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党政领导干部选拔任用制度改革研究

Reform of System for Slection and Appointment of Ieading Cadres

【作者】 刘再春

【导师】 吴志华;

【作者基本信息】 华东师范大学 , 教育经济与管理, 2012, 博士

【副题名】基于制度变迁理论的分析

【摘要】 干部选拔任用制度改革,是建设高素质干部队伍、培养造就大批优秀党政领导人才的治本之策。然而改革开放以来干部选拔任用制度改革,虽然一方面成效明显,另一方面却难以深化。现行的选拔任用制度存在着诸多与现实不相适应的地方,尚存在一些突出问题,尤其是改革中核心制度改革滞后,改革动力不足,深层次矛盾和难题有待于破解。有鉴于此,本论文总体梳理了改革三十年来的历程,实事求是地分析改革中存在的问题,运用新制度经济学的制度变迁与路径依赖理论的基本原理与方法,剖析干部选拔任用制度改革的一般过程和困境,揭示问题、症结产生的深层矛盾和深层次原因,在此基础上,进一步提出改革的目标、原则、策略、路径、方法以及具体举措等。本论文由六章内容组成。导论部分具体阐述了干部选拔任用制度改革研究的背景和意义所在,评述了国内外相关研究成果,同时阐述了本文的研究方法和论文框架,简要分析了本论文的创新与不足。干部选拔任用制度改革研究离不开科学的理论作为支撑。论文第一章从“党政干部”、“党政领导干部”、“选拔任用制度”基本概念出发,着重分析了新制度经济学的制度变迁理论、制度变迁的路径依赖理论与干部选拔任用制度改革直接相关理论的内涵及其与干部选拔任用制度改革研究的内在逻辑联系,为干部选拔任用制度改革研究奠定较为扎实的理论基础。第二章重点对改革的过程、改革中存在的问题进行诊断和分析。论文运用历史研究法、实证分析法、文献研究法等基本方法,首先梳理了改革的历程、总结了改革的成效,实事求是地分析干部选拔任用制度改革的问题,可以发现,现行的干部选拔任用制度仍存在着诸多与现实不相适应的地方,尚存在一些突出问题,尤其是改革中核心制度改革滞后,改革动力不足,深层次矛盾和难题还有待于破解,从而为有针对性地加强干部选拔任用制度改革提供现实依据。第三章分析探讨了干部选拔任用制度改革(变迁)的过程。首先,对改革的动因进行探讨论证,预示了后续改革的方向。其次,对干部选拔任用制度改革的主体展开分析,本文指出,权力中心的制度创新能力和意愿是决定干部选拔任用制度改革方向的主导因素,改革的方向、程度、形式和时间安排在很大程度上取决于拥有最高决策权的核心领导者的偏好及其效用最大化。运用制度变迁模型理论,并结合具体制度分析了三十年来的改革过程,本文认为,权力中心总体上选择渐进式改革模式,这是由整体的制度环境所决定的。权力中心从利益最大化出发,将来总体仍以渐进改革为主,某些时段和某些单项制度推广将采取激进变迁方式。目前改革路径以强制性变迁为主,未来将以强制性变迁与诱致性变迁相结合、相转化来加快改革进程。改革性质是适应性制度变迁,单项制度、外围制度改革将采取更新性制度变迁方式。改革方式以局部试点推动全局制度变迁。改革方法目前以模仿式变迁为主,首创式变迁为辅,未来核心制度要突破,必须依靠首创式变迁来开辟道路,依靠模仿式变迁来推广铺开。最后,运用制度变迁成本与收益分析框架对改革的动力展开分析,并以公开选拔制度、干部选举制度为例,通过收益成本分析,进一步论证了后续改革可能的路径、目标与空间。第四章分析探讨了干部选拔任用制度改革障碍与困境的深层次原因。首先,通过对改革的路径依赖消极制约机制的探讨,剖析了制度执行走样的深层原因。本文提出,干部选拔任用制度执行难、执行走样既有专制集权主义、官本位思想、官场潜规则等传统文化消极因素的影响和干部体制惯性的原因,又有渐进改革不彻底的影响,也有相关行动者心理与组织行为障碍方面的因素,还有权力-利益-责任不对称造成的机制障碍,主要阻力则在于既得利益者的利益障碍。其次,从创新障碍、权力中心偏好和意识形态刚性、政策执行阻滞等方面分析了三十年来干部选拔任用核心制度改革滞后的根本原因。最后,从理论上探源,从价值冲突、民主悖论、利益冲突、体制困境、主体困境、文化困境等七个方面进一步阐述了导致改革困境产生的深层次矛盾,为干部选拔任用制度改革划定了可能边界。第五章主要探究了干部选拔任用制度深化改革的若干设想。第一,从宏观上研究了干部选拔任用制度深化改革的目标、原则、路径、策略与方法等问题。本文提出,建立以干部选举制为核心,考任制、聘任制、委任制为补充,以考察考核制度、任用监督制度、任期制、罢免制、辞职制等等为配套的干部选拔任用制度体系,是改革的目标与方向。改革理性选择的路径是“强制式”变迁与“诱致式”变迁相结合、“整体渐进式”与“局部突破式”变迁相结合。改革的原则是维护核心价值的同时保持制度设计的前瞻性,克服改革主体自利倾向,使制度系统整体配套协调等。具体的制度改革策略有多种,但基本的策略是“正式规则式”变迁和“非正式规则式”变迁有机结合,降低改革成本。改革的基本方法是优化,最重要的方法是创新。第二,探讨了制度系统的设计、优化与创新问题。围绕着干部选举制度、选拔任用监督机制、能上能下机制等,提出了一系列完善的建议。第三,针对干部选拔任用制度改革的难题---执行走样,提出的基本思路是培育民主文化和新型主流意识形态,加快非正式制度变迁,为改革创造良好社会环境。另外对改革的焦点和热点---如何制约一把手滥用用人权也进行了深入探讨,提出了以群众认可权为核心的五权概念。最后,探讨了相关保障体系建设,提出加强理论研究、建立新的组织机构、加强立法保障,推进干部选拔任用制度改革。第六章结论与建议。干部选拔任用制度改革既是一个具有重大现实意义的理论课题,又是一个颇有技术性的实践难题。本章依据内在逻辑顺序对全文的主要研究结论进行了归纳总结,并根据研究结果提出了一系列完善制度的政策建议。

