【作者】 张延祥；

【导师】 王健；

【作者基本信息】 吉林大学 ， 法学理论， 2012， 博士

【摘要】 在方法论与实体上，哈特都将边沁法理学界定为实证主义，将边沁本人认定为法律实证主义的巨人。学界接受了哈特以上论断，而且半个世纪过去了，哈特的论断仍是学界通行的权威之论。然而，在边沁研究群体内部，哈特的论断却遭到批判。波斯特马看到了边沁法理学的规范性基础，批判了哈特认为边沁的法律有效性的根据是专断的观点，而将边沁法理学界定为规范性实证主义。斯科菲尔德看到了边沁法理学的基础乃是其自然主义本体论，看到了痛苦与快乐在边沁思想中的根本性地位，看到了边沁思想的动态性，所以对哈特的法律实证主义之界定进行了彻底的批判：边沁既不是实体性法律实证主义，也不是方法论法律实证主义，而是自然主义。然而，斯科菲尔德并没有将边沁的法理学基础推进到边沁的认识论，也没有对边沁的思想来源以及相关思想传统进行探究，这使得他的论证让不充分，疑窦重重。本文致力于探究边沁法理学终极的智识根据以及思想来源，在思想史的背景下探究实证主义与自然主义的核心主张，以论证与确定边沁法理学的理论属性。除作为第1章的绪论和第6章的结语外，文章的主体分为四大部分，共5章。第1章的绪论对选题的确定与意义、选题研究的历史与现状、本文的研究方式与研究方法以及全文的论述结构进行了阐述。本文认为，对边沁法理学的理论基础进行深入研究，可以恢复这位被誉为英格兰法律思想史上最伟大的法学家终极的智识根据，挖掘其思想潜在的对当代与未来法律理论与法律哲学讨论的贡献，审视、批判与推动当今的法学理论研究。第2章探讨了贝克莱的认识论与法律哲学，以为探讨分析边沁的认识论，探讨分析实证主义与自然主义，提供智识根据与分析参照。贝克莱是遭到误解最严重的思想家之一，其所提出的“存在就是被感知”被普遍解读为否认外在物体的存在，但事实上他并非否认外在物体的存在，而是强调指出主观感知是第一位的，外在物体的存在仅仅是从主观感知所推断出来。贝克莱构建了一个上位知识引领驾御下位知识的知识层次体系，形而上学与神学是第一知识，自然哲学是体系中的下位知识。认知与情感是由不同的心理机理所产生的，具有内在的关联，但认知是为情感服务的。所以，贝克莱的认识论不是实证主义的，而是属于自然主义的。善就是快乐，恶就是痛苦。公共善乃是上帝的设定，人之道德善是上帝所定之自然法，是永恒的理性规则。为获得最大的快乐与善，自然法要求确定性，要求人们消极不反抗。但是绝对的、不受限制的消极顺从是有界限的，若暴虐的统治者戕害人民生命祸害人民命运，则人民有权利反抗，这也是自然法的要求。贝克莱的法律哲学是神学功利主义的。第3章探讨了法律实证主义、实证主义与自然主义的核心主张。法律实证主义的核心是事实与价值分离的学说，所以必须从认识论这一根本立场上来理解与界定，否则非但无法从根本上辨清法律实证主义，而且也无法解释法律实证主义与自然法的许多主张是相似甚或相同的。通常认为，法律实证主义主张法律的实体内容甚或法律的程序，若要成为法律，并不必须与某一套道德原则相一致，或法律并不因违反某一套道德原则，就丧失法律之合法性地位，或简单的说法律乃是事实。然而，确认法律存在，来区分法律与非法律，确认活动本身必然是有价值负载的。分离学说来源于G．E．摩尔界定自然主义谬误所依据的认知与情感是分离的原理，然而这乃是对休谟的是与应当区分学说的误解。休谟所区．分．出的是理性与情感，不但并未将两者分．离．开来，而且还坚定的主张理性是服从情感的，并不具有独立地位。在休谟看来，情感、意志和行为本身就是原始的事实或存在。认为休谟将事实与价值分离的实证主义解读，恰恰是将休谟哲学与休谟所批判的哲学，给颠倒了。休谟所谓的事实，并不是现代实证主义者所谓的客观的观察。休谟的‘是’或‘不是’命题与‘应当’或‘不应当’命题，所阐述的是两种截然不同的关系。‘是’或‘不是’命题对应的是理性，其对象指的是观念的实在关系或对实际存在和事实的符合或不符合关系。而‘应当’或‘不应当’命题指的是道德判断，道德来源于我们的情感。我们的情感、意志和行为是不能有那种符合或不符合关系的。它们是原始的事实或实在，本身圆满自足，并不参照其他的情感、意志和行为，更不可能从观念间的符合或不符合关系中推导出来。在休谟的认识论中，观念并不是全部内容，还有更为重要的先在的印象。理性的对象仅限于观念，观念之外，并无理性的用武之地。在情感以及以情感为基础的道德领域，理性不具有独立地位。理性是、并且也应该是情感的奴隶，除了服务和服从情感之外，再不能有任何其他的职务。所以休谟的认识论是自然主义的。遵循G．E．摩尔的事实与价值分离学说的哈特所创立的法律理论与其对自己理论的实证主义属性之界定是矛盾的，其所谓道德中立在认识论上不成立的，而仅仅算是常识上的实践理性。第4章探讨了边沁法理学的功利主义哲学原理。边沁的功利主义法理学是以其本体论与认识论为根据的。在其本体体系中，诸快乐与诸痛苦是其他所有存在体的基础，它们是唯一的实存体，其余的则以诸快乐与诸痛苦为基础而衍生出来的，是拟制体。追求快乐避免痛苦，是普适的人性。行为与情感这两个拟制体，相互对应，不可分离。没有无情感的行为，也没有无行为的情感，行为与情感不能独立存在，缺一不可。利益是任何思想与行为的源泉，而利益的实质就是渴望快乐与避开痛苦。任何行为都是以快乐或痛苦为原初的根本的元素的，继而理所当然，任何行为都是以价值追求为根本的构成的，道德中立或价值中立在边沁那里是根本不存在的，更是荒谬的。人类的任何智识活动也必定是负载价值的，即使是那些普通法与自然法理论家，即使他们宣称寻求公正与真理，但是他们与任何人一样，也难以逃脱利益追求的支配。痛苦与快乐是对与错的标准，是人类的主宰。边沁的本体论以及认识论乃是自然主义的，在他那里并不存在二十世纪所创立的事实与价值的分离。第5章与第6章在梳理出边沁法理学的理论基础研究史的基础上，挑拣出具有里程碑意义的研究进行集中而深入的分析与批判，以澄清对边沁根本思想的误解，推进笔者的边沁法理学理论基础研究，并顺便勾勒出边沁法理学理论基础研究总体的迁变路线。奥斯丁是边沁功利主义学说赤诚的门徒，其在《法理学讲演录》中对边沁的法理学进行了继承与批判，针对历史法学派的解读进行了解释与辩护，但那时奥斯丁并未明确的、有意识的对边沁的法理学之理论属性进行界定。对边沁的法理学理论基础的界定，抛开正确与否，哈特无疑是影响最大的。正是由于哈特，才使得边沁的法理学研究以及边沁论著整理项目获得了极大的深入与推进；正是由于哈特，才使得边沁获得了令法律思想史上任何一位思想家都艳羡的巨大学术声望。哈特认为边沁的法理学秉持三个学说，即法律与道德是分离的，对法律概念要进行道德中立的分析与描述，法律是命令。在哈特看来，边沁的法理学无论是在方法论上还是在实体内容上都是实证主义的。然而，根据边沁的功利主义认识论、本体论与语言学，哈特对边沁的功利主义哲学原理的把握是远远不够的，其理解是错误的。边沁的法理学根本没有采纳哈特所谓“实证主义的”构想方案。根据这个实证主义解读，哈特在对边沁最重要的法理学论著的编辑工作中犯了致命的错误，而这又给边沁研究带来了很大的不良影响。因为哈特是《论一般法律》的独任编辑，又由于其法理学上的权威地位，这不但使得整个学界认同哈特的法律实证主义之界定，甚至使边沁研究群体也对哈特的法律实证主义之界定被迫服从。哈特的法律实证主义之界定到目前为止已近半个世纪，但仍是学界公认的权威之论。与哈特认为边沁采用了哈特所谓的道德中立的语言分析不同，波斯特马强调指出了边沁的法理学的规范性维度，将边沁的法理学界定为规范性实证主义。然而，波斯特马并没有明确意识到边沁功利主义哲学原理中的认识论与本体论，他的相关阐述是有欠缺的，他没有看到痛苦与快乐在边沁思想体系中的根本性地位，当然也没有看到这对边沁法理学所必然导致的影响。