【作者】 张天敏；

【导师】 王韬； 刘华；

【作者基本信息】 华中科技大学 ， 工商管理， 2012， 博士

【摘要】 避税行为是税收理论研究的一个重要课题,最初的研究集中于居民纳税行为研究,对企业避税行为研究甚少。对于规模较小的企业而言,其所有者通常也是日常经营者,此时,企业纳税决策行为与个人纳税决策行为极其类似。在税务机关审查率与处罚率给定情况下,如果税收规避成本小于税收规避带来的收益,那么企业便会选择逃避税收行为。随着现代企业制度的建立,企业的所有权与经营权相分离,所有者与管理者之间的委托-代理关系为企业避税决策行为研究带来了新的研究课题。此时,管理者在企业避税行为扮演怎么的角色成为学术研究的焦点和热点。然而,令人遗憾的是,国内现有文献较少涉及这一领域。与此同时,国外学者的研究对象多为欧美上市公司,而在我国上市公司中,国有控股公司占据很大比例,这导致我们不能直接借鉴国外现有的研究成果,同时也要求国内学者致力于中国公司治理的基本事实,详细深入地对我国企业避税行为进行研究。基于上述事实,利用我国上市公司数据,在委托-代理的框架下,本文详细探讨了以下问题,本文首先研究了企业所有者为管理者提供的激励报酬对企业避税行为的影响,并在此过程考虑到我国企业所有权类型的特点；然后对管理者个体效应对企业避税决策的影响进行分析,最后考察了我国税收征管措施对管理者避税决策的影响力问题。本文的主要结论如下：(1)为管理者提供的以股票为基础的激励报酬,会显著增加企业的避税行为,但这种效应在不同所有权类型的公司中具有不同表现。在非国有控股企业中,激励报酬对管理者的激励作用更有效果,增加管理者的激励报酬会导致更多的企业避税行为。但在国有控股企业中,由于管理者更加不愿意承担避税行为带来的声誉、仕途方而的成本,即使增加其激励报酬,企业避税行为没有明显增加。(2)管理者个人效应会对企业避税决策产生显著影响。管理者在决策过程中并不能具备完全理性,成本-收益的判断也不是其唯一的行事准则,管理者个人效应也会对决策行为产生影响。具体而言,高管的管理风格、高管任期长短对公司避税决策具有显著影响,但高管年龄、性别、学历、专业背景等特征对公司避税行为的影响并不显著。(3)税收部门监管措施对管理者的避税决策具有威慑作用。首先,税收监管力度的提高抑制了激励报酬对管理者避税行为的影响,同时,这种抑制作用对非国有企业更加明显。其次,在高税收监管的地区,管理者个人效应的显著性水平也有所降低。更多还原

【Abstract】 Tax avoidance is the important part of tax research, that was researched first in1970’s. But the early literature on the tax avoidance mostly on evasion by individuals, not businesses. For closely-held small businesses whose owners are also managers, if the dollar of tax saving is greater than the utility cost of a big penalty, holding constant the chance of getting caught and the penalty for noncompliance. This moment the businesses is the as same as individual taxpapers. The additional issues arise in widely held corporations tax avoidance research because of the principal-agent setting with the development of modern enterprise system and the separation of ownership and control. This moment, the effect of managers on corporate tax avoidance become the focus of research areas. However It is regrettable that little existing literature focus on corporate tax avoidance with the separation of ownership and control in our country. At the same time, the fact that a large proportion of listed companies in our country is state holding companies in our courty is very different with existing research. This condition cause that the existion research is not applicable to corporatation in China, and promote scholars make a research on corporate tax avoidance deeply based on Chinese firms’governance conditions.This dissertation make the research under the analysis framework of principal-agent and use the data about Listed Companies in China. Firstly, this dissertation analysis the effect of managers’compensation incentives on the corporate tax ovidance activities based on the firms’ownership type in our country. Sencondly, this dissertation makes a research on the association between the executive heterogeneity and corporate tax avoidance. Lastly, this dissertation make a empirical research on the effect of tax enforcement of authority on corporate tax avoidance activities.The main conclusions of this dissertation contain: (1) The positive association between compensation and tax avoidance will changed in state holding companies. The positive effect of managers’comepensation is more significant in non-state-holding companies than state holding companies. The managers’ comepensation can’t make firms engage more tax avoidance in state holding companies, because the cost of tax avoidance, such as reputation, career, is more serious for managers of state holding companies.(2) Managers heterogeneity affect significantly corporate tax avoidance. Managers are not fully rational, and the decisions of corporate made by managers involve more than a cost-benefit calculation, and reflect managers’intrinsic characteristics. Specifically, the management styles and the executive’s tenure have a significant effect on corporate tax avoidance, and the effect of age, sex, education etc. is not significant.(3) The deterrence of tax enforcement in our country on corporate managers’tax avoidance decisions. Firstly, higher tax enforcement of authority can reduce the impact of compensation on tax avoidance activities, and the inhibition effect is more significant in non-state-holding firms. Secondly, the significance of managers’individual effect will drop in the higher tax enforcement area.更多还原