【作者】 高玉强；

【导师】 孙开；

【作者基本信息】 东北财经大学 ， 财政学， 2011， 博士

【摘要】 2010年,中国GDP总量首次超过日本,上升为世界第二经济大国。然而,在赢得了举世瞩目、持续快速增长的同时,中国经济的深层次矛盾逐渐凸显,特别是农业发展与其在国民经济中的基础地位严重不匹配,业已成为制约中国经济可持续发展的瓶颈。首先,扭曲性的城乡收入分配格局并未得到根本性扭转,而且这种差距还表现出逐渐扩大的趋势。其次,日益趋紧的世界粮食供求关系使粮食安全问题激化到了前所未有的地步,而中国又是一个发展中的农业大国和人口大国,中国的粮食安全问题无论如何强调都不为过。再次,由于在农业生产过程中,化肥、农药等农业投入要素的过量使用,中国的农业生态环境正在遭到严重破坏,而且缺乏有效的制度设计能够加以缓解或遏制。最后,WTO成员国在全球农业的相关政策博弈与规则设定中的话语权不同,导致中国政府面临的国际农业补贴竞争环境非常严峻、复杂而不公平。所谓农业补贴,就是各级政府为了实现保障粮食安全、提高农民收入水平和农业可持续发展等政策目标,对农业生产、流通、贸易活动或农业生产者提供的具有导向功能的转移性财政支出。农业补贴是财政支农不可替代的政策手段,也是国际上普遍采用的支持与保护农业生产的有效手段。进一步健全农业补贴制度,对于促进增粮增收,推动农业农村经济又好又快发展,具有重要的调控和保障意义。因此,在WTO农业补贴相关规则的框架下,深入剖析我国农业补贴制度存在的问题及其症结,准确评估和测度中国农业补贴的政策效应和效率,比较并借鉴国外农业补贴的成功做法与先进经验,并以此为基础提出了中国农业补贴制度优化的方向和具体建议,最终形成目标清晰、受益直接、类型多样、简便高效以及符合WTO规则的农业补贴制度,理所当然成为当前中国经济发展面临的一项极具挑战性而亟待破解的重大课题。我们正是在此背景下对中国农业补贴制度的优化问题展开研究。首先,本文在比较和综合国内外财政补贴定义的基础上界定了农业补贴的定义,阐释了农业补贴的基本特征,从内涵和外延两个方面区分了农业补贴、农业保护和农业支持等几个术语。进而,从公共财政学说、福利经济学、制度经济学和农业多功能性理论等多维视角探讨了实施农业补贴政策的理论依据,分析了在开放经济条件下实施农业补贴对本国和它国的福利影响,列示了衡量农业补贴水平的主要指标,探讨了中国推行农业补贴政策的特殊性,以及中国政府面临的复杂国际农业补贴竞争环境。接着,本文梳理了新中国成立以来的农业补贴制度变迁过程,全面剖析了中国当前的农业补贴政策体系,探讨了各项具体农业补贴政策的实施情况,阐释了中国农业补贴政策的主要特征,分析了中国当前农业补贴的规模与结构,总体考察并具体分析了中国农业补贴制度存在的主要问题,从国际规则、法律、经济、制度等层面挖掘问题背后的根源。在上述定性分析的基础上,我们运用灰色关联度分析方法,从全国的层面实证检验了新型农业补贴政策整体和各项具体新型农业补贴政策的增产效应与增收效应。研究结果表明,中国新型农业补贴政策整体的两种效应均较为显著,而且增产效应比增收效应略微明显。从具体农业补贴政策来看,各项新型农业补贴政策的增产效应与增收效应的大小排序是一致的。除了良种补贴增产效应低于增收效应之外,其它三项农业补贴政策的增产效应均比增收效应突出。然而,与我国农资综合直补、良种补贴以及农机购置补贴等单项政策效应相比,中国新型农业补贴政策的整体效应欠佳。运用省际面板数据模型分别研究了粮食主产区、产销基本平衡区和主销区的农业补贴政策的整体增产效应；运用省际面板数据模型分析了农机购置补贴的政策效应。我们认为,在保证农业补贴政策效应显著性的同时,还必须提高农业补贴资金自身的使用效率。进而,简要介绍了农业补贴效率测度的基本理论与研究方法,运用数据包络分析(DEA)方法对各省的农业补贴的效率和超效率进行测度与比较分析。效率测算结果显示,粮食主产区和主销区的所有省份均处于农业补贴的高效区与中效区。在粮食主产区,辽宁、河北、河南、江苏四省处于农业补贴高效区,其余九个省份处于农业补贴中效区。在粮食主销区,上海、北京、天津、浙江、福建和海南等六省均处于农业补贴高效区,只有广东省位于农业补贴中效区。在粮食产销基本平衡区,只有西藏位于农业补贴高效区,新疆、青海、广西和重庆四省处在中效区,云南、贵州、甘肃、陕西、宁夏、山西等六省则处于农业补贴低效区。通过对粮食主产区、产销基本平衡区和主销区三大区域的比较,本文的结论是,主销区的农业补贴效率最高,主产区居中,而产销基本平衡区最低。省际农业补贴超效率测度的结果表明,超效率平均值均大于1的省份共有8个,按其超效率平均得分的多少,依次为上海、北京、海南、福建、天津、西藏、河南、辽宁。按照三大粮食产区的划分,本文分别找出各大粮食产区的农业补贴效率较高的省份作为参考。粮食主销区农业补贴效率最高的省份是上海,然后是北京、海南、福建、天津；粮食主产区农业补贴效率最高的省份是河南,辽宁次之；粮食产销基本平衡区农业补贴效率最高的省份是西藏。为了提高农业补贴效率,在农业补贴制度优化的过程中,我们建议对三大粮食产区分类指导,以各大粮食产区农业补贴效率最高的省份作为改革的典范与标杆。运用DEA-Malmquist模型测算和比较粮食主产区13个省份的粮食直补效率。研究结果表明,中国粮食直补效率不高的主要原因是技术无效率。粮食直补的Malmquist生产率年均增长3.6%,粮食直补生产率的提高主要源于技术进步与规模效率的提高,而不是纯技术效率的提高。由于发达国家和若干发展中国家的农业补贴实践已有较长历史,积累的很多先进经验值得中国借鉴,而留下的一些教训又需要中国引以为戒。本文比较并总结了欧盟、美国、日本等发达国家与印度、巴西、埃及等发展中国家的农业补贴的先进经验。我们认为,认真借鉴这些先进经验,对中国农业补贴制度的创新和完善大有裨益。在剖析中国农业补贴制度存在的诸多问题、准确评估与测度中国农业补贴的政策效应和效率、比较与总结一些国家农业补贴制度的基础上,我们从理论分析和经验研究两个角度分析了影响农业保护水平的一系列经济因素。结合中国的具体国情,我们界定了中国农业补贴制度的目标,给出了中国农业补贴制度优化的指导原则、总体思路与基本框架。在我们设计的基本框架内,遵循优化农业补贴制度的指导原则并沿着上述思路,从法律体系、农业补贴水平、政策工具、农业补贴结构、补贴资金的发放程序与监管等方面,界定中国完善农业补贴制度的基本着力点；提出了优化农业补贴制度的具体措施,以及完善农业补贴制度的配套措施。全文可能的创新主要表现在：其一,运用灰色关联度分析方法和2006-2010年全国层面的相关数据,从经验研究的角度检验了新型农业补贴政策整体和各项具体新型农业补贴政策的增产效应与增收效应。其二,在梳理农机购置补贴和其它财政支农支出的传导机制和拓展柯布—道格拉斯生产函数的基础上,我们运用农机总动力和土地生产率两个省际面板数据模型,分别对中国粮食主产区和非粮食主产区的农机购置补贴与其它财政支农支出的传导机制的有效性进行理论研究与经验分析。研究结果表明,无论粮食主产区还是非粮食主产区,农业补贴与其它财政支农支出的传导机制均较为有效。其三,运用DEA方法准确测度并比较了中国各省份农业补贴的效率和超效率。效率测算结果显示,粮食主产区和主销区的所有省份均处于农业补贴的高效区与中效区。为了提高农业补贴效率,在农业补贴制度优化的过程中,我们建议对三大粮食产区分类指导,以各大粮食产区农业补贴效率最高的省份作为改革的典范与标杆。其四,从理论上梳理了粮食直补的传导机制,基于省际面板数据的回归分析,从整体上检验了粮食直补传导机制的有效性。运用DEA-Malmquist模型测算了粮食主产区13个省份的粮食直补效率。更多还原

【Abstract】 China’s total GDP in 2010 surpassed Japan for the first time as to become the second largest economy in the world. However, during the remarkable, sustained and rapid development of the national economy, there appear gradually many deep-rooted contradictions, especially agricultural development mismatches serious with its fundamental position in the national economy. And they have become the bottleneck of sustainable development in China’s economy. First of all, the distorted income distribution pattern between the urban and rural residents has not been fundamentally reversed. And the urban-rural income gap is likely to expand further. Second, the increasingly tight relationship between the world’s