【Abstract】 Reform of the cadre selection and appointment system is fundamental counter-measure to construct a high-quality cadres, and train a large number of outstanding party and government leaders. But since the reform and opening up, the reform of cadre selection and appointment system which effectiveness is significantly, on the other hand, can hardly deepen. The current selection and appointment system is incompatible with reality, still has some conspicuous problems, particularly the core system reform lags, the reform power is insufficient, deep-seated contradictions and problems to be tackled. In view of this, the paper generally reviews the course of three decades of the reform, and realistic analysis of some problems of the reform, using of basic principles and methods of new institutional economics of institutional change and path dependence theory, rational analysis of the process and the dilemma of cadre selection and appointment system reform, revealing the crux of the deep contradictions and deep-seated reasons, on this basis, further putting forward the objectives, principles, strategies, paths, methods, and specific initiatives and so on. The paper is divided into six chapters.The introduction elaborates the background and the significance of the research on the reform of the system of selecting and appointing cadres, to review the relevant research at home and abroad, setting out the research methods and the framework of this thesis, and the paper’s summary analysis of the innovation and its deficiencies. The study on the reform of selecting and appointing cadres cadre system needs the scientific theories to support. The first chapter starting from the basic concept "party cadres","party leading cadres", and "selection appointments system", it is specific analyses of the inherent logic connotation that the system evolution theories of new system economics of changes theory and path dependence theory which directly related with cadres selection and appointment system reform, to lay more solid of theory foundation for cadres selection and appointment system reform research.The second chapter focuses on the reform process, reform of the problems in diagnosis and analysis. In using basic method such as history research method, empirical analysis method, and literature analysis method, and so on, first carding the process of the reform, and Summarizing the performance of the reform, which has gained obvious achievements, but there are still some new problems that the current selection and appointment system is incompatible with the reality, existing some highlight problems, especially the core system reform lags, the impetus some less, deep contradictions and challenges also remains to be resolved. Hence, it provides a realistic basis to strengthen its research.The third chapter probes into the reform of the cadre selection and appointment system (transition) process. Firstly, to explore the motives of the reform demonstrates that the follow-up direction of reform. Secondly, the paper argues that the system innovation capacity and will of State Power Center is the dominant factors determining its direction, level, form and timing of cadre system reform, to a large extent, of which depends on the highest decision-making core leader’s preference and utility maximization. With the theory of institutional change models, the thesis probes into the process of three decades of the reform, by specific examples of the system. We believe that power centre selects incremental reform model as a whole, which is determined by the overall system environments. The general reform is still dominated by incremental reform model, some time and some individual system arrangement will select radical model. From30years of the reform, it is basically followed by imposed institutional change, and it will accelerate the process of institutional change by combing and transition of the imposed institutional change and the induced institutional change. The reform is adjustability by nature, of which single system, peripheral system will update. The reform way impels the overall system vicissitude by the partial experiment. At present, the reform method primarily takes imitative vicissitude type, the original vicissitude as auxiliary, in the future, if the core system could break through, it must depend upon the original vicissitude to blaze the trail, and depends upon the imitative vicissitude to promote. Finally, the paper applies the cost-benefit