【作者】 张庆昉；

【导师】 夏德仁；

【作者基本信息】 东北财经大学 ， 金融学， 2011， 博士

【摘要】 改革开放以来,我国发生了翻天覆地的变化,人们的生活水平和质量大幅提高。然而作为改革开放起点的农村,并没有充分享受改革开放的成果,农户收入增长不快,城乡收入差距越来越大。最近十几年,农户及其相关问题是包括政府在内的社会各界持续关注的焦点问题。中央连续多年以一号文件的形式持续推进“三农”问题的解决,理论界也不厌其烦地进行相关研究,由此足以体现农户问题的复杂和艰难。从金融的角度来看,农户是农村金融需求的重要主体,建立有效的农户借贷支持体系是促进农民增收、农业发展和农村繁荣的重要环节。然而农户不同于传统意义上的经济主体,是农村经济社会活动的基本单位,农户结构和行为方式有其自身特点。本文基于改革开放以来我国和湖南省农户历史数据和湖南省2009年2000户农户问卷调查资料,试图从农户行为特征和结构变迁视角,通过构建实证模型,探究其与农户借贷需求和农村金融市场借贷供给的内在联系,评价农村信贷政策对农户发展的影响,以寻求借贷资金支持农户投资、消费、增收,改善农户生活的有效途径,这对于推动解决“三农”问题,促进整个国民经济平稳较快发展具有重要的现实意义。本文的研究遵循从理论到实证的逻辑顺序。首先对农户行为理论、农村金融发展理论以及制度与制度变迁理论进行诠释和对国内外有关农户结构行为及其金融问题的文献进行回顾,分析改革开放以来农村金融供求现状及农户与农村金融中介之间的博弈关系和农户借贷市场特征,两者之间的博弈关系是本文分析研究的逻辑起点；在此基础上分析改革开放以来农户结构特征、变迁轨迹,从总体上对农户结构与农户借贷关系进行实证研究,讨论农户收入对农户借贷的影响；对农户行为进行剖析,探讨农户行为性质和具体行为方式,以及分别具体对农户的投资行为、消费行为与农户借贷关系进行实证分析,并从农村金融机构执行农村信贷政策角度,即农户发生借贷行为后,评估分析农村信贷政策对农户发展的影响效应,这种影响结果实质上也是农户和农村金融中介博弈的结果；最后根据实证分析结果重新审视和反思我国农村金融服务体系中存在的问题,并提出构建适应农户结构行为的农村借贷服务体系的思路。本文的创新主要体现在三个方面：一是首次提出农户显性的有效借贷需求和隐性的有效借贷需求的概念。农户的借贷首先要判断是否有效,确定有效之后,如果农户没有主张借贷,则该农户的借贷需求为隐性的借贷需求；如果农户提出了要求,不管是否得到满足则称之为显性借贷需求。探讨农户借贷是否显性有助于发现满足率低下的原因。二是首次利用离散选择模型对正规借贷和民间借贷对农户结构行为影响进行比较研究。利用比较研究的结果有助于确定农村金融服务体系的重点、努力方向,提高农村金融服务的效率。三是首次采用DEA方法对基于农户借贷行为的农村信贷政策执行效应进行评估。不但对农户借贷行为效应进行评估,而且对农村金融机构执行农村信贷政策后对自身经营发展状况进行评估。这种评估结果可以反映农户借贷资金的配置效率和农村金融机构的执行信贷政策效果。本文采用规范研究、实证研究、文献研究和调查研究相结合的方法。本文的研究结论主要是：1、转型农户结构发生深刻的变化。除人口、年龄、教育程度等方面的变化外,农户劳动就业和生产经营结构的非农倾向、农户收入结构中非农收入比重快速上升、农户收入分布两极化(高中低比例为2.5：5：2.5,少于1万元为低,超过3万元为高)、农户经营支出结构的稳定和消费支出结构的逐步升级等现象,推动农户结构日益多元化。2、农户具有生产性、消费性和社会性的性质,农户行为存在超稳定性、模仿性、风险厌恶性、外部主导性等特征,农户行为的复合性质和以上行为特征表明,古典理论的理性人假设并不完全适应于农户,农户行为在诸多约束下仅仅表现为有限理性。农户行为受农户结构影响巨大。农户是农村投资和农业投资的重要主体,但其投资以简单再生产和非农产业投资、短期投资为主；受收入水平和收入稳定性影响,农户消费总体不足,借钱消费现象较多说明农户消费观念的重大变化。3、农户借贷需求的有效性,有受制于农业比较收益低、资本积累缓慢、农户财产权利不充分的一面,又有其强烈的还款自觉和独有的信用增进机制的一面。因此,要全面、公允地看待农村信贷需求的有效性；农户有效借贷需求受投资机会逼仄、投资意愿保守、借贷供给约束影响处于抑制状态,表现为显性借贷需求不足。农户借贷需求的用途分为生产性和消费性,对生产用途为主还是以消费性用途为主的判断关系到农村信贷政策的有效性问题。4、农户借贷供给由正规金融和非正规金融构成。农村信用社在农村正规金融市场的垄断局面正在被农村金融体制的进一步改革打破,通过农村信贷产品和服务方式创新可以有效地增加农户借贷供给,体制创新和产品创新成为当前国家推动对农户信贷供给的主要途径。非正规金融仍是农户借贷供给的重要力量。5、非完美信息市场中,由于信息不对称、交易成本和不确定性的存在,农户与正规金融中介和非正规金融中介的反复博弈,最终决定了正规和非正规金融中介不同的供给策略和农户的选择倾向。农户借贷市场上正规金融机构的信贷配给策略源于其与农户博弈的非均衡；非正规金融机构在农户借贷市场上的长期普遍存在与其掌握农户信息的能力较强有关。在反复博弈中,农户形成的融资渠道的路径依赖又可能反过来影响其投资和消费行为。6、农户和金融中介(正规与非正规)的博弈决定了农户借贷市场的三个基本特征：正规金融与非正规金融并存的二元格局,分割与垄断叠套的市场结构以及供给约束与需求抑制交织的市场均衡。7、农户的不同结构、行为对正规借贷和民间借贷的需求和供给存在不同程度和方向的影响。农户的受教育结构中,正规金融机构信贷供给倾向文化程度高的农户,文化程度低的农户倾向于民间借贷；农户的家庭成员结构中,有良好的社会关系的农户更容易获得正规借贷和民间借贷的供给；农户的收入结构中,低收入群体更倾向于民间借贷,相应地民间借贷供给也倾向低收入群体；民间借贷与正规借贷对待农户的土地资产有着截然不同的态度,民间借贷倾向于支持田地多的农户；农户的经营行为中,正规借贷倾向于农户的生产经营用途,民间借贷倾向于生活消费用途。8、农户借贷对农户增收有显著影响,但反过来不尽然。在其他条件不变的情况下,农户借贷对不同收入层次水平的农户和收入来源不同的农户的作用效果是不同的。对低收入农户,无论是民间借贷支持还是正规金融机构贷款支持,效果是不明显的,而对相对高收入农户的贷款支持,其增收效果更显著；从农户借贷对农户不同来源的收入敏感性来看,农户借贷对农业生产经营手段增收的作用不明显,而对非农经营手段增收有更加显著的支持作用。而农户收入对正规借贷的供给和需求没有显著影响,对民间借贷需求是负的影响。这说明,没有证据表明,农户会因为自己的收入提高了会去向正规金融机构申请借贷以进一步促进收入的提高,即农户并不指望从正规金融机构借款来提高收入,农户的收入提高也没有引致正规金融机构的资金供给。9、农户投资和消费行为与农户借贷关系密切。农户投资资金来源中,自筹资金居主导地位,借贷资金中民间借贷资金远大于正规借贷资金。正规借贷倾向于支持农户的长期投资,而民间借贷更倾向于农户的短期投资。总体上农村正规金融机构的贷款和农户的借款对农户消费有显著的促进作用。民间借贷对农户消费的支持作用比正规借贷强,而且民间借贷和正规借贷都更倾向于支持农户的非基本生活消费。10、当前农村金融机构的农村信贷政策执行情况不理想,与农村信贷政策对农户支持的要求存在较大的执行偏差,不同地区农村金融机构执行效应差距较大。农村金融机构的执行情况与对农户和金融机构自身的最终影响效应并不一定匹配,两者不存在显著的正向对应关系,农户贷款投入的增加并不意味着农户自身状况的有效改善,资金配置总体缺乏效率且存在明显地区差异。11、当前我国农村金融体系的症结不是缺乏供给,而是供给与需求错配,体现在金融主体、业务品种、信贷条件、审批机制、产品定价、基础设施等多方面。这主要是由于我国农村金融改革和创新的供给主导型思路严重忽视了农村经济社会发展的新趋势、农户结构和行为的新变化以及由此产生的农户对金融服务的新需求。在这种思路的主导下,引入新型机构、市场化、商业化导向的传统机构改革、利率浮动政策、城市金融产品的简单移植等,都是建立在对农户结构市场化程度、农户行为理性程度过于简单化判断的基础上,因而政策实施难以达到预期效果。在这种思路的主导下,民间融资作为农村地区重要的借贷供给力量受到歧视和压制,缺乏合理引导和规范。也是在这种思路的影响下,金融的重要性掩盖了为金融发挥功能提供良好的制度环境和公共品服务的重要性,而这对于农户借贷是至关重要的。根据上述研究结论,本文提出在构建农户借贷服务体系时要注重两个再造：一是国家农村金融体系的再造,其中政策性金融要坚持,普惠金融要优先发展,同时民间金融要发展,其中重点发展草根金融,形成与正规金融与非正规金融良性互动的体系；二是与农户借贷相关的农村公共物品和服务体系的再造,包括完善制度环境、建立健全农村信用体系,加强对农户信贷政策的评估,持续改善农村公共基础硬件和软件设施等。更多还原