grain supply and demand makes food safety issues escalated to unprecedented extent. Because China is a developing agricultural country and a populous country, we just cannot over-exaggerate the importance of food safety issues in China. Third, agricultural inputs elements, such as chemical fertilizers and pesticides, are excessively used during the procedure of agricultural producing, and China’s agro-ecological environment is severely damaged and there does not exist an effective system, which can relieve and contain the trend. Finally, because WTO member countries’ right to speak in global agricultural policies game and rules set is different, China’s government is faced with serious, complex and unfair international competition circumstances related to agricultural subsidies.The so-called agricultural subsidies means that nature-oriented financial transfer expenditure provided by all-level-government to agricultural production, circulation, trade or agriculture producers, in order to achieve policy objectives to ensure food security, to enhance the income level of farmers and to achieve agricultural sustainable development. Agricultural subsidy is an irreplaceable fiscal policy instrument and an effective means of supporting and protecting agricultural development, which is widely used around the world. To improve further the agricultural subsidies system is of significance to increase grain production, to enhance the income level of farmers, and to promote soundly and rapidly the development of agriculture and rural economy. In the WTO framework of agricultural subsidies rules, the problems of the agricultural subsidies system and the crux are deeply analyzed, the policy effects and efficiency of agricultural subsidies are assessed and measured comprehensively and accurately, the successful practice and the advanced experiences of foreign agricultural subsidies are compared and learned from. The direction and specific recommendations for optimization of agricultural subsidies system in China is put forward, as well as the agricultural subsidies system is formed with a clear goal, to benefit directly, to be diverse, simple, efficient, and to be consistent with WTO rules. It rationally becomes a challenging and important issue to be tackled with China government. In the context, we make a study on the optimization of China’s agriculture subsidies system.Firstly, the definition of agricultural subsidies is defined on the basis of sorting the definition of financial subsidies domestic and abroad. The basic characteristics of agricultural subsidies are illustrated. Several terms, such as agricultural subsidies, agricultural protection and agricultural support, are distinguished from two aspects in connotation and extension. From multi-dimensional perspective toward the theory of public finance, welfare economics, institutional economics and agricultural multi-functional, the theoretical basis of implementation agricultural subsidies is probed into. The welfare impact of implementation agricultural subsidies on their own country and other countries is analyzed in an open economy. Several main indicators, measuring the level of agricultural subsidies, are showed. The special nature of China’s implementing agricultural subsidies and the serious, complex and unfair international competition circumstances related to agricultural subsidies that China’s government faced with are researched.Then, the institutional change process in agricultural subsidies has been combed since the foundation of new China. China’s current agricultural subsidies system is analyzed comprehensively. The implementation of the specific policy in agricultural subsidies is discussed. The main features of agricultural subsidies in China are illustrated. China’s current size and the structure of agricultural subsidies are analyzed respectively. The problems in the agricultural subsidies system in China are investigated overall and