framework of Systematic transitional theory to analyze the impetus for the reform, the public cadre selection system and cadre election system, for example, through benefit-cost analysis, and further demonstrates that the subsequent reform may own its path, objective, and space.The fourth chapter analyzes and discusses the background reasons that cause the obstacles and difficulties of the reform of the cadre selection and appointment system. Firstly, by exploring the negative mechanism of path dependence of the reform, the paper is analysis of the underlying causes of system going out of form lose shape. This paper argues that why cadre selection and appointment system is difficult to implement, both absolutism centralization of authority, the official standard thought, and the bureaucratic rules and other potential negative influences of traditional culture and cadres of the institutional inertia, but also the impact of the gradual reform is not complete, but also related actors in psychology and organizational behavior disorder factors, as well as power-benefits-liability caused by the mechanism of asymmetric barriers, the major resistance lies in the vested interests of the obstacles.Secondly, from the barriers to innovation, rigid ideology and preferences of power centers, and other aspects of policy implementation block, and so on, analysis of the root causes which three decades of the core of the system reform lags. Finally, theoretically origin, from the value of the conflict, democracy paradox, conflict of interest, institutional difficulties, the embarrassment of subject, cultural difficulties, and so on, further elaborating the deep-seated contradictions of the reform’s dilemma, it sets of possible boundary.The fifth chapter mainly probes into the tentative ideas of deepening the cadre selection and appointment system reform. First, macroscopically, the chapter studies the deepening-reform goal, principle, way, strategy and method and other issues. This article proposes that cadre election system as the core, tests, the appointment system and engagement system as the supplements, the appraisal system, supervision system of appointment, the term system, the remove system, the resignation system and so on, as the necessary supporting system of cadre selection and appointment system, which is the reform goal and the direction. The rational reform path is where "the imposed" and "the induced" combining,"the whole incremental type" and "the part breaks" vicissitude unifies. The principle of the reform is to uphold the core values, at the same time, to maintain the system foresightedness, overcoming the reform body self-interest, getting the whole system coordination. There are several specific reform strategies, but the basic strategy is "formal" institutional change together with "informal" institutional change to reduce the cost of the reform. The reform of the basic approach is to optimize, the most important one is to innovate. Secondly, the chapter discusses the issues, such as system’s design, the optimization and the innovation. As the area of the electoral system, selection and appointment of oversight mechanism, promoted or demoted mechanism, a series of comprehensive proposals were made. Thirdly, in view of the difficult problem in the reform---the execution going out of form, the basic idea is to cultivate a new democratic culture and the mainstream ideology, speeding up the informal system vicissitude, to create a favorable social environment for the reform. In addition, the focus and the heat problem of the reform-how to restrict and supervise the chief leader to abuse, to be discussed, presenting the right of the people recognized as the core concept of the five rights. Finally, the chapter explores the relevant security system development, proposing that to enhance the fundamental research, to establish the new organizations and agencies, to strengthen the legislation, and so promote the reform of cadre selection and appointment system.The sixth chapter discusses the conclusions and recommendations of the reform. Cadre selection and appointment system reform is both a theoretical topics of great practical significance, and it is also the considerable technical difficulty in practice. The main conclusions of the full text is in accordance with the intrinsic logic order, based on the research results, and puts forward a series of policy proposals of the perfect system.

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