【作者】 周洪文；

【导师】 戴思锐；

【作者基本信息】 西南大学 ， 农业经济管理， 2011， 博士

【摘要】 农地非公益过度征收及低价补偿,已对我国经济社会发展造成严重负面影响。研究这一问题产生的背景和成因,分析相关主体的行为,总结这一问题诱发的各种效应和产生的后果,探寻其管理与控制的途径与手段,对我国土地资源的科学配置与合理利用、对土地财富的公平分享、对缓解征地矛盾等,既具有理论意义,也具有现实价值。一、研究的主要内容(1)农地征收的特征及农地过度征收的动因分析。借助公共利益理论分析公益用地与非公益用地的相互关系及其模糊边界,以公共选择理论分析农地征收的特征,从我国财政分权体制角度探求地方政府过度征地的动力,通过对我国农地制度和征地制度的剖析,探明农地过度征收得以实现的原因。(2)农地非公益强制征收的综合效应分析。利用宏观数据和典型调研数据,用市场均衡基本原理,分析政府非公益征地行为引发的土地资源在农业与非农产业之间、城乡之间的配置效应以及土地资源配置的短期化效应,度量农地减少、非农产业过度用地和城镇建设用地的浪费,分析非公益征地行为引起的土地财富在农民、政府和工商企业用地单位之间的再分配效应,阐明强制征地和低补偿标准对失地农民边缘化、农民与政府及用地单位之间对立关系的形成和矛盾激化的必然结果。(3)农地非公益征收的主体行为控制研究。在我国目前工农关系、城乡关系背景下,分析非公益征地中政府强制性行为、农民及村集体抗争行为、用地单位逐利行为及投机行为特征,并对地方政府与中央政府、被征地农民、用地单位之间分别进行两两博弈分析。在此基础上,提出抑制地方政府征地冲动的基本思路,探索中央政府发展战略方向调整、地方政府土地财政替代途径、替代激励因素和激励方式,就约束地方政府低价供给工业用地行为、超高价供给商住用地行为展开讨论,对用地单位投机行为的识别、监控与惩治进行探讨,对农民的土地短期化行为、村干部寻租行为的识别与约束方法进行研究。(4)农地非公益征收的数量控制研究。分析土地利用规划和城市规划两大规划体系之间失调的表现和原因,研究通过“两规”协调对非公益征地数量控制的方法。分析基本农田保护政策对非公益征地的约束机制和约束失灵的原因,提出改进思路。分析现行非公益项目用地标准、不同行业工业用地标准的执行特征,研究对现行标准的优化空间。对现行农地征收补偿安置标准及其争议进行再讨论,研究制定合理的补偿安置标准控制非公益征地数量。(5)农地非公益征收的程序控制研究。在农地集体所有及农地所有权与经营权分离的现实约束下,探索农民参与土地征收决策、土地征收价格协商的途径与方式。对农地转用审批和征地审批制度进行反思,研究改进审批体制、实现非公益征收控制的途径。研究农地非公益征收程序的监管方式。(6)农地非公益征收的控制手段研究。探索非公益征地中政府角色转换的目标、转换步骤及转换激励手段,分析非公益建设用地市场的特征、非公益征地市场化的条件塑造及市场监管手段,探索土地增值收益在国家、集体与农民个人之间合理分配的途径和方式,研究土地增值收益收缴程序控制和支出控制的手段。(7)提出农地非公益征收控制的相关政策建议。二、主要研究结论(1)现行体制和制度缺陷是农地过度征收的根本原因。一方面现行财政分权体制造成中央与地方政府以及地方上下级政府之间财权和事权失衡,现行政绩考核体制刺激地方政府在之间“发展”上的过度竞争,激发了地方政府的土地财政欲望。另一方面由于土地的城乡二元制度以及农村集体土地所有权主体模糊、征地中的公共利益范围界定不清、征地门槛过低,为政府强制征地行为提供了弹性空间。两方面的作用使农地过度征收成为现实。(2)农地过度征收带来严重后果。耕地迅速减少引发粮食安全风险。农民土地财富被强制剥夺造成失地农民边缘化、与政府和社会的对立加深,社会和经济矛盾不断激化,引发社会稳定风险和政府无限责任风险。地方政府对土地财政的依赖、对经济增长的偏执,增加地方债务风险。农地的过度非农化、城市化和土地资源的短期化配置,以及非农产业及城镇建设用地的浪费和低效率利用,带来土地资源利用的不可持续风险。(3)转变现行体制和政府职能、完善土地制度,才能从根本上解决农地非公益征收的矛盾。中央政府应摒弃低成本发展战略,实现由投资型政府向服务型政府的转变,相应弱化地方政绩考核中的经济增长指标、强化社会发展指标,方能扭转地方政府之间的非理性竞争。完善现行财政分权制度,加大上级政府对社会公共品的供给责任,可以有效避免地方政府对土地财政的过度依赖,弱化地方政府的征地冲动。强化农户对土地的用益物权,明确征地中的公共利益范围,可以有效遏制非公益征地行为。提高失地农民补偿安置标准,给予其平等的城镇居民待遇,可以提高征地门槛,有效控制非公益征地数量。(4)农地非公益征收的市场化改革需要过渡性措施。可以首先尝试政府放弃农地征收中的强制定价权,待条件成熟后再逐步放弃非公益建设用地的征收权,实现由强制征收向市场化转用的渐进性制度变迁。农地非公益转用市场的运行,必须首先明确农民对土地的用益物权、明确交易规则和监管规则。(5)不断完善现行规划体系、基本农田保护制度和城市建设用地利用标准,可以实现对农地非公益征收的数量的有效控制。以国民经济发展规划为基础,以土地利用规划指导城市总体规划的编制,实现两个规划的协调统一,可以提高规划体系的科学性和权威性,弥补两规脱节的漏洞。尽快建立基本农田保护的补偿制度,可以提高地方政府保护基本农田的积极性。城市人均建设用地标准、工业项目建设用地标准必须严格执行,城市居住用地标准可适当提高。(6)赋予农民参与征地的决策权、优化征地审批程序并加强征地过程监管,有利于实现对农地非公益征收的程序控制。赋予农民参与征地决策的主体地位,给予农民从土地规划、征地决策到征地实施的全过程参与权利,有助于非公益征收的程序公平。分离现行的农地转用审批和农地征收审批、严格限定审批中的自由裁量权,利用技术手段加强征地过程监管,可以规范征地程序。三、创新点(1)遵循渐进性制度变迁过程,提出农地非公益征收市场化改革需要过渡性措施的观点。在农地非公益征收市场化改革完成之前,必须完善现行体制和相关制度,实现对非公益征地的有效控制。(2)农地非公益征收市场化可以通过两个步骤实现。首先政府放弃单方强制定价权,赋予农民平等的议价权利。待农民对土地用益物权得到强化、农地征收的公共利益范围得到清晰界定以后,政府放弃非公益用地领域的强制征收权,农地向非公益建设用地的转移借助市场实现,农民与用地单位作为市场供求的平等主体对土地使用权进行谈判交易。政府司责土地用途管制、土地规划等相关制度的执行监督和市场监管。(3)土地增值收益既不宜全部归公,也不能全部归农,应当“农公分享”。失地农民分享部分,应当以保证其生活和发展水平不低于同地区城镇居民平均的生活和保障水平为最低界限。归公部分由政府代为管理,必须首先保证农业农村发展需要,还应在政府届际之间实现合理分配。四、需进一步研究的问题(1)财政分权体制进一步完善的方向和途径,不同功能分区前提下各级地方政府考核指标体系的构建和权重设定等,需要进一步专门研究。(2)农村集体经济组织及集体资产所有权主体的清晰界定,集体组织成员的具体责任、义务和权利界定,成员权的设定和表达方式等,有待进一步探讨。(3)农村集体土地使用权市场化操作层面的制度设计,有待专门研究。(4)土地增值收益“农公分享”的比例、在政府届际之间的分配和管理制度,需要专门研究。更多还原

【Abstract】 The non-public expropriation on rural land has serious negative effect on China’s economic and social development. Therefore, striking in-depth research on the background and cause of this problem, analyzing relevant main bodies’behavior, summarizing all sorts of post effects and results and exploring the path and measures of management and control are theoretically and practically meaningful for scientific allocation and utilization of China’s land resource, equal distribution of land wealth and buffering contradiction caused by land acquisition.1. Key Points of the Research.(1) Analysis on the motivation of rural land over-expropriation and features of rural land expropriation. This thesis analyzes the inter-connection and vague cross-border of public construction land and non-public construction land from the perspective of public interest benefit, studies the features of rural land expropriation from the perspective of public choice theory. Through research on China’s rural land system and land expropriation system, this thesis seeks to find the reason for the realization of over-expropriation on rural land and the local government’s incentives for over-expropriation from the perspective of financial power decentralization system.