analyzed in detail. The root causes behind the problems are mined from the aspects in international rules, laws, economy, institution, and so on.On the basis of qualitative analysis above, we examine empirically the yield and income effect of overall agricultural subsidies policy and every specific agricultural subsidies policy term from the national level by using grey relational analysis. The result shows that the two kinds of effect of China’s overall policy of agricultural subsidies are more significant, and the yield effect is slightly higher than the income effect. The sort of two kinds of effect of every specific policy term in agriculture subsidies is consistent. Besides the yield effect in seed subsidy is less than the income effect, the yield effect of the other three policy terms in agricultural subsidies are all higher than the income effect. However, compared with the individual significance of policy effect of agricultural input comprehensive subsidy, seed subsidy and subsidy to purchase agricultural machineries, the overall policy effect of China’s agricultural subsidies is not significant enough. The yield effect of overall agricultural subsidy policies is studied respectively in the main grain producing area, the basic grain balance area between production and selling and the main grain selling area by employing China’s inter-provincial panel data model. The yield effect of subsidy to purchase agricultural machineries is also analyzed by using China’s inter-provincial panel data model.We argue that the significance of policy effects of agricultural subsidies is ensured at the same time, and it is also important to improve the efficiency of using agricultural subsidies funds. The basic theory and research method of measuring the efficiency of agricultural subsidies are outlined. The efficiency and super-efficiency of agricultural subsidies in every province are measured and compared by using DEA method. The result shows that all provinces in main grain producing area and in major selling area are in high-efficiency area and mid-efficiency area. In main grain producing area, four provinces as Liaoning, Hebei, Henan and Jiangsu are in high-efficiency area, and the other nine provinces are in mid-efficiency area. And in main grain selling area, the six provinces as Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, Zhejiang, Fujian and Hainan are in high-efficiency area and only Guangdong is in mid-efficiency area. In the basic grain balance area between production and selling, only Tibet is in high-efficiency area, and four provinces as Xinjiang, Qinghai, Guangxi and Chongqing are in mid-efficiency area, the other six provinces are in low-efficiency area. Through the comparison of main grain producing area, the basic grain balance area between production and selling and major grain selling area, the conclusion is that all provinces in major grain selling area are in high-efficiency area, the main grain producing area are in mid-efficiency area, and the basic grain balance area between production and selling is in low-efficiency area. The result of measured super-efficiency shows that there are eight provinces which average super-efficiency is more than 1. According to the average score of super-efficiency, the order is Shanghai, Beijing, Hainan, Fujian, Tianjin, Tibet, Henan and Liaoning. According to the division of the three grain producing areas, we identify the most efficient province in agricultural subsidies in every grain producing area as a reference. In the main grain selling area, Shanghai is the most efficient city and then Beijing, Hainan, Fujian, Tianjin. In main grain producing area, Henan is the most efficient province and then Liaoning. In the basic grain balance between production and selling, Tibet is the most efficient zone. In order to enhance the efficiency of agricultural subsidies, we suggest that we should make different guidance in the three kinds of