【作者】 王恩山；

【导师】 刘明辉；

【作者基本信息】 东北财经大学 ， 会计学， 2011， 博士

【摘要】 随着社会主义市场经济体制的建立和完善,我国注册会计师事业取得了突飞猛进的发展。作为市场经济的产物,注册会计师行业的发展取决于两方面的因素：供给方面的推动与需求方面的牵引。在政府的大力支持下,我国注册会计师行业通过做大做强等战略的实施,极大地改善了审计市场的供给。但在需求方面,多年来高质量审计需求不足的问题一直未能得到有效的改善,这无疑不利于我国注册会计师行业乃至整个资本市场的进一步高质量地发展。本文将研究视线定位为审计需求,力求准确把握我国审计需求的现状,探究背后的制度成因,为改善我国审计需求现状、促进注册会计师行业和资本市场的长远发展提供智力支持。本文利用规范和实证相结合的研究方法,以利益相关者理论和制度经济学的有关原理为指导,在描述审计需求现状、探究制度成因的过程中,主要取得了以下三点创新：1.构建了更一般化的企业审计需求决定模型。借鉴利益相关者理论,将企业的审计需求看做是企业利益相关者审计需求的有机合成,认为企业的审计需求取决于两个因素：(1)利益相关者的审计需求偏好；(2)利益相关者的审计需求表达能力。其中,利益相关者的审计需求偏好取决于利益相关者自身利益与该审计类型的一致性；利益相关者的审计需求表达能力主要是指其对企业审计需求决策的影响力,这受到制度环境的制约,如股权表决制度、国家对证券市场的监管、区域市场化程度等。2.提出了通过实际控制人与控股股东股权回避的方式来完善审计委托制度的制度改革设想。现行审计委托制度下,股东大会对审计委托事项进行表决时,所有股东的股权都不回避,结果委托权实质性地落在了同时是大股东的经营者手中,经营者提供会计报表,并请人来审计自己,出现审计悖论。我国股权分置改革中流通股股东单独表决的成功实践以及上市公司对实际控制人和控股股东信息披露制度的逐步完善为我国审计委托制度的进一步创新提供了充分条件,于是本文大胆提出了实际控制人与控股股东所持股权在表决审计事项时回避的制度改革建议。同时进一步从理论上阐述了外部股东监督权与经营股东经营权的制衡,建议独立董事选举时,实际控制人和控股股东对应股权也应回避的制度建议。3.发现并分析了证监会的“审计需求表达困境”。我国当前的IPO制度是核准制,证监会对上市申请不但要进行形式审查还要进行实质性审查,面对千差万别数以百计的待上市公司,证监会确需高质量审计的帮助以鉴别申请资料的可信度,证监会因此成为现实中最大的审计服务消费者。自由表达自己的消费偏好是消费者的基本权利,但作为“审计服务消费者”的证监会却没有这一权利,原因就是它同时是审计市场的监管者。作为审计市场的监管者理应遵循公平原则,对待被监管对象一视同仁,证监会若表现出一定的“消费偏好”,将形成权力经商,严重危害审计市场的公平竞争。所以,证监会处于一个非常尴尬的地位,对待自己的审计需求偏好,经常是遮遮掩掩、欲言又止,本文将这种现象称为证监会的审计需求表达困境。全文共分七章,各章主要内容如下：第1章是“导言”。介绍本文的选题动机、研究对象、研究方法,以及研究路径与结构安排。第2章是“文献综述”。从审计需求理论假说、审计需求现状和影响审计需求的制度环境三个方面进行文献回顾,为本文的研究确定理论坐标。第3章是“审计需求的决定：理论归纳”。本章包括历史回顾、概念界定与需求影响因素分析、企业审计需求决定模型、企业利益相关者及其需求偏好、以及我国审计需求制度背景初步分析等共5节,构建了企业审计需求的决定模型,为后文的分析奠定理论基础。本章的主要结论是企业的审计需求取决于各利益相关者的审计需求偏好与各利益相关者的审计需求表达能力两个方面,而外部股东在各类利益相关者中是最需要高质量审计需求的。第4章是“审计需求的现状：经验证据”。研究我国审计需求的现状,先用历史梳理和文献归纳的方法对我国的审计需求现状给出一个总体判断,然后用实证的方法分角度为这一判断提供经验证据。该章分为四节,主要内容包括：(1)我国审计需求现状的总体特征是高质量审计需求不足,有三种表现：企业的低质量审计审计需求偏好、外部股东对审计质量的理性冷漠、审计需求的行政依赖。(2)利用近三年的年报审计数据研究审计师变更与审计质量的关系,为企业的低质量审计需求偏好提供经验证据。(3)利用2005年1月至2010年4月我国A股IPO数据实证检验审计师声誉对IPO定价的影响,为人们理解投资者对审计质量的冷漠态度提供经验证据。(4)利用政府对注册会计师行业做大做强战略逐步明确的支持态度,为审计需求的行政依赖提供新证据。第5章是“审计需求现状的成因：微观制度解析”。注册会计师审计是公司治理的一个环节,而产权性质、股权结构则是公司治理的基础。在行政权力对市场利益分配具有重大而直接的影响时,无论是国企还是私企都会有审计需求上的行政依赖,只是目的不同而已。国企在审计需求上的行政依赖是一种路径依赖的表现,因为政府是其“大老板”,国企官员的升迁决定权在政府手中。而私企在审计需求上的行政依赖主要是功用性的。一股独大仍是我国上市公司股权结构的重要特征,其他股东对第一大股东的制衡能力越强,高质量审计需求越大。当前高质量审计需求不足的重要原因就是其他股东缺乏对第一大股东的制约能力。而更直接的制度原因是现行审计委托制度存在缺陷。谁掌握审计委托权,企业的审计需求就更多地表现出谁的意愿。现行审计委托制度下,股东大会对审计委托事项进行表决时,所有股东的股权都不回避,结果委托权实质性地落在了同时是大股东的经营者手中,出现审计悖论。我国股权分置改革中流通股股东单独表决的成功实践以及上市公司对实际控制人和控股股东信息披露制度的逐步完善为我国审计委托制度的进一步创新提供了充分条件,于是本文大胆提出了实际控制人与控股股东所持股权在表决审计事项时回避的制度改革建议。在分析这一制度建议的必要性时,本文将思路稍作扩展,提出“外部股东监督权”的概念,审计委托权只是外部股东监督权的一项内容。为了公司治理的完善,建议在所有外部股东监督权事项表决中都实行实际控制人与控股股东的股权回避。第6章是“审计需求现状的成因：宏观制度解析”。该章探讨宏观制度与审计需求的关系,包括五节：概述、市场化改革进程与审计需求的关系、资本市场行政监管与审计需求的关系、资本市场虚假陈述民事诉讼与审计需求的关系,以及宏观制度改革建议。主要结论有：审计需求与市场化程度显著正相关；我国证券市场监管制度整体表现出“前紧后松”的特点,这是导致投资者对审计质量保持冷漠态度的重要原因；证监会面对审计服务,存在角色冲突,正深陷“审计需求表达困境”,即证监会既是应一视同仁的管理者又是可以偏好明显的审计服务消费者,两者存在明显的冲突。第7是“结语”。归纳全文的主要结论、政策建议和创新点,明确本文研究的局限,并对后续的研究进行展望。更多还原

【Abstract】 With the establishment and perfection of the socialist market economy, the Certified Public Accountant industry in China has achieved development by leaps and bounds. As the product of market economy, CPA industry’s development depends on two factors:the supply’s promotion and the demand’s traction. With the support from China Government, the CPA industry has improved audit market supply greatly by the implementation of the strategy of becoming bigger and stronger. But on the demand side, the problem of inefficient demand for high quality audit has not been resolved for many years, which go against the further development of CPA industry. We focus our eyes on the audit demand in this thesis. We have researched the current situation of audit demand in China and its institutional cause in order to provide intellectual support for further institutional reform.The thesis adopts the research method combining theoretical summary and empirical test. On the guidance of the stakeholder theory and institutional economics,3 innovations have been achieved in this thesis as follows:1. A new theoretical model about enterprise’s audit demand is built. Borrowing ideas from Stakeholder Theory, we take the enterprise’s