【作者】 朱木斌；

【导师】 叶依广；

【作者基本信息】 南京农业大学 ， 土地资源管理， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 随着我国市场经济体制的建立,城乡土地的资产属性已经显现。但我国现行土地征收制度却排除了农民集体作为土地所有者获取大部分土地增值收益的地位,严重侵害了农民集体和农民的土地权利和经济利益。农民集体对土地权利的预期和现实的强烈反差激发了规避土地征用、自主城市化等自发性的制度创新。与此同时,由于我国社会经济的快速发展,建设用地供给日益紧张。在国有存量的建设用地日益稀缺的情况下,集体增量的建设用地进入城市土地市场就成为政府推动改革深化和经济发展的主要切入点。随着农民集体推动和地方政府引导的合力逐渐加大,农村集体非农建设用地流转成为不争的事实。因此,本研究即是在此背景下,从制度经济学的角度,通过理论阐释与实证研究,系统分析了集体非农建设用地流转因外部利润而引致制度变迁的动因、因交易费用和利益集团博弈而导致的现实中不同的流转模式,并在此基础上通过现阶段两种代表性的地方自发形成的流转模式的比较,对上述理论进行检验,并在此基础上提出了集体非农建设用地流转制度创新的政策建议。本研究一共分为八章。第一、二章是绪言和理论基础,探讨了研究的背景、目的、内容、技术路线以及研究意义等问题,并通过梳理国内外新制度经济学关于外部利润、交易费用以及利益集团的相关理论,总结了外部利润、交易费用以及利益集团在制度创新过程中的作用。按照新制度经济学的观点,制度创新源于外部利润的出现,但创新能否成功主要取决于制度创新的成本-收益对比,由于制度变迁涉及多个利益集团,它们之间为获取外部利润而进行的博弈过程在实际上导致了制度变革的不同模式和路径。随着我国社会经济的快速发展,集体非农建设用地流转现象不断出现,将外部利润、交易费用以及博弈理论用于解释集体非农建设用地流转制度的变迁,有助于认识集体非农建设用地流转中的外部利润如何产生、交易费用如何变化以及利益博弈如何达到均衡的经济过程,从而通过制度创新巩固土地制度改革的成果。第三、四、五章运用新制度经学的相关理论对集体非农建设用地流转的动因、模式选择过程进行分析。研究表明,随着我国社会的不断发展,农村集体非农建设用地流转的制度环境发生了一系列变化,由此带来了土地增值收益等潜在的外部利润。而随着外部利润的不断积累,当前国家对集体土地的控制现状与潜在利益之间的矛盾日益突出,从而激励着地方政府和农民集体在制度环境不断变化的过程中进行流转制度上的创新。但农村集体非农建设用地流转面临技术和制度惯性等初始障碍、制度变迁的成本(交易费用)、各利益集团的相互制约等造成了各地方政府和集体经济组织在实际中不同的制度创新尝试。随着现阶段我国农村社会经济发展与土地资源产权特性这种制度创新外部环境的不断变化,制度变迁交易费用的构成与规模也在不断发生变化,所以对该过程中交易费用的把握是分析制度变迁的重要方面。与此同时,面对集体非农建设用地流转中的外部利润,各利益集团都试图在交易成本最小的情况下实现外部利润的内化,由此引发了各利益集团的相互博弈。对于利益集团而言,只要制度变迁为本集团带来的预期收益大于推动制度变迁的预期成本,就有动力推动制度变迁,因此在行动过程中,它们会根据制度变迁的预期利润和变迁成本选择制度方案,最终在某利益集团的主导下达成博弈的均衡,从而实现制度变迁。比如,集体建设用地使用权由原则上禁止入市流转向允许在有形市场流转的变迁,是一种制度创新。这一制度变迁能否顺利实现,取决于在新的制度框架中获益的变迁主体是否有足够的力量推动变革的发生,以及新制度的运行成本与其收益的比较。因此,通过各利益集团博弈的视角对该问题进行分析,有利于发现集体非农建设用地流转制度变迁的内在机理。分析结果表明,当中央政府提供流转的正式制度,各利益主体服从中央政府的制度安排,入市流转后的均衡效用就更高,这也表明我国集体非农建设用地流转的产生具有其必然性。第六章是实证研究。本章结合对广东佛山市南海区和江苏南京市江宁区两地的实地调查,对现阶段两种代表性的集体非农建设用地流转的案例(即,农村集体土地股份合作制的合法模式和“以租代征”的集体非农建设用地直接入市的非法模式)进行分析,尝试验证本文理论分析的各种假设和推论。研究发现,通过对两种模式形成过程中的外部利润、交易费用和相关利益集团博弈进行分析和比较,基本验证了本文的理论分析和相关推论。研究结果表明,无论是合法的还是非法的农村集体非农建设用地流转制度的变迁都是因为存在了外部利润,但在各方利益集团捕获外部利润的过程中交易费用的影响方式和制度创新减少交易费用的意图不同,导致了制度创新路径的不同。从利益集团博弈的角度可以把握制度变迁的机理。通过对本章案例的比较发现,首先,地方政府由下往上模式的制度创新是现阶段农村集体非农建设用地制度创新模式的重点途径,这从中央政府在博弈过程中无法或者谨慎推行改革的做法可以看出。其次,地方政府在进行制度创新的时候,即使面对的外部环境相似,但是否有中央政府在相应政策空间上的许可,是地方政府采取合作性质变迁的决定性因素。所以,如果中央政府为了避免类似于以租代征的非法模式,有限度地给予当地政府一些创造性的制度空间,可以起到事半功倍的效果。第三,制度创新过程中要考虑所有利益集团的利益,否则任何变迁的均衡都只是短暂的和不稳定的,尤其是对弱势但数量众多的农民群体。第七章阐述了集体非农建设用地流转制度创新的设想。本章指出,农村集体非农建设用地制度的创新,必须注重规范的制度环境,比如,法制建设和保障各利益集团的正当利益。这需要从外部利润内部化、减少交易费用以及平衡各方利益的总体目标出发,对集体建设用地流转的法律制度、产权制度、市场机制以及收益分配机制等进行改革。与此同时,还要进一步完善土地用途管制制度、土地登记制度、土地征地制度以及村务公开制度等。只有满足相关经济主体对外部利润的追求,使他们在集体建设用地流转制度创新中获益,促使它们之间的合作博弈,才能减少制度创新的阻力,提高制度运行的效率。第八章是研究结论和简要的政策建议。通过总结本文的主要研究成果,提出相关政策建议：提供允许集体建设用地流转的法律制度,使流转制度化、规范化；完善农村集体土地产权制度,促进土地产权明晰化；完善土地流转收益分配制度,保障农民土地权益；建立村务公开制度,完善集体建设用地流转的监督管理体制；建立有效的农村集体非农建设用地流转中介组织等。更多还原