【Abstract】 Since the introduction of reform and opening-up, China has undergone enormous changes, and people’s living standard and quality have been significantly improved. However, the rural area where the reform and opening-up originated, has not shared the fruits of reform and construction. Rural residents’income is growing slowly, and the gap between urban and rural residents’ income is widening. In recent decades, three rural issues have gained constant attention from society and Chinese government. Chinese government formulated CCP Central Document NO.1 for several consecutive years devoting to the solution of three rural issues, and scholars also did many researches, demonstrating the complication and difficulty of this issue. From the perspective of finance, rural households are demanders of rural financial service; hence establishing an effective lending supporting system is crucial for rural households’income growth, agriculture development and rural area’s prosperity. Unlike economic subject in traditional theory, rural households as basic units of economy and society, have their own features in social structure and behavior form. Based upon historic statistic of China and Hunan province rural economy, and questionnaire analysis of two thousand rural households, this paper tries to establish an empirical model of rural households’borrowing demand and credit provision in rural financial market, evaluating the influence of rural credit policy on farming development, and to find appropriate credit policy to support rural households’ investment, consumption, income growth and living improvement, which has a practical significance for resolving the three dimensional rural issues, and maintaining steady and rapid economic development.This paper follows the Logic Sequencing from theory to evidence. It firstly makes a retrospect of previous theory of farmers’behavior, financial development in countryside and institutional change, and of research results on farmers’behavior and financial problems. Then it analyzes the status of rural financial service demand and provision, and gaming relationship of rural households and features of lending markets for rural households. The later is the main theoretical framework in this paper. Based on the above research, the paper analyzes the rural households’structure, revolution path, and the relationship between rural households’structure and farmers’behavior, behavior feature and concrete form. It makes further research on rural households’credit behavior, exploring empirical evidence both of overall relationship between rural households’structure, behavior and lending activity, and of respective relationship between rural households’ lending and their investment, consumption and income increasing. It also evaluates the effect of rural credit policy on rural economic development, which in substance is the result of rural households and rural financial institutions’gaming. And it finally contemplates the problem of existing rural financial system, and put forward opinions of establishing a rural financial service system adapting to rural households’structure and behavior.The innovation of this paper goes as the following three aspects:(1) the proposal, for