(2) Synthesized effect analysis on the forced expropriation on rural land. Based on market equilibrium and research data as well as macro based data, this thesis analyzes the short-term effect of land research allocation, distributing effect among urban city and rural region, agricultural production and non-agricultural production that cause by local government’s non-public land expropriation. Moreover, we give measurement on the loss of rural land, waste of non-agriculturally productive rural land and county construction land. Then, we study the re-distributing effect that caused by non-public land expropriation among rural citizen, government and firms, and argue that the marginalisation of rural citizen, the formation and escalation of contradictive relationship between rural citizen and local government along with land user were definitely caused by forced land expropriation and low compensation for it. (3) Research on the main bodies’behavior of non-public expropriation of rural land. Under the background of current relationship situation of employer and farmer as well as urban city and rural region in China, this thesis analyzes the features of speculation and profitability behavior of land user, resistance behavior of rural citizen and community and local government’s forced non-public land expropriation. And then, we give in-depth gaming analysis on the relationship among local government, central government, expropriated rural citizen and land users. Based on all above, this thesiss proposes the fundamental framework of inhibiting land expropriate incentives of local government, explores the strategic adapting direction of central government’s development, substitution path of local government’s land finance power and motivating factors of substitution. In order to constrain the behavior of industrial production-oriented land offering with low pricing from local government and high pricing behavior for business-oriented construction, this thesis discusses the perception, supervision and punishment of speculation behavior of land users, and we study the perception and constraining method of short-term-orientation behavior and rent seeking behavior of rural officials.(4) Research on quantitative control of non-public expropriation of rural land. This thesis analyzes the performance and reasons of dis-coordination between land utilization plan system and urban plan system, and also analyzes the quantitative control method for non-public land expropriation by harmonizing the two systems. To improve the thoughts framework, we study the reason for the dysfunction of constraining system of basic rural land protecting policy on non-public land expropriation. Furthermore, this thesis also studies the executive feature of different industrial construction land standard as well as current standard of non-public land utilization project and analyzes the improving space of current standard. Then, we re-discuss current standard of expropriation compensation and its contradiction, gives analysis on how to scientifically produce the compensation standard and control of non-public land expropriation.(5) Research on the procedure control of non-public expropriation of rural land. Under the constraining of community ownership of rural land as well as the power disjunction between ownership and operation, this thesis explores the methods for rural citizen to participate the decision and pricing procedure of land expropriation, studies the way to realize control of non-public land expropriation and improve approving system though rethinking on approving system of rural land transfer and acquisition, analyzes the supervision form of the procedure of non-public land expropriation.