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集体建设用地流转的资源配置效应与优化调控研究

Study on Resource Allocation Effects and Optimization Control of Collective Construction Land Transfer

【作者】 张梦琳

【导师】 孙佑海; 陈利根;

【作者基本信息】 南京农业大学 , 土地资源管理, 2010, 博士

【摘要】 作为人类社会发展不可替代的稀缺性资源,土地资源能否实现优化配置直接关系到社会经济的可持续发展。农村集体建设用地流转对集体建设用地资源优化配置的引导作用在诸多理论研究中已经得到肯定,我国政府部门也逐渐认识到其重要性并越来越多地将其作为调节集体建设用地资源配置可依赖的路径选择。事实上,集体建设用地流转即是实现资源配置的过程,流转行为本身客观具有资源配置效应。但以直接入市为主要特征的集体建设用地流转具有丰富的内涵,是一个系统工程,集体建设用地流转有无相应的制度安排或制度如何安排将造成资源配置效果具有多种可能性。因此,集体建设用地流转究竟对资源配置产生怎样的影响?如何建立有针对性的调控措施以实现资源优化配置?问题的解决需要对集体建设用地流转与资源配置的关系作系统深入地理论研究。本研究将集体建设用地流转与土地资源配置的关系置于系统整体中加以考察,构建集体建设用地流转资源配置效应的分析框架,为后面系统深入的分析提供必要的逻辑结构。具体而言,论文采用系统分析、法和经济学分析、比较静态分析和动态分析相结合等方法,全面系统地阐释集体建设用地流转前后资源配置状况及流转资源配置效应的机理,并引入典型案例实证分析流转的资源配置效应以及对目前我国集体建设用地流转政策措施进行评价,据此为我国集体建设用地流转优化调控提供依据,并提出有针对性的改革建议。通过上述研究,论文得出如下主要结论:(1)集体建设用地流转系统是以集体建设用地使用权转移为中心,由集体建设用地流转市场子系统和流转管理子系统构成并受外部环境影响,具有一定结构和相应功能的开放系统。这决定集体建设用地资源配置受集体建设用地流转系统内部各部分及外部环境的共同作用和制约,其内在的作用机制是:通过集体建设用地流转制度的变化来影响权利主体的目标和行为,进而影响土地资源在不同部门及不同主体间的配置。合理的集体建设用地配置目标既要保证其经济价值在市场上得到充分显化,又要实现资源配置的公平性。集体建设用地流转资源配置效应优化是指有利于资源配置效率改善、资源配置公平提高的所有指数。(2)在集体建设用地流转前也即土地征收制度下,政府对资源配置的行政垄断带来土地价格扭曲、土地供求矛盾突出以及土地收益格局不合理等;集体建设用地流转能够打破政府独家供地的垄断局面、避免征地程序及其产生的交易成本、有利于形成合理的市场价格、闲置土地得到重新配置利用及农民拥有持续获取土地流转收益的能力等。因此,集体建设用地流转有助于修正流转前的资源低效配置状态。但受集体建设用地流转系统内部各部分及外部环境等因素的影响,诸如,集体建设用地流转市场竞争程度及能否形成有效竞争;能否在交易费用尽可能少的情况下实现交易;集体建设用地价格、集体建设用地供求效应能否实现最优化,是否会导致新的供求矛盾;农民集体权益能否得到最大程度的维护等,其发展方向都具有多种可能性。因此,总的来说,相对于流转前的资源低效配置,集体建设用地流转虽然有助于优化资源配置,却不一定更有效或将带来资源配置负效应。(3)集体建设用地流转系统外部环境、内部要素及其结构功能对资源配置的影响。