differ greatly about the motivation and influencing factors in market structure,enterprise behavior, and market performance.“should use antitrust law to regulateenterprises’ behavior, restrict the development of monopoly power to maintain anappropriate competition in the market” and “market structure determines corporatebehavior, which in turn determines the market performance” is their commonunderstanding. However, in the implementation of antitrust law, the differences betweenthe “regulating an oligopoly’s behavior”(action) and the “normative behavior of anoligopoly”(result) is often overlooked. Thus, the relationship between “reasonable marketstructure-normative behavior of enterprise-perfect market performance” is wronglysimplified as “antitrust law regulate enterprise’s behavior-perfect market performance”.Because of this, the regulating effect of antitrust law is overly magnified, and theenforcement agencies rely solely on antitrust law to regulate oligopoly.As a result, many oligopolies has been mistreated by the enfocement agency, because oligopolies prefer to“dance along the”, thus the deterrent effect of antitrust law is counterproductive. Theenforcement of antitrust laws thus becomes an obstacle against growth of enterprises(including the oligopoly) while negatively affecting the public’s valuation of antitrust law.To overcome the drawbacks of using a univariate-model, the regulator has had tocomplete the system from all-round aspects, including preventing violations before theyoccur, monitoring for violations, and providing reasonable relief measures. The legislation,enforcement and justice of antitrust law has also introduced a great number of economic,moral, ethical, cultural factors, which interact and greatly enrich the regulation “tool-kit”of antitrust law, resulting in a change from an univariate-model to a multivariate-model.This shift has a solid practical basis, and it’s a process that regulator constantly balance thesystem demands according to social changes. This shift also has a solid theoretical basis, itreflects the superstructure’s response to the changes in economic relationship, and it alsoreflects that as a regulation manner, antitrust law’s response to different regulation objects,different manners for different and appropriate tools. In the survival of the fittestenvironment that generated from multivariate-model, regulators put in a lot of additionaleffort to supplement the existing system. But the effects of these efforts are mixed. Somesystems had a great success, such as the forgiveness system and compliance system; butsome failed and were replaced by regulator replacement system. Those systems thatsuccessfully survived had amazing convergence.In the era of approaching to “better regulation”, to learn about these experiences andpromote multivariate-model antitrust regulation on oligopoly in China, which is alate-developing area, is our late-developing advantage when establish related antitrust lawsystem, it’s also an effective way for China to achieve “cultivate large enterprises andgroups with strong international competitiveness” strategy and improve oligopolymonopoly market performance.更多还原