保险公司治理对企业绩效影响的实证研究

【作者】 陈彬；

【导师】 张晖明；

【作者基本信息】 复旦大学 ， 政治经济学， 2011， 博士

【摘要】 保险公司是市场经济中以“经营风险”为主要功能的特殊企业,风险经营能力的水平与合理性,直接关系保险公司的企业绩效。在现代公司治理框架下,公司治理结构决定了企业行为,影响企业的风险偏好与管理效率,并最终体现在企业绩效指标上。保险公司经营目标、产品性质、资本结构和监管机制的特殊性,决定了保险公司治理对于企业绩效影响具有特别的作用机制和影响程度。本文主要研究我国特殊的保险公司治理影响因素下的企业绩效差异情况,以期对完善我国保险公司治理提出建议。国内针对保险公司治理与绩效的研究,相对于一直是国内外经济学领域研究热点的一般公司治理研究,仅是“沧海之一粟”,研究文献不但较少且不深入、无完善的理论分析框架,理论上的研究在很大程度上落后于保险公司治理的实践。保险在中国作为“舶来品”,经历了国外输入、民族保险业创立与发展、虚假繁荣、接管、停业、恢复和市场化等发展阶段,发展路径具有外生性、跳跃性和强制性的特点。自1980年恢复国内业务以来,尤其是中国加入WTO后,保险业作为率先开放的金融领域,取得了巨大的经济和社会成就。在继续推动我国保险业改革进程和保险市场加速开放的背景下,完善保险公司治理成为提高我国保险业整体竞争实力,确保其健康持续发展的迫切要求。本文从金融机构由公司治理的“治理者”到“被治理者”的角色转变出发,综合运用了公司治理理论和金融中介理论,系统分析了保险公司作为金融中介在公司治理上的特殊性,包括加强风险防范、控制偿付能力、体现保单持有人利益、协调政府监管与市场机制问的关系等,体现了利益相关者共同治理的要求,构建了保险公司治理的理论分析框架。同时,在充分考虑国际保险公司治理规范的借鉴和保险公司治理模式比较的启示的前提下,结合我国保险公司治理的现实环境,提出了适合我国保险公司发展的理想治理模式,即以外部人模式为主,内部人模式为辅；以董事会为核心,监事会行使监督职能为补充,维护利益相关者的利益。在理论分析的基础上,本文梳理了我国保险公司治理由“行政型治理”到“经济型治理”的转变,统计分析了2009年中资财产保险公司治理和绩效现状,并构建了保险公司绩效评价体系。按照保险公司治理的特点和利益相关者共同治理的要求,以中资财产保险公司2009年的公司治理数据和财务数据,利用逐步回归法进行了实证研究。实证结果显示：国有股比例对企业绩效具有显著的积极影响,意味着在当前形势下,保险业的发展还需要政府在诸如资金、政策等方面的大力支持；但股权的过度集中对企业绩效造成了显著的负面影响；外资股股东未对保险公司绩效的提升产生正面影响；在董事会结构方面,董事会规模对企业绩效具有显著的负面影响；独立董事的独立性令人质疑,对企业绩效有显著的负面影响；女性董事凭借谨慎的行事风格、过硬的专业背景对企业绩效有显著的正面影响；董事会的二元领导结构与企业绩效间存在着显著的正相关关系,说明当董事长与总经理的两职分任更有利于董事会工作的开展和对经理人员的监督；董事会专业委员会的设置对企业绩效并无显著的影响,进一步说明董事会建设尚处于“合规”阶段,未充分发挥应有的职能作用；高管激励机制对企业绩效具有负面影响,但并不显著；信息披露透明度对保险公司绩效具有正面影响,说明高质量的信息披露有助于保险公司的利益相关者了解公司发展的信息,从而降低信息不对称程度,有利于提高公司治理水平、降低资本成本,最终提高企业绩效。最后,本文从七个方面提出了完善保险公司治理、提高企业绩效的政策建议：通过引入民营资本和境外战略投资者优化股权结构、建设具有管理能力的董事会、实行与远期盈利能力或未来经营绩效相关联的高管激励约束机制、建立独立监事制度以强化监事会专司监督的职能、提高对所有利益相关者进行信息披露的真实性和透明度、完善公司治理结构监管的联动机制、关注管理层控制和股东过度干预的风险。更多还原