①集体建设用地流转是否得到国家基本法律层面上的支持,对流转系统的建设具有方向性的指引作用;其他环境因素和环境超系统对集体建设用地配置主体的价值观念、行为方式或选择、地区综合竞争力及土地流转市场发育起着重要影响。②土地产权制度安排影响土地市场交易费用的大小,对各利益主体具有不同的激励效应并导致不同的行为选择,进而影响交易能否顺利进行和资源配置效果。具体而言,土地产权界定清晰能够降低市场交易费用并影响土地收益分配规范化;集体土地产权权能完全性和安全性影响城乡土地市场竞争程度及法律赋予农民土地权益的实现;合理的土地产权结构有利于培育合格的市场主体。③集体建设用地流转市场发育完善有利于形成合理的土地市场价格及土地供求信息。其中,农民定价权及农民的文化素质影响其获取土地市场信息和谈判竞争能力;中介机构和有形市场能够降低交易费用,提供有效的市场供求信息和价格信息;但市场功能性缺陷对集体建设用地资源优化配置存在失效,如市场主体间的过度竞争造成资源配置价格扭曲、趋利性及盲目性导致土地供求数量失衡、合成谬误引致供求结构失衡、土地外部性导致耕地大量损失、市场可能导致土地收益分配的“马太效应”。④政府管制如土地交易最低价格管制、土地供给数量管制、收益分配制度以及市场准入管制等能够弥补集体建设用地流转市场失效,引导资源合理配置。但以政府缺位、越位和错位为表征的政府失灵又会破坏市场有序竞争,带来资源低效配置。要避免或消减政府失灵的诺斯难题,必须在政府和农民之间形成可信的承诺与信念。(4)论文对安徽芜湖、广东南海与江苏昆山集体建设用地流转资源配置效应的实践分析,以及对我国目前调控集体建设用地流转的政策措施及其实施效果的整体考察表明,国家法律对集体建设用地流转的禁止,没有消除现实中的大量流转;相对于无流转和隐形流转,地方政府规范流转资源配置效应较优,但因缺少国家法律支持及其相应的制度规范,使得地方集体建设用地流转实践存在法律依据不足及管理不规范等问题。这造成地方政府规范流转与隐形流转运行过程中都出现诸多问题,造成资源配置效果并不理想。总的来说,国家法律禁止集体建设用地流转是目前流转资源配置效应低下的根本原因。因此,调控集体建设用地流转,与其无效防堵,不如进行管理规范。实现集体建设用地优化配置,首要任务是进行集体建设用地流转优化调控,建立规范的、符合资源优化配置需求的集体建设用地流转制度。(5)集体建设用地流转优化调控应将私权保护和公法干预作为切入点,也即是尊重和保护农民土地权利,并对农民土地权利行使进行必要的国家干预和公法限制。调控实现策略需要综合运用市场工具和政府工具,主要包括市场调控、产权管理、土地供应计划、地价管制、收益分配等的配合实施。具体而言,集体建设用地流转制度建设需要从集体建设用地流转立法、集体土地产权制度建设、培育集体建设用地流转市场、加强政府对土地市场的管制与干预等方面展开;与此同时,还应该加快征地制度改革步伐、严格土地用途管制制度、加强农民作为市场主体的培育、保障政府行为规范化以及推进土地市场动态监测等配套措施的调整与改革。基于论文研究结果,本文为改善和优化集体建设用地流转系统及其运行环境提出如下政策建议:提供允许集体建设用地流转的法律制度,使流转有法可依、有章可循;深化集体土地产权制度建设,明确集体土地产权主体及其产权权能,完善土地产权治理结构;加强集体建设用地流转市场培育与政府管制制度的系统建设和改革,实现市场机制和政府干预的耦合。具体措施有:充分保障农民定价权,合理引入政府价格管制,以构建合理的集体建设用地流转价格机制;培育土地有形市场和中介机构,促进土地市场发育;严格集体建设用地流转市场准入管制,通过土地利用总体规划及土地利用年度计划严控流转规模与节奏;完善集体建设用地流转收益分配制度,保障农民土地权益;多方面保障政府行为规范化等。

