【作者】 黄文旭；

【导师】 丁伟；

【作者基本信息】 华东政法大学 ， 国际法学， 2011， 博士

【摘要】 导言部分对论文的选题意义、文献综述与研究方法进行了介绍。如果发达国家对我国出口产品征收碳关税,将对我国经济产生重大的影响。对发达国家有关碳关税的立法提案是否符合国际法进行分析,并提出我国的应对策略,具有重大的理论与实践意义。第一章对碳关税的法律性质进行了分析。由于碳关税这一名词的出现已是既成事实并已被普遍接受,因此重要的不是碳关税这一表述是否正确,而是对碳关税的法律性质做出准确界定。碳关税指的是基于碳排放的进口环节边境调节措施,表现为要求进口商对进口自未实施碳减排制度的国家的产品缴税或购买排放配额等形式。根据这一定义,碳关税具有以下特征:第一,碳关税是实施碳减排制度的国家对进口自未实施碳减排制度国家的产品采取的边境调节措施;第二,当进口国的碳减排制度为碳税时,碳关税表现为税收的形式,当进口国的碳减排制度为限额与交易制度时,碳关税表现为配额的形式;第三,凡是进口国基于进口产品的碳排放要求进口商承担的税费,都可称为碳关税,不管其采取何种形式。第二章对美国与欧盟的碳关税法律制度进行了介绍。《美国清洁能源安全法案》和之前的提案都采用了“国际储备储备额”的碳关税模式,《清洁能源工作与美国电力法案》只要求采取边境措施,并未详细说明边境措施的类型。美国未来可能采取的碳关税模式很有可能就是“国际储备配额”。美国式“碳关税”条款具有以下特征:(1)明确指出实施“碳关税”的目的是防止“碳泄漏”,即防止因为本法的实施造成美国生产成本提高,从而导致其他国家的工业实体温室气体排放量的实质增加;(2)要求“碳关税”的设计与实施符合美国参加的国际条约;(3)如果符合一定的条件,美国的“碳关税”将于2020年1月1日对进口产品适用;(4)“碳关税”不适用于最不发达国家、合格工业部门中占全球温室气体排放量不足0.5%的国家以及占涵盖产品的进口量不足5%的国家,发展中国家并不享有“碳关税”豁免;(5)“碳关税”的相应国内制度为排放权交易制度;(6)“碳关税”与国内涵盖产品生产商购买排放配额的价格相当。欧盟提出碳关税的时间比美国更早,并且主要是针对美国退出《京都议定书》的行为。2008年1月,欧盟委员会公布了一份修改欧盟2003年第87号指令的提案,目的是改善并扩大欧盟温室气体排放配额交易制度。这是第一份明确考虑了排放权交易制度的运行所产生的碳泄漏问题的指令草案,该草案在序言的注释中讨论了在符合WTO要求的情况下建立一种要求进口商以“不低于欧盟内的机构”的条件获得并提交配额的制度的可能性。由于欧盟成员国对是否实施碳关税还存在着分歧,因此欧盟何时开始实施碳关税还不得而知。第三章以WTO规则为视角分析了碳关税的合法性。从WTO的具体规则来看,GATT第2.2(a)条规定了边境调节税,碳关税有可能表现为一种与碳排放有关的进口环节边境调节税,只要碳关税的征收符合WTO的国民待遇原则和最惠国待遇原则,那么碳关税就是符合WTO规则的。即使碳关税的征收违反了国民待遇原则和最惠国待遇原则,碳关税还可以从GATT1994第20条例外来寻找合法性依据。由于应对气候变化的措施旨在保护人类免遭气候变化带来的负面影响,因此符合GATT1994第20条(b)项的规定;同时,它不仅保护全球的大气而且保护一些动植物免遭气候变暖而灭绝,因此符合GATT1994第20条(g)项的规定。在得出碳关税符合GATT1994第20条(b)项或(g)项后,需要进一步分析碳关税的实施是否“在情形相同的国家之间构成任意或不合理歧视的手段或构成对国际贸易的变相限制”,如果结论是否定的,则碳关税是WTO规则下的合法措施。碳关税的实施可能存在任意或不合理的歧视,但并不代表碳关税本身存在任意或不合理的歧视。第四章从气候变化国际法框架的视角分析了碳关税的合法性。经过分析后,本文认为,采取碳关税措施是一国的主权事项,如果要主张碳关税措施不合法,必须要有国际法上的依据。因此,碳关税本身并不违反《联合国气候变化框架公约》,只是要受到一定的限制,即不得成为国际贸易上的任意或无理的歧视手段或者隐蔽的限制,不得违反“共同但有区别的责任”原则,即不得对发展中国家进口的产品实施。第五章分析了碳关税的国际协调问题。由于《联合国气候变化框架公约》的发展中国家缔约方可以根据该公约中的“共同但有区别的责任”原则主张其他缔约方对其实施的碳关税不合法,但由于《联合国气候变化框架公约》没有解决争端的有效机制,因此解决碳关税争端的最好平台是WTO争端解决程序。但是在WTO争端解决程序中,发展中国家很难证明其他国家对其实施的碳关税违反了WTO规则,如果在WTO争端解决程序中,专家组或上诉机构能够适用《联合国气候变化框架公约》中的条款,则发展中国家胜诉的机率会大大增加。WTO争端解决程序能否适用WTO之外的规则,在理论与实践中都存在着争议。第六章提出了中国应对碳关税的策略。中国的不少出口商品都是高能耗产品,如果发达国家征收碳关税,中国的绝大多数出口商品就失去了竞争力,这将对中国的外贸出口造成严重打击。因此,在国际层面,我国要坚持《联合国气候变化框架公约》中的“共同但有区别的责任”原则,坚持世界贸易组织的“自由贸易”原则和“最惠国待遇”原则。此外,中国要努力成为国际经济规则的主动参与者、制定者,维护国家正当权益。在国内,要加快发展新能源和新材料产业,加快经济结构调整和产业调整、转型、升级步伐,加快节能减排进程,引导企业强化绿色生产意识和不断提高节能减排技术水平。但是,我国没有必要为应对碳关税而急于推出碳税制度。因为国外的碳关税提案都是以其国内的碳排放权交易制度为基础的,只要我国采取了相当的碳减排制度,其他国家就不能对我国的产品征收碳关税。因此,我国只需根据我国的国情在适当的时候实行碳排放权交易制度或碳税制度之一种即可。此外,我国还可实施碳出口税和碳关税来应对国外碳关税。总之,碳关税本身并不当然违反国际法,如果其设计与实施符合一定条件,则有可能符合国际法规则,而针对发展中国家实施的碳关税违反了国际法规则。更多还原

【Abstract】 The introduction part explains the significance, academic history and research methods of this dissertation. If China’s exports are levied carbon tariff by developed countries, there will be a significant impact on our economy. Analyzing the legitimacy of carbon tariff under international law and putting forward our countermeasure strategies are of great theoretical and practical significance.Chapter 1 illustrates the legal nature of carbon tariff. Since the emergence of the term "carbon tariff" is a fait accompli and has been generally accepted, so what is important is not whether the expression of carbon tariff is correct, but to make an accurate definition of the legal nature of carbon tariff. This dissertation argues that carbon tariff refers to carbon-based import border adjustment measures, which requires importers which import goods from the countries not implementing greenhouse gas reduction measures to pay tax or purchase emission allowances. Under this definition, carbon tariff has the following characteristics: First, carbon tariff is a border adjustment measure taken by the countries implementing greenhouse gas reduction measures on imports from countries not implementing greenhouse gas reduction measures; Second, when the importing country’s carbon reduction system is carbon tax, carbon tariff takes the form of tax, when the importing country’s carbon reduction system is cap and trade system, carbon tariff takes the form of allowances; Third, all carbon-based taxes and fees borne by the importer can be referred to as carbon tariff, regardless of the form.In Chapter 2, the United States legal system of carbon tariff was introduced. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 and proposals before it all take "International Reserve Allowance" as the form of carbon tariff. Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act only requires the adoption of border measures, but does not specify the type of border measures. It is foreseeable that the United States may take the International Reserve Allowance as the form of carbon tariff in the future. American-style "carbon tariff" provisions are of the following characteristics: (1) they clearly point out that the implementation of a "carbon tariff" is to prevent "carbon leakage", i.e. to prevent any substantial increase in greenhouse gas emissions by industrial entities located in other countries as the production cost in the United States increases due to the implementation of this Act resulting from the implementation of this Act; (2) they require carbon tariff be designed and implemented in a manner consistent with applicable international agreements to which the United States is a party; (3) if certain conditions are met, the US carbon tariff will apply to imports on January 1, 2020; (4) carbon tariff does not apply to least developed countries, any foreign country that responsible for less than 0.5 percent of total global greenhouse gas emissions and less than 5 percent of United States imports of covered goods with respect to the eligible industrial sector. Developing countries do not automatically enjoy the exemption; (5) the corresponding domestic system of carbon tariff is the emissions trading system; (6) carbon tariff should be roughly the same as the price of domestic emissions allowances. EU carbon tariff was proposed earlier than the United States, and mainly because of U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol. In January 2008, the European Commission released a Proposal for a Directive amending Directive 2003/87/EC to improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading system of the Community. This was the first Directive draft explicitly taking into account concerns about carbon leakage stemming from the operation of the ETS. The Prefatory Note discusses the possibility of creating a WTO-compliant system which requires importers to acquire and surrender allowances on terms no less favorable to institutions within the EU. Since EU member states still holds different views on the implementation of carbon tariff, the time when the EU carbon tariff will be implemented is still unknown.Chapter 3 analyzes the legitimacy of carbon tariff from the perspective of WTO rules. Article 2.2 (a) of GATT 1994 provides a border adjustment tax, the carbon tariff is likely to be expressed as a import-related border adjustment tax concerning carbon emissions. As long as carbon tariff is imposed consistent with the principle of national treatment and the principle of most-favoured-nation treatment, it is consistent with WTO rules. Even if carbon tariff is not consistent with the principle of national treatment or the principle of most-favoured-nation treatment, it may be also legitimate under Article XX of GATT 1994. As measures to address climate change are to protect humanity from the negative effects of climate change, it is consistent with Article XX(b) of GATT 1994; Furthermore, as it not only protects the global atmosphere but also prevents some plants and animals from extinction due to climate change, it is also consistent with Article XX(g) of GATT 1994. In order to determine whether carbon tariff is in line with Article XX(b) or (g) of the GATT 