如此一来，波斯特马对边沁的认识论进行了一种纯粹的经验主义解读，将边沁思想中的功利主义部分与本体论和认识论部分分离开。这样一来，波斯特马认为边沁的法律是一个自足封闭的体系的观点是无法成立的。法律实证主义来源于功利主义，或道德考量，而这与实证主义之认识论上的道德中立是不相符合的，如果将法律实证主义看作是不同于认识论意义上实证主义，那么，这一界定就没有多大的意义，因为仅仅在法律的框架内，按照法律提供的参照计算功利肯定是远远不够的，因为这样其实已经设定了人们必须无条件服从法律的安排，而这种专断是边沁的功利主义所不接受的。斯科菲尔德的边沁研究，三十年如一日，其对边沁资料的把握，应当说在学界无人可望其项背；他重新发现了边沁功利主义基本哲学原理，加之他广阔的哲学视野与对基本哲学问题深刻的把握，这使他对通行的权威的错误解读进行了彻底的清理。这是边沁研究史上的重大突破与重大实质性进展，具有划时代的意义，即使在整个思想史上，也具有划时代的意义。斯科菲尔德主要是看到了作为边沁法理学基础的自然主义本体论，看到了痛苦与快乐在边沁思想中的根本性地位，看到了边沁思想的动态性。在斯科菲尔德看来，在边沁那里，不管是确认法律，还是研究法律，都必然受痛苦与快乐的支配，所以边沁决不是哈特所认定那样，边沁既不是实体性法律实证主义，也不是方法论法律实证主义，而是自然主义。然而，斯科菲尔德并没有将边沁的法理学基础推进到边沁的认识论，也没有对边沁的思想来源进行探究，这使得他的论证不充分不圆满，疑窦重重。从总体上看，边沁法理学的理论基础之界定，从奥斯丁的归纳功利法理学开始，经历了哈特的方法论法律实证主义与实体性法律实证主义，再到波斯特马的规范性法律实证主义，最后再到斯科菲尔德的自然主义。总体的情况似乎是，以哈特为界点，整个脉络大体是远离边沁，又重回边沁。哈特以来，研究者对边沁手稿的把握逐步全面而准确，对边沁思想的解读逐步贴近而令人信服。这个研究史也同样表明，研究者本人所秉持的思想决定了他的边沁研究，这恰好证明了富勒的三棱镜比喻，证明了哈特的道德中立的研究主张是行不通的。第7章作为结尾，在边沁法理学理论基础研究上，对研究方式与研究史脉络与迁变进行了归纳总结，重申了边沁法理学终极的智识根据即认识论是自然主义的。在边沁的思想体系中，痛苦与快乐居于主导地位，不管是确认法律，还是研究法律，都必然受痛苦与快乐的支配，所以无论是法律形式，还是法律内容，其价值负载都是内在的、必然的；二十世纪基于事实与价值分离而创立的法律实证主义在边沁那里是不存在的。边沁所独创的功利主义法理学是自然主义的。更多还原

【Abstract】 H.L.A Hart defined Bentham’s jurisprudence as legal positivism, methodologicallegal positivism as well as substantivel legal positivism, and recoginized him as thegreat originator of legal positivism. The general academia has accepted H.L.A Hart’sthesis , and H.L.A Hart’s thesis still possesses the authority even if half a century haspast. However, within the Bentham study circle, H.L.A Hart’s thesis has encounteredchallenges. Gerald Postema，seeing the normative foundation of Bentham’sjurisprudence, criticized Hart’s position that the reason of legal validity is peremptory,and defined Bentham’s jurisprudence as normative positivism. Phillip Schofield caughtBentham’s naturalistic ontology , and took it as the basis of Bentham’s jurisprudence.He also saw that pain and pleasure are the unique fundamental element , and thatBentham’s thought is of dynamic character. All these contribute to a splendid critiqueof H.L.A Hart’s definition of legal positivism: Bentham’s jurisprudence is neithersubstantive legal positivism, nor methodological legal positivism; instead, it isnaturalism. However, unfortunately, Phillip Schofield’s argument is not complete andsufficient, because he did not advance to Bentham’s epistemology which is the mostfundamental basis, nor did he explore Bentham’s intellectual sources and theintellectual tradition to which he belonged. This dissertation is dedicated to accomplishthe theoretical basis of Bentham’s jurisprudence with a complete and sufficientargument by exploring Bentham’s ultimate intellectual basis and its sources and thecore claims of positivism and naturalism in light of the intellectual history.The main dissertatin consists of four parts of five chapters, in addition to theintroduction and epilogue.Chapter 1 , the introduction of the whole dissertation, consists of the confirmationof the subject, the history and status of the research, the research principle and methodwhich this dissertation will apply, and the framework of this dissertation. This dissertation points out that an in-depth study of the theoretical basis of Bentham’sjurisprudence will recover the ultimate intellectual basis