【作者】 张明辉；

【导师】 孙乃纪；

【作者基本信息】 吉林大学 ， 企业管理， 2012， 博士

【摘要】 本论文研究的是影响中国发电企业持续、均衡发展的两个核心变量——企业的规模和政府的价格管制。即2003年中国电力体制改革以来，随着发电企业规模的迅速扩张，企业在市场化运行过程中是否实现了规模有效；放松电价管制，实行竞价上网试点是否达到了预期目标以及企业的规模和电价管制对发电企业持续均衡发展的影响。在规模效率研究方面，利用DEA模型对沪、深两市34家火力发电公司2003年-2010年的综合效率、技术效率和规模效率以及投入产出状况的实证分析结果表明：在样本期内，我国发电企业存在技术效率提高和规模效率下降并存的现象，说明发电企业经营管理能力和技术能力有所提高，体制变革在一定程度上促进了企业技术进步和管理创新。但从测度结果看，发电企业的整体综合效率偏低，表明我国发电企业的总体规模效率较低，存在较严重的规模不经济现象，这种规模不经济性内在原因主要源于产业规模的过度扩张。在投入与产出结果的分析上，34家样本公司的固定资产规模和营业成本的投入都出现了较大的投入冗余，规模过度问题相对突出。过度的规模投入，造成了中国发电企业经营效率低下，亏损加剧，负债率过高，在较大程度上已经影响了发电产业持续和均衡发展，合理控制产业规模是中国发电企业必须面对的现实问题。在价格管制研究方面，用产品定价理论、电力产品价格管制模型、信息不对称理论分析了电价波动在经济领域的传导规律，对电价指数与PPI、CPI之间的动态相关性做了深入研究。在实践方面，基于笔者的亲身经历，对2005年东北区域电力市场竞价上网试点和2009年西藏藏中电网电价集中管制两个电价管制实践进行了研究，结果表明：电价改革实施以来，受体制环境和市场环境制约，放松电价管制并未达到“建立适度竞争的上网电价机制，实现销售电价与上网电价联动”以及降低终端销售电价的改革目标。在目前的电力市场环境下，竞争主体过少，发电市场基本上处于寡头垄断状态，不具备充分竞争条件，在这种市场状态下展开竞争，无法实现有效竞争。另外，竞争模式设计本身的缺陷，也造成了不公平竞争。因此，在市场化竞争的条件尚不完全具备、监管机制不健全、信息不对称的情况下，电价不宜放开，必须实行严格的管制政策。在价格形成机制上，2004年以来，煤炭价格持续上涨，发电成本上升，由于上网电价与销售电价联动机制尚未完全建立，成本上升压力不能够通过煤电的联动得到释放，因此，电价形成机制不完善是造成发电企业经营效益普遍下降和亏损的政策原因。更多还原

【Abstract】 Studied in this thesis are the two variables influencing sustainable and balanceddevelopment of power generation enterprises in China, namely scale of enterprisesand price control of the government i.e. since 2003 when electric power systemreform was carried out in China, whether or not the enterprises have achieved scaleeffectiveness in the process of market-oriented operation with rapid expansion of thescale of power generation enterprises, whether or not the expected goals have beenachieved in respect of relaxation of electricity price control and experiment of pricecompetition, and the effect of scale of enterprises and control of electricity price onsustainable and balanced development of power generation enterprises.In terms of study on scale efficiency, analyses of overall efficiency, technicalefficiency, scale efficiency and input/output situation of 34 thermal power generationcompanies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2003 to 2010 by means of the DEAmodel show the following: In the sample period, technical efficiency of powergeneration enterprises increase while scale efficiency of them decreases, whichindicates that operating capability and technological capacity of the enterprises havebeen enhanced and the system reform has promoted to a certain extent technologicaladvances and management innovation of them. From the view point of measurementresult, however, the overall efficiency of enterprises as a whole is on the low side,which indicates that the overall scale efficiency is quite low and serious diseconomyof scale exists. The immanent cause of such diseconomy of scale is mainlyoverexpansion of the industry scale.In terms of analysis of input and output, all the 34 sampled companies have theirinput of fixed assets and operating cost under a great redundancy and the problem ofoverscale is relatively obvious. Overscale of input leads to low operational efficiencyof power generation enterprises in China, with ever increasing loss and excessivelyhigh rate of debts. This has to a great extent affected sustainable and balanced development of power generation industry. It is a practical question for powergeneration enterprises in China to have to face with to control reasonably the industryscale.In terms of analysis of price control, the law of transmission of electricity pricefluctuation in the economic sphere is analyzed by means of the product pricing theory,the electric power product price control model and the information asymmetry theoryand the dynamical correlativity between electricity price index and PPI as well as CPIis examined in depth. In respect of practice, two cases of practice of electricity pricecontrol are analyzed based on the author’s experience, namely the experiment of pricecompetition in the Northeast China’s electric power market in 2005 and centralizedcontrol of electricity price of the Central Tibet Electric Grid in 2009. The resultshows that since the beginning of electricity price reform, the goals of“Establishmentof mechanism of moderate electricity price competition and achievement ofinterlocking between the selling electricity price and on-grid price”and reduction ofterminal selling price have not been achieved by relaxation of electricity price controldue to the restriction of the institutional environment and market environment. In thecurrent electric power market environment, there are too few competition subjectsand the power generation market is basically in the state of oligopoly without anycondition for sufficient competition. No effective competition is possible in such amarket condition. In addition, the defect in design of the competition pattern leads tounfair competition. Therefore, it is inadvisable to let go electricity price control and astrict control policy must be implemented as the conditions for market competitionare not fully available, the supervision mechanism is unsound and information isasymmetric。In respect of the price formation mechanism, the generating cost has beenincreasing with the coal price since 2004. The pressure of increasing cost cannot bereleased through interlocking between coal and electricity because the mechanism ofinterlocking between the on-grid price and the selling price has not be fullyestablished. As a result, imperfection of the price formation mechanism is the policycause for power generation enterprises to suffer general reduction of operatingefficiency and loss.更多还原