audit demands as a Nexus of stakeholders’audit demands. And the expression of enterprise’s audit demand depends on two factors:(1) stakeholders’demand preference to audit; (2) stakeholders’express abilities of demand preference. Among them, the stakeholders’audit demand preference depends on the consistency of their own interests and the audit; the stakeholders’express ability of their audit demands mostly depend on the institutional environment, such as audit entrust system, equity voting system, the government’s influence on the securities market, and regional marketization etc.2. A new equity voting system is put forward to perfect the current audit entrust system by withdrawing the actual controller and the controlling shareholder’s voting right to select auditor. Under the current audit entrust system, none of shareholders’equity is evaded when shareholders vote on audit entrusted matters, as a result that audit entrust right belongs to the controlling shareholder while the controlling shareholder is substantially responsible to the accounting statements. Audit paradox appears when the controlling shareholder not only runs the business but also holds the right to select the auditor. In order to clear up audit paradox and allow full play to audit supervision function, the controlling shareholder’s right to select auditor should be call off. This audit entrust system reform proposal’s realistic foundations include the the successful practice of classified voting system during the share reform in our country and the corporate disclosure system about the actual controller and controlling shareholder. In agreement with the audit entrust system reform, the independent director system should also be reformed because independent director’s one of important duty is to supervise the actual controller and the controlling shareholder.3. The CSRC’s "audit demand express dilemma" is found and analyzed. Because of the current Authorized System of IPO in China, China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) is the biggest consumer on audit. Facing the hundreds of applications to list, the CSRC do need the high quality audit to classify them. The freedom of expressing their consumer preference is consumer’s basic right, but CSRC dosesn’t have this right, because it simultaneously act as audit market regulator. Being the audit market regulator, CSRC should abide by the principle of fairness, treat custody objects equally. If CSRC shows certain "consumer preference", this will form using power to do business and seriously damage the fair competition in audit market. So, the CSRC is in a very awkward position about their their audit demand preference. This phenomenon about CSRC is named as "audit demand express dilemma" in this thesis.The thesis is divided into 7 chapters as follows:Chapter 1 is "introduction". This chapter introduces the topic-selection motivation, the object of study, the research methods, as well as research approaches and the structure arrangement.Chapter 2 is "the literature review". This chapter determines the theory coordinates for the study, including the summary on the former audit demand theories, audit demand status and the institutional environment’s influence on audit demand.Chapter 3 is "the enterprise’s audit demand decision:theory conclusion". This chapter lays a theoretical basis for the post amble, including five points, such as the definition, the effect factors of audit demand, the theoretical model on enterprise’s audit demand, enterprise’s stakeholders and its demand preference to audit, and the current system background in China. This chapter’s core task is to construct a more common theoretical model than before. Our conclusion is that the enterprise’s audit demands is the Nexus of stakeholders’audit demands, which depends on two factors:the stakeholders’demand preference to audit and the stakeholders’express abilities of demand preference.Chapter 4 is "the status quo of audit demand:empirical evidence". This chapter studies the situation of enterprise’s audit demand in China. At