the first time ever, of concept of dominant and recessive effective credit demand. We need to confirm whether the demand is effective or not, then if the effective demand is advocated by rural households, it’s dominant no matter it is satisfied or not, which helps to find out the reason of low demand fill rate; (2) for the first time it uses an discrete choice model to make comparative study on the effect of formal lending and informal lending on rural households’structure and behavior, which helps to find out the key points and improvement of rural financial system and improve it’s efficiency; (3) for the first time it use DEA model to evaluate the effect of rural credit policy based on rural households’ behavior. Not only to evaluate the effect of rural households’credit, but also to evaluate the financial institutions’operation after executing credit policy. The evaluation results can reflect the allocation efficiency of rural households’credit resource and policy effect. This paper comprehensively applies theoretical study, empirical study, literature search approaches and investigation and research method.The main conclusions of this paper are:(1) In the transitional period, rural households’ structure and behavior form take profound changes. The trend of rural households’ production and operation to non-agricultural becomes more obvious, and the proportion of non-agricultural income in the rural households’income structure grows quickly, and the income gap is wide with a ratio of the number of rural households with low, medium and high income level is 2.5:5:2.5. Less than ten thousand is low level, and more than thirty thousand is high level. The production expenditures of rural households are stable and the consumption expenditures are gradually upgraded. All of these changes promote the diversification of rural households’structure.(2) Rural households have production, consumption, and social characteristics, therefore, farmers’behavior is super-stable, imitative, risk aversive and external guided. Farmers’behavior and their features show that hypothesis of rational man in the classic theory cannot be fully applied in farmers. Farmers’behavior, expressing bilateral features, under many restricted circumstances, is bounded rationality. Farmers’behavior is sufficiently affected by rural households’structure. Rural households are the important entities of the investment in rural area and agricultural investment. But rural households usually invest in simply re-production, non-agricultural investment and short-term investment, which can be affected by income levels and the stability of income. In general, rural households do not have adequate consumption. Many rural households borrow money for consumption which means their consumptions concept has changed.(3) On one hand, the efficiency of rural households’credit demand is affected by the low profits of agriculture, slow accumulation of capital, inadequate rights and rural households’properties. On the other hand, farmers have a strong sense to repay the loans and strengthen their credit record. Therefore, we need to look at the rural credit demand comprehensively and fairly. Inadequate dominant credit demand is demonstrated by less investment opportunities, conservative investment will, restricted credit provision. Rural households’ credit goes to two aspects:production and consumption. Hence, production-oriented or consumption-oriented is crucial to judge the effectiveness of rural credit policy.