grain producing area and consider the most efficient province of agricultural subsidies in the three grain producing areas as their model and benchmarking for the reform during the optimization of agricultural subsidies system. The efficiency of direct grain subsidies is also measured and compared in 13 provinces of major grain producing area by using DEA-Malmquist model. The result shows that the major reason that leads to the low efficiency of grain direct subsidy is technology inefficiency. And the annual average increase of grain direct subsidy Malmquist TFP index is 3.6%, which comes from technical progress and the increasing scale efficiency instead of pure technical efficiency improvement.As practice of agricultural subsidies in developed countries and several developing countries has a longer history, there are lots of advanced experiences which are worth learning from and some lessons which is deserved to be drawn for China. We compare and summarize the advanced experiences about agricultural subsidies system in developed countries such as European Union, U.S.A and Japan, and in developing countries as India, Brazil and Egypt. And the article argues that it is very beneficial for the innovation and improvement in China’s agricultural subsidies system to learn these advanced experiences.On the basis of analyzing the problems in China’s agricultural subsidies system, quantitative analysis in the policy effects of agricultural subsidies in China, measuring the efficiency of agricultural subsidies in China and comparison and summary of agricultural subsidies in some typical countries, we analyze a series of economic factors impacting the level of agricultural protection from the perspective in theoretical analysis and empirical research. Combined with China’s specific national conditions, we define the goal of China’s agricultural subsidies system and provide guidelines, general idea and basic framework of optimizing China’s agricultural subsidies system. In the basic framework above, following the guidelines and general idea of optimization of agricultural subsidies system, the basic focus on improving agricultural subsidies system is defined in the legal system, the level of agricultural subsidies, policy instruments, the structure of agricultural subsidies, the procedure for releasing and supervision and management of subsidies funds. Specific and supporting measures of optimizing China’s agricultural subsidies system are put forward.There are following aspects of innovation in the paper. First, the yield and income effect of the overall policy and every policy term of agricultural subsidies are examined from the perspective in empirical study by using grey relational analysis method, and the national-level data from 2006 to 2010. Second, after analyzing the conduction mechanism of subsidy to purchase agricultural machineries and other public expenditure on agriculture theoretically and improving the Cobb-Douglas production function, the article makes an empirical research on the effectiveness of conduction mechanism of subsidy to purchase agricultural machineries and other public expenditure on agriculture in the main grain producing area and the other area employing China’s inter-provincial panel data model. The result shows that the conduction mechanisms of subsidy to purchase agricultural machineries and other public expenditure on agriculture are both efficient in two kind of area. Third, the efficiency and super-efficiency of agricultural subsidies in every province are measured and compared by using DEA method. Finally, the conduction mechanism of grain direct subsidy is analyzed theoretically. Then the effectiveness of the conduction mechanism is tested on the whole based on regression analysis of inter-provincial panel data. And the efficiency of the direct grain subsidy in 13 provinces in main grain producing area from 2004 to 2008 is evaluated by using DEA-Malmquist model.更多还原