【作者】 骆祖春；

【导师】 高波；

【作者基本信息】 南京大学 ， 应用经济学， 2012， 博士

【摘要】 在对相关文献进行回顾和综述的基础上,本文综合运用多种理论分析方法和计量经济学的研究方法,主要研究中国社会转型时期地方政府特有的土地财政收入现象。全文主要试图回答以下四个问题：(1)对土地财政的概念、不同外延及特征作了定性归纳,并对不同口径的土地财政收入的规模进行了估算；(2)构建土地财政生成机制的理论模型与实证分析,实证研究了地方政府间土地财政的空间标尺竞争效应与其对地方政府财政支出效率的影响；(3)土地财政与宏观经济增长、城市化以及房地产发展之间的关系；(4)对土地财政的未来发展趋势做出判断,并提出相应的治理建议。本文首先研究了土地财政的内涵、规模与运作机制。通过归纳、总结与新的研究,本文认为土地财政是特指1994年中国分税制改革以后,在中央与地方财政分权体制不健全条件下,地方政府为缓解财政压力,利用现行土地产权与管理制度的不足,以自身收入和资源控制最大化为目标,以城市用地规模膨胀为核心,通过土地收购和出让之间巨大的价格“剪刀差”,获取由地方政府自主支配、规模逐年膨胀的土地资产收益及其延伸收益,它主要被地方政府用于城市化和工业化相关的经济扩张活动,由此形成一套地方政府相应的财政收支活动与利益分配关系。按照外延的大小,土地财政可分大、中、小三个口径。本文分别核算出了1999-2009年间东中西部地区三种口径的土地财政收入与地方一般预算收入的平均比值,发现土地财政的发育程度呈现东中西递减的规律。中国地方政府的土地财政运作机制已经形成,并形成不同的模式。其次,本文较系统地研究了土地财政产生的制度及其不同主体行为取向。1994年分税制改革瓦解了地方政府的“企业财政”基础,但体制造成地方政府的“事权”与“财权”不相匹配,又最终诱发了土地财政的诞生、发展与壮大。中国现行的土地产权与管理制度为土地财政打开“方便之门”。而中央集权体制下地方政府向上负责的治理结构、财政收入、“经营城市”和追求GDP一起成为地区间竞争标尺的内容,助推了土地财政的做大做强。通过构建委托——代理理论下的地方政府收入行为最优化模型分析后发现,加入土地财政收入因素后,地方政府的分成增加、风险减少,中央政府则代理成本下降,所以,加入土地财政有助于分税制的实施。地方政府间在土地财政上的最佳策略是非合作博弈策略,不同省份之间存在土地财政的“标尺竞争”效应。土地财政对地方政府支出效应有一定的影响,存在空间效应,但对不同地区存在不确定的关系。土地财政的物质基础是大量土地被从农业转入工商业,作为一种基本生产要素,它是推动经济发展一个源泉。土地财政通过土地要素投入的途径对经济产生正向影响。依据C-D生产函数,本文推导出土地财政对宏观经济的贡献。通过静态面板模型实证发现,全国的土地财政对经济增长具有当期及滞后二期的正向影响。东中西部分的土地财政对地方经济增长也存在正向影响关系。第二、三产业对应的土地财政收入,与各种产业的增加值之间均存在正向的影响。通过DEA核算技术,本文得出了第二、三次产业的竞争力得分,然后分析了土地财政对第二、三产业竞争力的影响,发现第二、三产业对应的土地财政收入分别对第二、三产业竞争力产生了近乎于零的负向效应。实证研究发现,城市化率对土地财政收入有着较大的正向影响作用。土地财政中的“招拍挂”土地出让收入与房地产业增加值之间存在正向关系,同时还存在滞后的正向影响,但数据关系差异较大。通过系统广义矩阵检验(S-GMM),本文证明了地方政府对土地财政的依赖对地价、房价均有推动作用。本文从18亿亩耕地保有量与城市化进程的角度,对2012-2020年间的土地财政规模做了测度。土地出让收入作为地租收入将长远存在,具有可持续性,不可能消亡,但大规模的土地出让收入或由财产税收、或由其他新型收费项目所取代。土地财政最终回归到其应有地位是历史的必然。最后,对土地财政的治理给出了对策建议。治理土地财政问题的关键,一要通过放松政府对市场的过度管制、改进对地方政府绩效评估机制,进而改进政府治理结构；二是重构财政分权体系,优化中央与地方政府的利益格局；三是完善土地产权制度创新与居民土地使用权保护。更多还原