(4) There are two types of rural households’ credit:formal financing and informal financing. In the past, rural credit cooperatives took the major share of the formal financing market, but things changed recently by intensified reform on rural financial system. By increasing rural credit products and innovating service patterns, we can effectively increase the supply of rural households’ credit. Innovation on financial system and products has become the major measures to promote the supply of credit to rural households. The informal financing remains the important way of credit to rural households.(5) In the imperfect information market, due to the information asymmetry, trading cost and uncertainty, gaming between rural households and formal financing intermediaries and informal financing intermediaries determines the different policies drawn by formal financing intermediaries and informal financing intermediaries and rural households’ choice. Policies of formal financing intermediaries come from the disequilibrium of gaming between rural households and formal financing institutions. Informal financing institutions can gain more information about rural households; therefore they can exist for a long time in the rural households’credit market. In the process of gaming, the path dependence of financing channel can also influence rural households’investment and consumption.(6) There are three features of rural households’credit market, which are determined by the gaming between financial intermediaries (formal and informal):the co-existence of formal financing and informal financing, a market structure with both segmentation and monopolization, and market equilibrium between limited supply of credit and restricted credit demand.(7) Different structure of rural households and different farmer’s behavior can impose different influence on the demand and supply of formal and informal lending. According to the education structure of farmers, formal financing institutions tend to issue credit to farmers with higher degree of education, while farmers with lower degree education tend to borrow from informal financing institutions. According to the family structure of rural households, farmers with good social relation can get formal and informal credit more easily. According to the income structure of rural households, low income rural households tend to borrow from the informal financing, and the informal financing also tends to issue credit to low income rural households. Formal financing and informal financing institutions hold totally different attitudes to rural households’land assets. Informal financing intermediaries tend to support rural households with more land assets. Formal financing tends to issue credit for production, while informal financing tends to support living and consumption.(8) Rural households’credit has significant influence over the growth of rural households’ income, but not vice versa. For low income farmers, rural households’credit’s influence is not obvious, no matter formal financing or informal financing. While for high income rural households, the influence is more obvious. Rural households’credit’s effect is not obvious over agricultural production, while more obvious over non-agricultural production. Rural households’income do not has obvious influence over supply and demand of formal financing, while has negative effect over demand for informal financing. This demonstrates that rural households will apply for credit from formal financing institutions because of the increase of income, and therefore further improve their income. In other words, rural households do not expect to borrow from formal financial institutions to improve income, and the increase of rural households’income does not lead to greater supply of credit from formal financing institutions.