【Abstract】 Insurance company is the special enterprise with "risk management" as the main function in the market economy. The level and rationality of risk management ability have the direct impact on the firm performance. In the modern corporate governance framework, the behavior, risk preference and management efficiency is decided and affected by the governance structure, and ultimately reflected in the firm performance indicators. It is due to the particularity of objectives, products, capital structure and the supervision mechanism that the corporate governance has a special mechanism of action and influence on the firm performance. This paper mainly studies the various impacts for the insurance corporate governance on the firm performance, in order to provide the suggestions to perfect insurance corporate governance in China.Compared to the domestic and foreign economic studies focusing on the general corporate governance, the domestic studies on the insurance corporate governance and the firm performance is quite a few. The research literature not only less and less in-depth, but also no perfect theoretical analysis framework. The theoretical research hindered the insurance practice. Insurance in China as "exotic", experienced the different periods including foreign input, national insurance industry development, false prosperity, takeover, closure, restore and marketization. Since the recovery on domestic business in 1980, especially after the join to WTO as the leading opening financial sector, China insurance industry has make the huge economic and social achievements. By continually pushing for the reform process of the insurance industry and accelerating the opening of the insurance market, to strengthen the corporate governance become the urgent requirement of the establishment and improvement of modern enterprise system as well as promoting the competition and sustainable development of the whole insurance industry.With the change of the financial institutions from the role of "controller" to "controlled" in the corporate governance, we synthesized to make use of the corporate governance theory and financial intermediary theory. A systematic analysis on the particularity of the insurance company as a financial intermediary in the corporate governance reflects the common governance requirements of the stakeholders, including strengthening of risk prevention, control of solvency, protection of the policy holders’ interests, coordinating the relationship between the government supervision and the market mechanism. And the analysis framework of the insurance corporate governance theory is constructed. At the same time, in full consideration of the international specification requirements and the various models, with reference to the corporate governance environment in China, the ideal model in corporate governance of China insurance company is put forward, which is primarily based on the outsider model with the board of directors as the core, complemented by the insider model with the board of supervisors as the major supervisor to maintain the stakeholders’interests.Based on the theoretical analysis, this paper periodically lists the transformation of insurance corporate governance from "government governance" to "economic governance" and statistical analyzes the status for Chinese insurance company in 2009. Meanwhile, the performance evaluation system of insurance company is constructed. At the request of the characteristics of the insurance company and stakeholders’ common governance, the data of Chinese property insurance company in 2009 is empirical processed using the method of stepwise regression. The following empirical results are achieved. In the equity structure, the proportion of state-owned shares has significant positive effect. The equity concentration and the proportion of foreign capital stocks has significant negative effect. Foreign shareholders with technical and managrial advantages also failed to play an expected role. In the structure of board of directors, the scale has significant negative effect. The bigger scale increases the cost of coordination and organization and reduces efficiency of the board of directors. Due to the questionable independence, the proportion of the independent directors also has a negative effect. The proportion of women directors with careful way and professional background has significant positive effects. For the board structure, the duality of chairman and general manager has significant positive effects. The professional committee has no significant effects, further explained that the board construction is still in a "compliance" stage. The incentive mechanism of senior executives has a negative effect, but not dramatically. It is related to the present status which lack of long-term effective supervision mechanism and performance evaluation institutions. The transparency of the information disclosure has a positive effect. The high quality information disclosure help stakeholders to understand the development of the insurance company so as to reduce the information asymmetry, and to improve the management level and reduce the cost of capital so as to eventually improve the firm performance. Finally, this paper draws the following policy suggestions to improve the insurance corporate governance as well as the firm performance, which respectively are further optimization of equity structure by introducing the private capital and foreign strategic investors, to construct the board of directors with a powerful management, to perfect the incentive and restraint mechanism linked to the long-term profitability and future performance, to strengthen the supervision function of the board of supervisors by independent supervisors system, to improve the authenticity and transparency of information disclosure to all stakeholders, to set the linkage of the external supervision mechanism, and to focus on the management control and excessive intervention risk of shareholders.更多还原