of the greatest jurist ofEngland, discover its potential contribution to legal theory and philosophy, and pushforward the contemporary legal theory.Chapter 2 provides an analysis of Berkeley’s epistemology and legal philosophy,in oder to provide a reference framework for an analysis of Bentham’s epistemology,positivism and naturalism. Berkeley is perhaps the philosopher who has been mostseverely misunderstood ever in history. Indeed, Berkeley puts forward this thesis“tobe, is to be perceived”, but actually he does not denign the existence of external bodies.What he wanted to emphasize is the fact that subjective perception is primary andexternal bodies are only the inferences from the subjective perceptions. Berkeleyprojected an institution of knowledges of different levels within which metaphysicsand theology are the first philosophy and natural philosophy lies in a lower level, andhigher level knowledge enlightens and governs the lower level knowledge. Cognitionand emotion are from different psychological faculties ,but cognition is subservient toemotion. Therefore Berkeley’s epistemology cannot be positivism, but is naturalism.Goodness is pleasure, and badness is pain. Public good is ordained by God, andhuaman being’s moral goodness is the natural law ordained by God and the eternalrules of reason. Natural law requires certainty and passive obedience in order toprocure the greatest pleasure and good. But the so-called absolute passive obediencedoes have implicit limits. When cruel tyrants are dangerous to life and fortune, thepeople have the right to resist. This is also the requirements of natural law. Berkeley’slegal philosophy is theological utiltarianism.Chapter 3 explores the core claims of legal positivism, positivism and naturalism.With the separation thesis of fact and value as its core, legal positivism must beunderstood and defined in the fundamental sense of epistemology, otherwise it will notresolve the problem that legal positivism and natural law have many similar or evensame claims. It is commonly held that legal positivism claims that in order to be lawthe substance of the law or its procedures are not necessarily conform to a particularset of moral principles; to wit, law is fact. However, it is necessarily value-laden to recognise law, to distingush between law and non-law. The separation thesis is derivedfrom G. E. Moore’s doctrine of the separation of cognition and emotion, whichcontributes to his naturalistic fallacy. G. E. Moore’s separation is the result of amisunderstanding of Hume’s thesis of is-ought which separates reason and emotion,not cognition and emotion. Hume firmly claimed that reason did not possess autonomy,and reason was and ought to be subservient to passion. In Hume’s view, passion,will,and action are original facts or existences. Hume’s fact is not the fact of the modernthinkers; it is not the objective observation. Hume pointed out clearly that thepropositions of is or is not and the propositions of ought or ought not expressed verydifferent relations, the former cooresponding to reason, and the later cooresponding tomorals. In Humean epistemology, idea which is empiricist is not the all, and theantecedent and original is impressiom which also produces