【作者】 刘勇；

【导师】 刘纯阳；

【作者基本信息】 湖南农业大学 ， 农业经济管理， 2011， 博士

【摘要】 新古典经济增长理论认为技术进步是经济持续增长的主要推动力,而在技术进步过程中,技术研发、技术使用、技术转让等环节所衍生的产权界定、利益分享、侵权救济等问题则依赖于知识产权的制度保护来解决。近年来,我国农业知识产权保护被提到了重要的战略高度,2008年、2010年国家先后颁发了《国家知识产权战略纲要》和《农业知识产权战略纲要》。农业知识产权制度作为一种产权结构与制度安排,着力于产权人与使用人在“产权——收益”基础上的利益平衡,产权的合理界定能实现交易主体的效用最大化。然而这种合理界定并不一定是指严格的刚性产权界定,农业知识产权的产权界定可以在一定程度与条件下弱化。农业知识产权的制度变迁也遵循着从不均衡到均衡的发展过程,这一渐进的均衡过程同样受制度需求与制度供给的影响,并最终表现出在一定时期内的蛛网式波动。我们的研究发现,我国现阶段农业知识产权的制度供给并没有完全建立在制度的真实需求之上,这种制度供给带有强烈的行政权力伴生性的特点。而对于农业知识产权的侵权与救济,以及权利人与潜在侵权行为人的行为选择,我们通过构建博弈得益矩阵和模型分析发现,加大对侵权行为的惩罚性赔偿力度能有效的防止农业知识产权侵权行为的发生。本文以湖南农业知识产权保护为实证研究对象,通过构建农业知识产权制度保护的评价指标体系,发现了湖南现阶段农业知识产权制度保护呈“倒金字塔”格局,即作为农业知识产权保护的制度需求层次较低,突出的表现在农业知识产权保护的意识较低,民众对农业知识产权保护的了解度、认同度与依赖度不高。与之相反,湖南农业知识产权保护的制度供给不管是从立法强度还是执法强度来看,均体现出完善化与系统化的特点。农业知识产权保护制度的形成并没有植根于有效的制度需求,是一种“自上而下”的功利主义行政权力催生品。这种外部催生性使得农业知识产权在农业经济增长中的贡献率极低,根据本文采用柯布——道格拉斯生产函数的分析,湖南1991年至2009年期间农业知识产权制度保护对农业经济增长的贡献率仅为0.76%,远低于劳动力与固定资产投资的贡献。对农业知识产权的理论与实证分析均表明,农业知识产权由于其属性上的强资源禀赋性与高外部风险性,其保护制度的设计不但要区别于其它知识产权制度,而且要摆脱原有知识产权制度在发展过程中的路径依赖进行创新,在农业地区差异、产业差异、产品差异的基础上实现农业知识产权保护个性化制度体系的重塑。从政策意义层面上讲,本研究的结论也有利于为湖南农业知识产权战略纲要的制定提供理论与实证支持。更多还原

【Abstract】 The neoclassical growth theory claims that the technical progress is the main driving force for the sustainable economic growth. While issues derived from the technical research, the technical utilization and the technical transfer, such as definition of property right, the benefit-sharing and the Infringement Remedy are to be solved by the application of the intellectual property protection system in recent years. Thus, the protection of the intellectual property rights of our country’s agriculture has been brought to an important strategic height. In the year of 2009 and 2011, National Outline Of Intellectual Property Rights Strategy and Outline Of Intellectual Property Rights Strategy Of The Agriculture have been issued successively by Chinese government.As one kind of the property right structure and the system arrangement, the intellectual property system for agriculture devote itself to the interest balance between the owners and the users on the basis of "property Right——Profit". The reasonable definition of the property rights offers the utility maximization of the transaction participants. However, it does not always mean the strict definition of property rights. The definition of the property rights for the agriculture can be weakened under some circumstances. Admittedly, the institutional change of the intellectual property rights of the agriculture follow the gradual process from imbalance to balance. This gradual process of balance is limited by the institutional demand and supply, and eventually betrays some cobweb-fluctuations in a fixed period. Our researchs demonstrates that the system of our country’s intellectual property rights of the agriculture is not based on the real need of the system, which is strongly accompanied with characteristics of administrative authority. Additionally, by the use of our matrix of game theory profit model and by comparing tort to relief, and obligee to potential infringer behavior choice, we may safely conclude that increasing punitive damages can effectively prevent the tort of intellectual property rights from happening.This dissertation points out the reverse pyramid pattern of the protection system of Hunan province’s agriculture intellectual property by empirical research on Hunan province’s agriculture intellectual property, meanwhile, by constructing the evaluation index system of the protection of the intellectual property. In other words, people have limited consciousness about the protection of the intellectual property, and their understanding, identification and dependency of the intellectual property also are at very low level. Contrary to it, the strength of the legislation and enforcement tends to be systematized and completed. The truth of this paradox is that our protection system of the agriculture intellectual property is not based on the effective system demand but on the utilitarianism of the administrative power. So this paradox reduces the contribution of the agriculture intellectual property. According to the Cobb-douglas production function, the agriculture intellectual property plays only 0.76% part of the agriculture economic growth, a very small amount compared to the parts the fixed assets investment and the labor force plays.It has been illustrated both theoretically and practically that the resource endowment and the external high risks of the agriculture demand that protection system of the agriculture intellectual property should be different and independent from other intellectual property. A personalized institutional system should be rebuilt on the foundation of the regional variations, the industrial difference as well as product diversity. From the perspective of policy significance, this finding will provide empirical and theoretical support in the formulating of the Hunan province’s outline of intellectual property rights strategy of the agriculture.更多还原