1994, we still need to analyze whether the carbon tariff is applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade. If the answer is negative, the carbon tariff is legal under WTO rules. There may be arbitrary or unjustifiable discriminations in the implementation of carbon tariff, but it doesn’t necessarily mean that carbon tariff as such involves arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination.Chapter 4 analyzes the legitimacy of carbon tariff in the perspective from international law of climate change. After analysis, this dissertation argues that collecting carbon tariff is a matter of sovereignty. If one wants to argue that it is not legitimate for a country to take carbon tariff measure, the argument must be supported by the international law. Therefore, carbon tariff itself does not violate the UNFCC, but it shall not be a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination in international trade or a disguised restriction,nor shall it be implemented on the imports of developing countries.Chapter 5 analyzes the problems of international coordination of carbon tariff. Based on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, the developing country parties of UNFCC can claim that other parties implementing carbon tariff are illegal. As UNFCC has not an effective mechanism for dispute settlement, the best platform for carbon tariff dispute settlement is the WTO dispute settlement procedures. But in the WTO dispute settlement procedures, it’s difficult for developing countries to prove that other countries’carbon tariff measures are violating WTO rules. If the panel or the Appellate Body can apply the clauses of UNFCC in WTO dispute settlement procedures, developing countries’probability of winning will be greatly increased. Whether the WTO dispute settlement procedures can apply rules outside the WTO is still controversial both in theory and practice.Chapter 6 proposes China’s response strategy to carbon tariff. Many of China’s exports are energy-consuming products, so China’s exports will lose competitiveness and consequently decrease seriously if developed countries impose carbon tariff on Chinese exports. Therefore, at the international level, China should adhere to the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities of the UNFCC, as well as the principle of free trade and the MFN. In addition, China should actively participate in making international economic rules and protect its legitimate rights and interests. Domestically, we should accelerate the development of new energy and new materials industries, speed up economic restructuring as well as industrial restructuring, transformation and upgrading, quicken the pace of energy conservation and emissions reduction, and guide enterprises to strengthen their awareness of green production and upgrade their technology in energy conservation and emissions reduction. Nevertheless, it is unnecessary for us to introduce the carbon tax regime to counter other countries’carbon tariff, for other countries’carbon tariff proposals are based on their domestic carbon emissions trading system. As long as China takes a comparable carbon emissions reduction system, other countries will not be able to impose carbon tariff on Chinese products. Hence, all we need to do is implement either carbon emissions trading scheme or a carbon tax system according to China’s national conditions. Furthermore, we can also carry forward the export carbon tariff and carbon tariff to deal with foreign countries’carbon tariff.In the Conclusion part, the paper points out again that carbon tariff itself does not necessarily violate the international law. As a matter of fact, if it is designed and implemented in line with certain conditions, it’s likely to adhere to the international law. However, it is otherwise if being targeted towards developing countries.更多还原