(9) Rural households’investment and consumption behavior have a close connection with rural households’credit. Self-funded capital takes the major part of the rural households’investment fund, and rural households’informal financing is greater than formal financing. Formal financing tends to support rural households’long-term investment while informal financing tends to support short-term investment. Generally speaking, formal financing and rural households’credit can greatly promote rural households’ consumption. Informal financing has greater support over rural households’consumption than formal financing. Formal and informal financing both tend to support rural households’ non-basic living consumption.(10) At present, the implementation of rural credit policy in the rural financial institutions is not satisfactory, and has not met the requirement of supporting rural households set in the rural credit policy. In different areas, the implementation effects differ greatly. The implementation of policy does not necessarily match the ultimate effect over rural households and financial institutions, with no obvious positive-going relations. The increase of rural households’credit input does not mean that farmers themselves improve their life effectively. The allocation of capital in general is insufficient and differs region by region.(11) The problem of rural financial system in China is not inadequate supply, but mismatch of supply and demand, which is displayed in many aspects such as financial entities, business products, credit conditions, approval mechanism, product pricing and infrastructures. Because of the supply-oriented rural financial reform and innovation, we ignore new development of rural economy and new changes of rural households and farmers’ behavior, as well as new demand from rural households. Under such circumstances, the reform of traditional institution with the introduction of new agencies and market-oriented, floating interest rate policy, implant of urban financial products are based on the judgment of the market degree of rural households’structure and farmers’ behavior, which is obviously too simple. Therefore, the implementation of policy cannot reach the pre-set goal. Accordingly, informal financing, as an important way of credit supply, is restricted and discriminated, without rational guidance and regulation. Similarly, the importance of finance overtakes the importance of providing good system environment and public service, which is essential for rural households’credit.According to above conclusion, this paper puts forward two "rebuilds":one is the rebuilt of rural financial system in China, which means we need to stick to policy finance with common finance as its priority. Meanwhile, informal financing needs to be developed to create good interaction between formal finance and informal finance. The other is the rebuilt of public goods and service system related to rural households’ credit, including improving system environment, establishing rural credit reporting system, strengthening the evaluation of rural credit policy, and constantly upgrading the hardware and software facilities of infrastructures.更多还原