passion. Humeanepistemology is naturalist. Following G. E. Moore’s doctrine of the separation ofcognition and emotion , H.L.A. Hart projected his legal positivism, but his claim ofmorally independent law and legal study is not sound in epistemology, only tantamountto practical reason.Chapter 4 explores the utilitarian philosophy of Bentham’s jurisprudence.Bentham’s jurisprudence takes his ontology and epistemology as its basis. Pleasuresand pains , the only real entities, are the basis of all the other entities which arefictitous entities. It is the universal human nature to pursue pleasure and avoid pain.Action and emotion are fictitious entities, correspondent to each other and inseperable.There is no action without emotion.Interest is the source of thought and action,becauseInterest is to procure pleasue and avoid pain. Pleasure and pain are the originalfundamental elements of any action, and thus naturally, in Bentham’s view, morallyneutral or value-free actions cannot exist at all. Therefore, human’s intellectualactivities are necessarily morally laden and governed by interest, even if the activitiesof those common law jurists and natural law jurists who claim to pursue justice andtruth. Pleasure and pain are the standard of right and wrong, and the two sovereignmasters. Bentham’s ontology and epistemology are naturalistic, and according toBentham there is nothing like the separation of morals and fact created in 20th centuary.Chapter 5 and 6 provide a history of the study of the theoretical basis ofBentham’s jurisprudence, an in-depth and delicate analysis of the milestone studies ofJohn Austin, H.L.A Hart, Gerald Postema and Philip Schofield, and an outline of thepath of the development of the study of the theoretical basis of Bentham’sjurisprudence. As to Bentham’s jurisprudence, John Austin, an enthusiastic disciple ofBentham’s utilitarian principle, inherited and criticized Bentham, and explicated anddefended Bentham against the interpretation of historical school jurists. But then thetheoretical basis of Bentham’s jurisprudence was not clear and was not undetakenconsciously. Put aside the matter of right or wrong, Hart’s definition is no doudt themost influential one. It is just because of Hart that Bentham’s jurisprudence andBentham Project have made great progress , and it is just because of Hart that Benthamhas procured superb reputation which must be envied by any great thinker in history.According to Hart Bentham held three doctrines: the separation of law and morals; themorally neutral analysis of legal concepts; and the imperative theory of law. ThusBentham’s jurisprudence is positivism in methodology as well as substance. Howeverin light of Bentham’s epistemology , ontology and linguistics, Hart’s grasp ofBentham’s utilitarian philosophy is far from sufficient, and his interpretation is wrong.Bentham’s jurisprudence is not positivist at all. This misinterpretation lead to fatalmistakes in Hart’s edition of Bentham’s most important work Of Laws in General, andthis in turn brings bad consequences to Bentham studies. Even half a centuary has pastHart’s positivist defintion of Bentham’s jurisprudence still enjoys the authority. UnlikeHart’s recognition of Bentham’s morally neutral