【Abstract】 Since the start of the transition period in China, the capital characteristic of land in urban and peri-urban areas has been emerged. The current land acquisition policy excludes the farmers to obtain the incremental value of farmland conversion for urban development, which actually harm severely the benefits of farmers and the rural collectives. The huge difference between the expectation and the reality causes the farmers and collectives try to avoid the land acquisition and find its own way to self-urbanization, which aims to gain more benefits. At the same time, due to rapid social and economy growth, the demand for urban construction land increase indeed. With constrain of the scarce of urban construction land, the newly converted farmland for construction has become the main source for the local governments to push their economy growth. Under above conditions, the conveyance directly from rural to urban without the only legal method that the land has to go through land acquisition first has emerged in many regions in China. So this study aims to analyze the driving forces and mechanism of current institution change on the related policies on rural construction land conveyance. It will employ New Institutional Economics to probe into the external rents, the transaction cost, and the mechanism based on the game analysis of the related interests groups’strategies and behaviors. The paper will also select two typical cases on the institutional change to verify the theory and assumptions developed by the paper. Some institutional design and recommendations for policy will also be provided. There are 8 chapters in total. The first, second chapters are the introduction and theoretical parts, which describes the background, the aim, the content of the study. It also includes a literature review for current arts status on NIE, on external rents, transaction costs and game between interest groups, which are focusing on their roles on the institutional change. According to NIE, institutional change is due to external rent occurs. But whether the change could succeed depends on the related transaction costs and benefit, and also depends on the game results among the stakeholders. So to probe into these three factors are helpful for identification of the process.The third, fourth, and fifth chapters employ NIE to analyze the driving forces, modes, and process of the conveyance of rural collective-owned construction land. The results show that due to the change of economic and social environment, the land conversion can bring huge or potential huge incremental value. When the value becomes big enough then it drives the institutional change. But the cost of institutional change and the corresponding between different stakeholders will constrain the change and results in a balanced or unbalanced equilibrium. When the central government provides formal institutes, and the other actors in the game obey the arrangement, then the equilibrium will be balanced and leads to higher benefit.The sixth chapter is the cases study. The cases are selected in Nanhai district, Foushan city, Guangdong province, and in Jiangning district, Nanjing city, and Jiangsu province, which are representing two typical cases currently in China, the land stock system and rent directly by the collectives to urban. The former is a legal experimenting mode, while the latter is a illegal mode which are forbidden by the central government. The cases study verified the theoretical analysis. The results show that no matter the initiated institutional change is legal or illegal, a external rent existing is the prerequisite, and the path for change is according to the related transaction cost and the game behavior of the stakeholders. Some recommendations are also can given as following. First the bottom-up direction for institutional change is important currently in China for its rural collective-owned land conveyance. So the central government should provide certain policy spaces for local government’s innovation can leads to a two-win situation. The seventh chapter describes the design for institutional change. It points out that the innovation should firstly base on a formalized institutional environment, e.g. legal act and protect the legal benefit of all stakeholders. This can be fulfilled through internalized the external rents, reducing the transaction cost and balancing the interests of all the stakeholders. The law, the property right institution, and the market mechanism are needed to be reformed.The eighth chapter is the conclusion and policy recommendation. It first traces back to the whole paper and then gives the main findings and contributions of this paper. The recommendations are 1) a formal rule for local innovation is quite important,2) pay attention to the interests of all involved stakeholders during the conveyance of rural collective-owned land,3) at last, but not the least, a bottom-up mechanism for innovation is important.更多还原