【Abstract】 Based on literature review and the theoretical analysis by comprehensive use of various methods and econometric methodology, the thesis focuses on the study of fiscalisation of land which is a unique phenomenon of Chinese local government off-budget revenue mainly on requisition land "in the public interest ". Full main attempts to answer the following four questions:(1) a clear concept, extension and characteristics of fiscalisation of land is defined. And different scales of fiscalisation of land are estimated.(2) a theoretical model based on principal-agent theory is set up to explain the birth mechanism of fiscalisation of land. As a further study, the paper exploits the spatial yardstick competition effects and its expenditure efficiency effects of fiscalisation of land among provincial level regions.(3) the relationship between fiscalisation of land and macro-economic growth, urbanization, and real estate development is analyst respective through tests and models.(4) based on the analysis of financial difficulties of land and its future development trends, the thesis gives its corresponding recommendations on the management of fiscalisation of land.First, this paper studies the concept, extension, sizes, and operation mechanism of fiscalisation of land. Since major reforms initiates by the central government beginning in1994and continuing through2002centralized control over fiscal revenue, local governments have been squeezed by a widening gap between available revenues and expenditure needs. Local governments especially in county or city level, however, have to exploit increasing land values to generate revenues to close this fiscal gap. Government land requisitions for real estate and industrial development make up of the most important source of on-budget and off-budget revenue. This unique phenomenon in China is called fiscalisation of land. According to the size of its different extension, fiscalisation of land can be divided into large, medium and small caliber. The paper calculates the size of three calibers of fiscalisation of land and finds that the development degree of fiscalisation of land has a positive relationship to the development of regions’economic. Chinese local government financial operation mechanism of the land has been formed, and there are different modes in different regions.Second, the thesis undergoes a more systematic study of fiscalisation of land, its financial system and behaviors of different agents. The1994tax reform collapse the "corporate finance" basis of local governments’, as a result of the "revenue powers" and "business rights" not matching, and finally induced the birth and development of fiscalisation of land. China’s current land ownership system also opens its "door" to fiscalisation of land. The centralized governance structure which local governments are responsible for the upper level governments in turns, revenue and the "city management" and the chasing for GDP become the benchmark of regional competition, further make fiscalisation of land bigger and stronger. Through the establishment of a model based on principal-agent theory, the paper analyses the optimization revenue behavior of the local government’s under the sharing tax system, and finds that, by adding the factors of fiscalisation of land, the local government’s revenue increases and risk reduces, while the agency costs of central government decrease. So by adding fiscalisation of land is to help the implementation of the sharing tax system. Non-cooperative game strategy among the local governments in the land is the best strategy. There is spatial yardstick competition effect on fiscalisation of land among the different provinces. To a certain extent, fiscalisation of land affects the expenditure effectiveness of local government finance, but there is uncertainty on the relationship among different regions.Third, the material basis of fiscalisation of land is land which is transferred from agriculture to industry and commerce, and as a basic factor of production, it is a source of economic development and has a positive impact on the economy. Based on C-D production function, the thesis derives the economic contribution of fiscalisation of land. On the static panel model, the paper finds that fiscalisation of land with current and lagged two has positive effects on economic growth. There is also a positive relationship between fiscalisation of land and economic growth in the East, Middle and West. There are also positive relationships between fiscalisation of land corresponding to secondary and tertiary industries and the growth of respective value-added in the above three regions. On the DEA technique, the paper gets the scores of respective competitiveness of secondary and tertiary industries’, then the paper analyses the effects of fiscalisation of land on secondary and tertiary industries, and finds that fiscalisation of land has a near-zero positive effect on competitiveness of both secondary and tertiary industries, but the coefficient of tertiary industry is less than secondary industry’s at the same period. And this result also reflects the fact that revenue of the third industrial land the role of direct investment is less than the role of fiscalisation of land directly investment in tertiary industries is less that in the second industries at the same period. Empirical studies have found that the rate of urbanization has a greater positive effect on fiscalisation of land. There are positive relationship and lagging the positive effects between real estate value-added and fiscalisation of land. Through the system GMM test, it can be seen that the local government financial dependence on the land boosts house prices and land prices respectively. From the population structure, urbanization development and the final size of plantation, the paper devises a program and measures the size of fiscalisation of land from2012-2020. Fiscalisation of land, as rent income, will be long-term, sustainable and no death, but the large-scale of fiscalisation of land might be replaced by property taxes or other new fees. Fiscalisation of land eventually returning to its rightful place is historical necessity. Finally, this thesis gives countermeasures to the management of fiscalisation of land. We must push the reforms in local level governments through deregulation, and improving the evaluation mechanism of local government performance, and further optimizing the governance structure. Another measure we should take is to reconstruction of the system through fiscal decentralization, which requires the optimization of central and local government interest pattern. The third one is to improve the innovation system of land ownership and land use rights to protect land owners.更多还原