【作者】 刘亚臣；

【导师】 韩毅；

【作者基本信息】 辽宁大学 ， 经济史， 2011， 博士

【摘要】 自从住房产权制度改革作为我国社会经济制度改革的重要内容以来,就注定了住房产权制度改革的发展路径有其特殊的发展规律。我国住房制度改革从计划经济体制下的住房产权公有制到改革开放之初的补贴出售公有住房、提租补贴和住房合作社的住房产权初步私有化为代表的产权共有制度,又到以全面住房产权私有化为标志的住房制度改革,直到最近又被重新重视的以住房保障为特征的经济适用房和廉租房制度,体现了我国城镇住房产权演变过程与国内政治经济发展以及国家体制转型的同步性和互动性,为研究提供了丰富而独特的产权制度变迁过程。产权制度的选择与经济绩效对于我国城镇住房保障的影响尤为突出,随着中国日益重视市场经济,意识形态对于住房制度发展的障碍将会减小,我们既要解决传统体制下形成的城镇住房产权制度的低效问题,又要改变原有城镇住房产权结构在演变中导致的社会不公问题。我国城镇住房产权制度变迁存在路径依赖问题,既有的产权制度本身就是一个先在的制约因素。产权的权利束理论是本文试图理解该制度演进变迁实质并对这段制度史进行分析的重要工具;借鉴和运用制度经济学的方法和分析工具来分析、阐述我国城镇住房产权制度变迁,并依此提出我国城镇住房产权制度的创新思路就成亟待解决的理论问题。第1、2章,论文提炼出研究思路与分析方法,对制度、产权以及我国城镇住房保障与产权制度进行了综述;第3、4、5章,论文分别分析了对福利分配下城镇住房产权公有制度(1949-1978)、多元投资下城镇住房产权多种所有制度(1979-1998)、市场主导下城镇住房产权私有制度(1999-2010)的理论和实践形成基础,系统地梳理了各个阶段住房产权制度确立路径,并总结了各个阶段住房产权制度的经济绩效;第6章,论文采用三方博弈模型对现有住房制度中最重要的政府、房产商和购房者三个利益相关者进行了决策博弈,采用静态博弈模型对保障房建设涉及的中央与地方政府投入进行了探讨,提炼出住房私有产权制度下应采取的制度路径;第7章,论文提出了对策建议与研究启示。在我国城镇住房产权变迁的过程中,除了受到经济因素的影响之外,还受到其他几个因素的影响:我国在不同历史阶段的政治体制,以及政府对城镇住房产权制度的偏好;社会不同阶层和群体对于城镇住房产权制度的抵制或接受程度;能够将制度监督机制进行外部性内部化的激励机制;在新的住房制度下,原有城镇住房产权制度下的受益者对于收益和损失的权衡结果。通过研究发现,中国历次的城镇住房产权制度变迁基本上为强制性变迁,即由政府通过政策和法律的出台引致变迁,此外,我国城镇住房产权制度还受到了价值观、伦理规范、道德、习惯、意识形态等多方面的影响。我国住房制度变迁一直伴随着既得利益社会阶层和群体的干预,具有路径依赖特征,不可能在忽略国家制度差异性前提下利用国外的理论和经验研究我国住房产权制度。论文提出构建产权制度明晰,政府、市场各行其责的住房制度模式,建立权力约束、制度约束、市场约束以及法律约束等四个机制来系统地规范和解决现有住房产权制度下的管理问题。我们在反对平均主义基础上的城镇住房产权公有制以及福利分配方式住房安排的同时,还要尽量避免社会对效率优先路径的过分依赖,防止由此产生的住房保障程度、贫富差距和收入差距过大等问题。更多还原

【Abstract】 Since the institutional reform of housing property rights became an important part of the social and economic system reforms in China, the reform development path has been destined to special development. China housing system reform has experienced a long period of development, from the public ownership of housing and property rights under the planning economic system to the public ownership of housing property rights represented by preliminary privatization of housing properties which involves selling public housing with subsidies , raising subsidies and housing cooperatives at the beginning of the reform. Then the housing system reform signified by the complete privatization of housing property, the economically affordable housing and low-rent housing system which was emphasized again recently featured by housing guarantees. All these encapsulate the mutual communication and cooperation among evolution process of China urban housing properties , domestic ,political and economic development and transformation of the national system, which provides the rich and unique institutional history changing course for the research.The choice of property right system and economic performance is very important for China urban housing safeguards. With China increasingly paying attention to the market economy, ideological obstacles for housing system development will reduce. We should not only solve the inefficiencies of the town house property rights system formed under traditional institution, but change social inequality problems caused by the original town house property rights structure due in its evolution. China’s urban housing property rights system change faces the problems of path dependency, the existing property right system itself is a preexistent restricting factor. Property right bunch theory is the main tool in this paper to understand the essence of the evolution system ,and to analyze the institutional history.In Chapters 1 and 2, this paper points out the research and analyzing method, and reviews the definition of system, property rights, as well as China’s urban housing safeguards and property right systems. In Chapters 3, 4 and 5, the paper explains respectively the basis of the theory and practice of the following systems: public ownership system of urban housing property , ownership system of urban property under the distribution of benefits(1949-1978), the diverse housing property rights under multivariate investments (1979-1998), and private system of urban housing property rights under market-based system (1999-2010).This paper also makes the establishment paths of housing property right systems through its various stages and summarizes economic performance of housing property right systems in its various stages. In Chapter 6, the paper adopts a three-party game model to analyze the decision-making game among three benefit-relevant parties of local government, property developers and homebuyers. The static game theory model is established to discuss the functions of the central and local governments involved in the safeguards of construction and refines the system paths under the private property rights system. In Chapter 7, this paper puts forward the conclusions , suggestions and their implications.The change of China’surban housing property rights, in addition , was also influenced by the following factors: the political systems of different historical periods, the government preferences for urban house property rights system, the degrees of rejection and accentance from different social classes and groups, incentive mechanisms which can internalize the externalities to supervision, original town house property rights beneficiary’s weighing up gains and losses in the new housing system. Through the study ,this paper finds that the change of China’s urban housing property rights system is basically mandatory, i.e., through government policies and laws. In addition, urban housing property rights system was also influenced by values, ethics, morals, habits, ideologies and other aspects.China’s housing system change with vested interest has been intervened by social classes and groups, which is characterized by path dependency. National system difference can’t be ignored when foreign research theory and experience are introduced to study China’s housing property right system. This paper puts forward from mechanisms, which include power restrictions, institutional constraints, market constraints, and legal restrictions, to normalize and resolve the management problems under the current housing property rights system. We are opposed to urban housing property rights on the basis of the egalitarianism. At the same time, the society should try to avoid relying too much on path of mere efficiency, so as to avoid leading to some problems, for example, the housing subsidizing levels, the gap between the rich and poor and the income gap.更多还原