lingusitics, Postema emphasized thenormative dimension of Bentham’s jurisprudence, and defined it as normativepositivism. However, Postema did not see the fundamental position which pain andpleasure occupy in Bentham’s jurisprudence, because he did not have a sufficient graspof Bentham’s epistemology and ontology. This lead to a purely empiricistinterpretation with the separation of utilitarianism and epistemology. ConsequentiallyPostema’s recognition of a self -sufficient and and self-contained law in Bentham isnot Bentham’s law. According to Postema, Bentham’s project of positivism comesfrom utilitarianism, or moral considerations, if so, then Postema’s definition ofBentham’s legal posivism cannot agree with the positivism in epistemological sense.The recognition of legal positivism will not make any sense at all if it is regarded asvery different from the positivism in epistemology, because it is far from sufficient to calculate utility within the framework of law, for it has implicitly presupposed thatpeople must obey the law unconditionally. This peremptotriness, Bentham will neveraccept. With a deep understanding of the basic philosophical thesis, Philip Schofield isremoving the accepted positivist interpretation of Bentham’s juriprudence, based onhis discovery of Bentham’s utilitarian principle and his unrivalled grasp of Bentham’smanuscripts from thirty years of constant and whole-hearted Bentham study. His studyis a great contribution to and a milestone in Bentham studies .Phillip Schofield caughtBentham’s naturalistic ontology , and took it as the basis of Bentham’s jurisprudence.He also saw that pain and pleasure are the unique fundamental element , and thatBentham’s thought is of dynamic character. According to Schofield, whether it is therecognition of law or the study of law, it is necessarily governed by pain and pleasure,therefore, Bentham’s jurisprudence is neither substantive legal positivism, normethodological legal positivism; instead, it is naturalism. However, unfortunately,Phillip Schofield’s argument is not complete and sufficient, because he did not advanceto Bentham’s epistemology which is the most fundamental basis, nor did he exploreBentham’s intellectual sources and the intellectual tradition to which he belonged.Generally speaking, as to the theoretical basis of Bentham’s jurisprudence, it startedfrom Austin’s inductive utilitarian jurisprudence, through H.L.A Hart’s legalsubstantive legal positivism and methodological legal positivism, Gerald J Postema’snormative positivism, at last to Philip Schofield’s naturalism. It seems that H.L.AHart’s interpretation left far away from Bentham, and Gerald J Postema and PhilipSchofield have tried go back to Bentham with reference to Hart. This also shows thatthe researcher’s own thought determines his Bentham study, as justly demonstratesLon Fuller’s metaphor of prism and the impossiblity of morally neutral study.Chapter 6 is the conclusion of the whole dissertaton.It makes a summary of thehistory and the development of the study and resaerch methods, and reiterates that inBentham’s jurisprudencethe Bentham’s naturalistic epistemology occupies the ultimatebasis and therefore Bentham’s original utilitarian jurisprudence is naturalism.更多还原