【Abstract】 As the scarcity resource that can’t be replaced of human society development, land resource can be achieved optimal allocation whether or not, is directly related to the socio-economic sustainable development. The transfer of rural collective construction land can guiding collective construction land optimal allocation, that have been acknowledged in many theory studies, Chinese government also realized the importance of collective construction land transfer gradually and took it as a reliable way to regulate the allocation of collective construction land resource. In fact, the collective construction land transfer that is the process of allocation of resource, the transfer itself has objective with the resource allocation effects. However, collective construction land transfer which characterized by entering market directly is a systematic project with abundant content, if the transfer have some institution arrangements, or how the institution to arrangement, which will result in multiple possibilities of resources allocation results. Therefore, what impacts of collective construction land transfer on resource allocation on earth? How to design the pertinence control measures to achieve the optimal allocation of resource? Solution to the problem requires make a systematic in-depth theoretical research of the relationship between the transfer of collective construction land and resource allocation.The study investigates the relationship between collective construction land transfer and land resource allocation in the whole system, builds an analysis framework of resource allocation effects of collective construction land transfer, which provide the necessary logical structure for the following systematic in-depth analysis. Specifically, the paper adopts systems analysis, law and economics analysis, comparative static analysis and dynamic analysis combining, to interpret the resource allocation effects of collective construction land transfer and its impact mechanism systematically, and introduce typical cases to analyse the resource allocation effects of transfer and evaluate China existing policy measures of collective construction land, according that to provide a basis for optimal control of collective construction land transfer and make pertinence reform suggestions. Through this research, draw the following main conclusions:(1) The collective construction land transfer system is based on the collective construction land usufruct transfer as a center; by the collective construction land transfer markets subsystem and management subsystem constitute and is subject to impacts of the external environment, have a certain structure and corresponding function. This decide the allocation of collective construction land resource is impacted and restricted by the parts within the transfer system and external environment, its internal function ways is:the institution change of collective construction land transfer affect persons’goals and behavior, and thus affecting land resource allocation among the different sectors and different persons. The reasonable goals of the collective construction land resource allocation are necessary to ensure its economic value fully explicit in the market, but also achieve equity of resource allocation. The optimization of resource allocation effects of collective construction land transfer is beneficial to improve the efficiency and equity of resource allocation in all indicators.(2) Before the transfer of collective construction land that is the land expropriation system, the government administrative monopoly to resource allocation bring the land price distortion, land supply and demand contradiction obviously and land income distribution irrationality. The transfer of collective construction land can break the government monopoly of land supply; avoid land expropriation process and the resulting transaction costs; benefit the formation of a reasonable market price, the idle land reconfiguration and farmers obtain continued access to land transfer income capabilities. Thus, the collective construction land transfer will help to amend inefficient state of resources allocation before the transfer. However, subject to the internal parts and external environment of collective construction land transfer system, such as the level competition of collective construction land transfer market and if can form effective competition; whether the transaction costs as little as possible in the case of the transaction; whether the collective construction land price and supply and demand effects can be achieve optimization, and if lead to a new contradiction of supply and demand; whether rights and interests of farmers can get the maximum degree guarantee, their development have a variety of possibilities. Therefore, in general, the collective construction land transfer helps optimize the resource allocation relatively to the inefficient resource allocation before the transfer, but not necessarily more effective or bring about the negative effects of the resource allocation.(3) The collective construction land transfer system which the external environment, internal elements and its structure function influence the resource allocation.①Whether the country’s basic legal support the collective construction land transfer, that play a role of directional guidance; other environment subsystems and environment super-system make an important influence to the values and behavior patterns or selections of the allocation subjects of collective construction land, regional overall competitiveness and the land transfer market growth.