the beginning of this chapter, the history of China enterprise’s audit demand is studied. And then, some new empirical facts are taken to support the induction of history. This chapter is divided into four sections, the main content includes:(1) the overall features of the status quo of audit demand in China is the lack of high audit demand, which has three kinds of expressions, such as: enterprise’s low quality audit demand preference, external shareholders’rational apathy to audit quality and audit demand’s dependence on administrative. (2) the enterprise’s low quality audit demand is supported by the quantitative relation between the shift of auditor and audit quality in recent three years. (3) the external shareholders’rational apathy to audit quality is showed by the empirical test on the relationship between the IPO pricing and the auditor’s reputation from January 2005 to April 2010. (4) the audit demand’s dependence on administrative appears in the research on the influence on the audit of CPA industry’s strategy to bigger and stronger, while China government shows support for the strategy.Chapter 5 is "the cause of audit demand status:microscopic institutional analysis" Auditing of CPA is a component of corporate governance, while property rights and corporate equity structure is the basis of corporate governance. Because of the government ’s great influence on the market, state-owned and private enterprises also show dependence on the administrative in auditor choice, though the goal of dependence is different. State-owned enterprise show dependence in audit demand because the government is its "big boss", while the private enterprise show independence because the government’s support can lead to superiority in market competition. "Only one big" is still the main trait of current listed company equity structure. Whoever hold more right to select auditor, whose demand reference can be more showed by the enterprise’s audit entrust system.Under the current audit entrust system, none of shareholders’equity is evaded when shareholders vote on audit entrusted matter, as a result the actual controller and the controlling shareholder manipulates the the right to select auditor while he is in charge of the business actrully. This is the main microscopic institutional cause to the lack of enterprise’s demand on high quality audit. So this chapter proposes a bold system reform proposal that the actual controller and the controlling shareholder’s voting right should be canceled in auditor selection. The conception "external shareholder’s right to supervise" is also put forward to support the reform proposal theoretically, while the right to select auditor is the main content of external shareholder’s right to supervise. Chapter 6 is "the cause of audit demand status:macro institutional analysis". This chapter discusses the relationship between macro system and audit demand, including five sections:an overview, the relationship between area market reform process and audit demand, capital market’s administrative supervision and audit demand, false statements civil actions in capital market and audit demand, and macro system reform proposal. Experience evidence makes clear that the audit demand has significantly positive correlation with the degree of marketization. The CSRC is in a very awkward position about their their audit demand preference, which is named as "audit demand express dilemma". China government’s supervision on the securities market shows a overall feature as " tight at first but loose afterwards", which leads the outside investors to keep a rational apathy to the audit quality. Macro system reform proposal is offered in this chapter is that the government should loose the direct control on the economy, because CPA audit is the product of market economy in nature.Chapter 7 is "epilogue". The main content includes:main conclusions, policy suggestions, and innovation points. At the end of this chapter, the limitations of this thesis and the possible subsequent research on audit demand are discussed.更多还原