(6) Research on the control measures of non-public expropriation of rural land. This thesis explores the objectives, procedure and incentives of role transferring of government in non-public land expropriation, analyzes the feature of non-public construction land market, market forming condition and supervision measures of non-public land expropriation market, explores the path and way of scientific allocation of the benefit caused by land value increasing among nation, community and rural citizen, studies the measures of procedure control and payment control of benefit caused by land value increasing.(7) Policy implication on the control of non-public expropriation of rural land.2. Findings.(1) Systematical drawbacks are the fundamental reason for over-expropriation of rural land. For one thing, there is imbalance in financial power and operating power between central government and local government, and this is caused by the current system of financial power decentralization. Therefore, the unhealthy competition that inducted by performance-oriented system motivates the behavior of over-expropriation on rural land by local government. For the other, the dual-system of between rural and urban region in land utilization and rural land ownership as well as the common interest in expropriation procedure are all in vague space and low entry standard, and this provides government’s expropriation behavior with flexible choices. Both sides offer chances for over-expropriation on rural land.(2) Serious problem caused by over-expropriation of rural land. There will be food security risk caused by the decreasing of agricultural land. Rural citizen who lost their land resource and wealth would be marginalized. This would escalate their contradiction with government as well as social contradiction, and then activate risks like social instability and accountability-free of local government. The dependence on land finance of local government and stubbornness for economic growth would grow local debt risk. Over non-agriculturalization, urbanization of rural land and short-term allocation system of land resource, wasting behavior and utilization with low efficiency of county construction land and non-agricultural industry would bring about the insustainability risk of land resource utilization.(3) System transferring measures can basically solve the contradiction in non-public expropriation of rural land. It is necessary for central government to discard low cost developmental strategy in order to realize the transformation from investment-oriented government to service-oriented government, to weaken the economic growth factor in performance assessment of local government while strengthen social development factor. Only this can positively change the irrational competition among local governments. Improving existing decentralized system of financial power and strengthening the supplying responsibility of public goods from local government to society could effectively avoid the over-dependence on land finance of local government and weaken the incentives of land expropriation from local government. Strengthening the usufructuary right of farmers on rural land and clarifying the public interest scale in land expropriation could effectively inhibit the behavior of non-public land expropriation, Increasing the compensation for those farmers who lost rural land and offering them with equal treat as urban citizen shared could increase the entry level of land expropriation and control the quantity of non-public land expropriation.(4) There is in need of transitional measures to conduct market reform of non-public expropriation of rural land. Government could firstly try to abandon the pricing power in land expropriation, and then to gradually give away the expropriating right of non-public construction land when time is right, which is beneficial for the progressive institutional change from forced expropriation to market-oriented transformation. The operation of non-public land transferring market should built on the basis of clear usufructuary right of farmers on rural land and clear trading rules as well as supervising rules.