②The land property rights institutional arrangements affect the land market transaction costs, bring different incentive effects to the various interest groups and lead to different behavior choices, thereby affecting whether a transaction will proceed smoothly and resource allocation effects. Specifically, well-defined land property rights can reduce market transaction coasts and affect the land income standardization distribution; the perfectibility and security of collective land property rights influence the level of competition of urban and rural land market, and the realization of farmers’land interests of the law given; rational land property rights structure is beneficial to cultivate eligible market subjects.③T he improved growth of collective construction land transfer market benefits to form a reasonable land market price and land supply and demand information. Among them, farmers’pricing rights and farmers’culture diathesis affect their ability to obtain land market information and negotiate competition; intermediary structures and visible market can reduce transaction costs, provide an effective market supply and demand and price information. But the market functional defects is failure to optimize collective construction land resource allocation, such as excessive competition among market subjects cause resource price distortion, profit-orientation and blindness bring land supply and demand imbalance, composition fallacy cause the structure imbalance between supply and demand, land use externality lead to significant loss of arable land, the market may lead to "Matthew effect" of land income distribution.④Government regulation, such as market access control, the lowest price control of land transaction, land quantitative supply control, and income distribution system, which can remedy market failure of the collective construction land transfer, and guide rational resource allocation. However, the government failure characterized by government absence, offside and mismatches will undermine market orderly competition and bring about inefficient resources allocation. To avoid or reduce government failure of North problem must be formed a credible commitment and belief between the government and farmers.(4) The paper makes practice analysis that resource allocation effects of collective construction land transfer by cases of Wuhu city in Anhui province, Nanhai district in Guangdong province and Kunshan city in Jiangsu province, as well as the overall study that China current control policy measures of collective construction land transfer and their implementation results, which show that the national law prohibition of collective construction land transfer does not eliminate a large number of transfer in reality; relative to the non-flow and gray flow, the resource allocation effects of the transfer by the local government regulated is better, but the lack of national legal support and the corresponding system of rules, local collective construction land transfer practices are legal basis inadequate and manage are not standardized and so on. This has resulted in many problems in local government regulation transfer and gray transfer, and resource allocation results unsatisfactory. In general, the state laws prohibit the collective construction land transfer is the fundamental cause of resource allocation low effects. Therefore, the regulation of collective construction land transfer is better to management practices, rather than ineffective blockades. The primary task that achieves the optimal allocation of collective construction land is to optimize control of collective construction land transfer, establish the collective construction land transfer system that is standard and consistent with resource optimal allocation needs.(5) Optimization control of collective construction land transfer should protect private rights and introduce public law intervention as the entry point, which is to respect and protect farmers land rights, and introduce state intervention and public restrictions to farmers land rights exertion. The control implementation strategy requires to integrate market instruments and government tools, mainly including market control, property management, land supply plan, land price control, income distribution should be actualized together. Specially, the collective construction land transfer institutions should include some aspects, the collective construction land legislation, build collective land property rights system, develop collective construction land transfer market and strengthen government control and intervention in the land market; at the same time, it should adjust and reform supporting measures, such as speed up land expropriation reform, strict land use controls system, strengthen farmers cultivation as the market subjects, ensure standardization of government behavior and promote the dynamic monitoring of the land market.Based on research conclusion, this paper puts forward following key policy suggestions in order to improve and optimize the collective construction land transfer system and its operating environment. The suggestions are to establish collective construction land transfer legal system so that the transfer has rules to follow; deepen the collective land property rights system construction, definitude the subjects of collective land property rights and their power, improve the governance structure of land property rights; strengthen the collective construction land market cultivation and government control, achieve the coupling of market mechanisms and government intervention. Specific measures include:protect farmers pricing power fully, introduce government price control reasonably, in order to construct a reasonable price mechanism of collective construction land transfer; cultivate the land visible markets and intermediary facilities to promote land market development; strict market access control of collective construction land transfer, through land use planning and land use annual plans, and strictly control the scale and pace of circulation; perfect the collective construction land transfer income distribution system to ensure farmers land rights; ensure government behaviors standardization in many ways.

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