【作者】 林乃善；

【导师】 叶子荣；

【作者基本信息】 西南交通大学 ， 公共工程组织与管理， 2011， 博士

【摘要】 政府投资基础设施项目,对促进国内经济的增长,提高社会服务水平,起到显著的作用。然而,从以往的工程项目实施情况看,公共工程(政府投资项目)管理的实际效果并不尽人意,一些工程项目存在突破投资、降低质量等级标准、经济或社会效益差等现象,个别项目甚至出现直接危害人民群众生命安全的事故。其主要原因之一是招投标监管机制不健全,政府监管不到位。通过对公共工程招投标的研究,认识招投标管理存在的弊端,识别并分析监管效果的各种影响因素,并采取措施强化积极因素的有利影响,消除不利因素对于招投标管理效果的制约,促进工程进展,实现政府公共工程投资的最大效益。本文运用理论与实证相结合的方法,首先对政府投资基础设施项目进行界定,随后,结合现实中的招投标实践情况,在分析招投标监管中存在问题的基础上,探讨招投标监管效果的影响因素,并构造招投标监管的影响因素模型,然后通过在招投标行业内相关单位与人员的实证数据分析,揭示招投标各个影响因素之间的相互联系,以及各个影响因素与招投标监管效果的关系。基于上述实证结果,针对招投标监管效果影响因素中的重要因素,进行深入分析,提出改进招投标监管效果的有效措施。本文得出的主要结论是：1.招投标监管各方参与者是一种为了经济利益或社会效益进行的博弈,目的是招投标组织者以最小政府资金的投入,实现公共工程社会效益或经济效益的最大化。招投标监管主体包含监管者、被监管者以及除此之外的第三方；客体包含监管项目本身以及所依存的外部环境。在监管要素组合中,监管者、法律与制度环境因素起着更大作用。2.传统文化、招投标法律、举报制度、监管能力四个方面因素影响着招投标监管效果,传统文化除了直接影响监管效果外,还对举报制度、招投标法律的制定与完善起明显作用,并与招投标法律及举报制度制约着监管能力。3.政府公共工程项目监管效果与监管机构成员有关,不同背景特征的监管者对于监管效果的影响存在显著差别。在政府公共工程监管中,监管机构应根据监管项目的具体情况以及监管的侧重点不同,按照监管人员的背景特征,合理进行人员的配置,以达到最佳的监管效果。4.正向激励能提高监管效果,激励的数额等于预期的寻租收入减执行效益的提高值,能够使得招投标相关管理部门更好地发挥工作积极性,提高各部门工作效率,避免寻租现象的发生,提高监管效果,促使政府实现效益的最大化。5.降低举报人的举报风险,增加举报人在举报活动中的预期收益,可以提高举报人的积极性,是完善政府公共工程招投标腐败举报制度的重要途径,对于预防和查处招投标违法、法违规行为起重要作用。更多还原

【Abstract】 Government investment in infrastructure projects plays a significant role to promote domestic economic growth and improve social services. However, in the project implementation, the actual management effects of public works projects(government investment projects)is not comforting. Some projects exist the phenomenon, such as breakthroughing investment, reducing quality standards, poor economic or social benefits etc. Even there is safety accident in individual project directly. One of the main reasons is that tendering supervision mechanism is not perfect and the government supervision is not in position. By the tendering management research in government public works, we can know drawbacks of regulation, identify and analyze the various factors influencing and take measures to reinforce positive factors, eliminate disadvantages influences for tendering effect, promoting the development of the public works and achieving the best interests.The paper use theory and empirical methods. First define the concept of government investment infrastructure projects. Then, with the reality of tendering practice situation, on the basis of analyzing the problems in tendering, research the effects factors of effectiveness of tendering supervision and establish the factors influencing model of tendering supervision. Analyze the empirical data from relevant departments or personnel in tendering and reveal the correlation between various factors influencing. Reveal the correlation between each factor influencing and effectiveness of tendering supervision. Based on empirical evidence, have a profound analysis of the important factors influencing of effectiveness of tendering supervision and proposed effective measures to improve tendering regulatory effect. The main conclusions in this article are:First, each participant in the tendering supervision play an economic or social interests game. The purpose is that tendering organizers use least government fund input and achieve the maximization of the social or economic efficiency. Tendering supervision subject contains the regulators, the regulated members third-party; Object contains the project itself and external environment. In the combination of factors, regulators, laws, and regulations environmental factors play bigger role.Second, the four factors cooperative, such as traditional cultural, legal system, reporting system, and monitoring capability, cause the size of the regulatory effect. Traditional culture not only impacts directly on monitoring effective, but also impacts reporting system and tendering law system significantly. Traditional culture, law and reporting system, constraint a supervisory capacity.Third, the members of monitoring body affect effect of public works projects. There are significant differences about supervision effect among different backgrounds regulators. In public construction supervision, monitoring bodies should be based on the monitoring of project details and supervision of different emphasis, in accordance with the background of regulator, reasonable personnel configuration to achieve optimal regulatory effect.Fourth, positive incentives can enhance monitoring effect. Inspire quantity is equal to the desired rent-seeking income minus the value incremental of relevant departments of tendering. Thus they work better to improve the efficiency and avoid rent-seeking.The government achieve the maximization of benefits.Fifth, to reduce the risk of these reports and increasing reports expected return of report activities would improve the initiative of the complainant. It is an important way to improve corruption reports system of public works tendering. And it would play a great role on preventing or punishing tendering illegal.更多还原