(5) Constant improving existing planning system, basic farm land protecting system and land standard of urban construction utilization could realize the efficient quantitative control on the non-public expropriation of rural land. Based on the national economic growth and the guidance system of land utilization plan on urban construction plan can realize the coordination of the two plans, and this could improve the scientific level and authority of planning system and make up to the disjunction between the two plans. Swift construction of the basic farm land protection system and compensation system could improve the initiatives of the protection from government. Standards of urban construction land per capita and industrial project construction standards must be strictly taken into action and the standards of urban residential land can be properly increased. (6) Offering the decision making right in participating into land expropriation, optimizing the approval procedure in land expropriation and strengthening the process supervision are beneficial for the procedure control in non-public rural land expropriation. Providing rural citizen with position of major participator in land expropriation and offering them with the right in land planning, expropriating decision making and its execution are also good for the equality making in non-public expropriation. Separating existing approving system of rural transfer and expropriation, strictly limiting the flexible decision right space in approval and improving the quality of procedure supervision with help of modern technology could standardize the expropriation procedure.3. Innovation Points.(1) Based on the gradual institution change, this thesis originally argues that transitional measures are necessary for the market reform of non-public expropriation on rural land. Before the completion of the market reform of non-public expropriation on rural land, existing system and institutions should be improved in order to conduct effective control of non-public land expropriation(2) There are two steps for the market reform of non-public expropriation on rural land. Government should firstly abandon the pricing right in expropriation and offer farmers with the right of price negotiating. Government could give away the forced expropriation right on non-public utilization land after the clarification of the public interests in rural land expropriation and the escalation of the usufructuary right of farmers on rural land. Then, the transferring process from rural land to non-public construction land can be achieved by market and fanner can initiate the equal negotiation on land operation right with land users while government could be responsible for regulation on the market supervision and execution system of utilization of land and land planning.(3) The benefit caused by land value increasing neither belongs neither to government nor to farmers, and it should be shared. Those rural citizens who lost land should share the level which should be guaranteed the their life and development level is not lower than the average area of urban residents living and the level of protection. Public shares could be managed by government in order to assure rural development while realizing scientific allocation among local governments.4. Implications and future research agenda. (1) Further development and researches are needed in the direction and path for financial power decentralization system, evaluation index system of local government at all levels and index weighting methodology under the premise of different functional areas.(2) Further exploration on the clear definition of ownership bodies of rural economic community and collective capitals, the clear definition of concrete responsibility, obligation and rights of community members, the form and measures of description for membership are all strongly needed.(3) There is in need of specific research on the institutional design of market reform of rural community land using on the operational level.(4) Future specific research on the public and private shares proportion of benefit caused by land value increasing, and allocating system as well managing system among local governments are also in need.更多还原