【作者】 刘晓峰；

【导师】 张康之； 刘祖云；

【作者基本信息】 南京农业大学 ， 行政管理， 2011， 博士

【摘要】 本文试图通过对当下乡镇干部行为情境与过程的呈现,将中国地方性的日常行政实践同基层行政组织的理论研究联系起来,为那些希望了解有关中国行政真实经验而又不便深入实践的智识提供一种可能。本研究还希望能够让真实生活世界和理论世界有效地得以对接,并以此引发更多学者就有关西方理论之于中国经验适用性的问题进行思考,以推进本土化行政学理论的发展。本研究的确立源于笔者在日常生活中所面对的诸多经验性困惑,笔者发现,行政学理论中所阐述的有关政府组织及干部行为的理论与基层行政的实际情况往往有很大距离,理论中的政府和干部形象在老百姓眼里是陌生的,而那些与“理论形象”相背离的政府及干部行为却为老百姓所习以为常。作为行政学研究者,如何有效地弥补理论文本与实践的差距,而不是简单地以西方理论来质疑或解释本土行政现象,是笔者思考从日常行政经验出发来研究行政组织行为的一个基本考量；其次,不论老百姓还是理论研究者,对基层政府普遍持有一种偏见,认为“中央是好的,地方把经念歪了”,并将基层政府或是整个行政体系视为一个封闭的系统,这种观点忽视了外部环境对行政组织及其成员的影响,如果简单地从这个视角出发,也就无从认识一个真实的基层政府了；再次,不论从研究视角、研究取向还是研究方法上,已有的研究都没能很好地呈现和解释有关乡镇干部行为的一些现象。在上述背景下,乡镇政府之于我们似乎仍然是一个“黑箱”,我们不了解乡镇干部是怎样一群人?不了解他们是怎样互动的?哪些因素影响了他们的行为选择?这些行为背后隐藏了怎样的理论逻辑?这些困惑是笔者决定深入到乡镇政府进行“近距离观察”的主要原因。本文在研究策略上属于定性研究的范畴,笔者在2009年8月至2010年4月期间对中国北方的Q镇进行了较为深入的田野调查,通过参与式观察、访谈以及文字资料的收集等方法获取了大量的有关Q镇干部行为的一手资料,在此基础上运用“编码分析”、叙事分析、比较分析、“过程-事件分析”等方法围绕本研究的核心问题,对上述材料进行了系统的整理和分析。在研究内容方面,本文首先试图在批判性借鉴帕森斯“唯意志行动理论”基础上构建一个适合乡镇干部行为的分析工具,将组织的个体行动抽象为情境、行动者、手段和结果四个基本要素,并以“情境理性人”和“结构二重”作为本研究的两个前提性假设。接下来,文章呈现了乡镇政府的外部环境,即外情境的特征。首先,在文化环境方面,处于乡土文化转型期乡土文化呈现出现代性、多样性、市场性相互交融的特点,具体表现为从“封闭同质”到“开放异质”、从“生存理性”到“经济理性”、从“伦理本位”到“利益本位”三个方面；其次,在政治环境方面,文章着重关注了那些对乡镇政府行为具有直接影响的政治制度因素,包括自上而下的“压力型”政务体制和农民自下而上的非制度化政治参与；再次,在经济环境方面则主要表现为失衡的资源配置结构和“关系资本化”的倾向。紧接着,文章呈现了乡镇政府内部的正式规则和非正式规则。通过结合在Q镇的调研讨论了乡镇政府中正式规则的表现形式,即“条”与“块”的规则、“党”与“政”的规则、“指标化”奖惩规则以及“中心任务规则”。这些正式规则的结果是塑造了乡镇政府中的“规定性行为”,即设定准任务型组织、会议与通知、检查与应查、评比与总结；本文还从“人情法则”与“面子工夫”、晋升资本以及“关系艺术”三个方面对乡镇政府中的非正式规则给予了介绍,非正式规则的结果是产生了“策略性行为”,这是一种更为复杂的行为现象,因为乡镇干部在做出行为选择之前所考虑的因素要比社会中原子化的个体决策所考虑的因素更为复杂,它是乡镇干部对组织外情境、乡镇政府中正式规则和非正式规则以及自身状况等各种因素的综合考虑的结果。本文结合Q镇的调研主要呈现了乡镇政府中存在的三种“策略性行为”,即：制度性说谎、责任规避和关系运作。在有关干部行为过程的一章里,本文尝试从微观社会学的角度建构一个新的分析框架,来回答“情境是如何被乡镇干部所内化的?”这一问题。文章将这一内化过程分为感知、修正和维持三个子过程。文章还将乡镇干部的日常互动行为视为一种社会交换,并改进了布劳的社会交换过程模型,改进后的模型包括：需求认知、供方寻找、交换能力展示、获取与回报四个阶段,文章通过Q镇的个案调查更具体地展示了这个模型在经验上的运作过程。本研究的主要结论是：一、“正式权力的非正式运作”是乡镇干部行为的总体性特征,它是乡镇政府“乡土性”和“官僚性”相互交融的现实在微观层面上的体现。文章认为大部分乡镇干部在进入官僚体系之前是“生于斯长于斯”的农民,他们对乡土社会规则具有高度认同,当他们进入官僚体系之后,又接受了官僚体系规则的约束,并逐渐建构起对自身“干部身份”的认同,但却又无法完全摆脱乡土社会性的身份认同,再加上他们工作中面对的是“老百姓”,工作的主要场域也仍然是乡土社会,因此他们不得不通过对自身行为的策略性调试来适应各种复杂的、相互交织的规则,呈现出“正式权力非正式运作”的行为特点；二、乡镇干部对行为的选择与他们如何理解和权衡情境有关。乡镇干部对情境心存敬畏,能够清醒地意识到情境与自身未来处境是息息相关的,因而有强烈的内在动力去认识、理解情境并据此调整行为。这些情境包括外情境和内情境两个方面,但不管是外情境还是内情境,其结果是使乡镇干部承担了绝大的压力,但却又缺乏法定的权力和能力去应付这些压力,而此时,外情境中特有的乡土文化环境和内情境中的非正式规则又恰恰为乡镇干部“变通”自身行为方式提供了空间,于是“正式权力的非正式运作”也就出现了；三、乡镇政府中存在“规则替代”的现象,非正式规则的出现并非为了弥补正式规则职能方面的不足,而是在正式规则职能范围内起主要行为约束作用,这些非正式规则是隐性的,并不被组织价值所认可。乡镇政府中的“规则替代”现象,实质上是“乡土性”社会关系原则对官僚制公共关系规则的一种替代。“规则替代”的直接后果是产生“双轨行政”现象,也即一方面,乡镇行政有一个完整而程序化的组织体系,所有乡镇行政活动都有正式的规范和程序,其特征是理性化、一元性和抽象性,是国家力量在地方上理性建构的体现。如果从公开的、形式化的和象征的角度来看,乡镇行政运作是科层化的,这是乡镇行政运作的一个维度；而另一方面,非正式运作作为隐藏在科层制背后的文本,表明基层干部创造并维持着一个巨大的权力运作空间,这是了解基层政府和基层干部的另一个维度。“双规行政”使得作为官方文本的正式权力规则被扭曲、被置换、被超越,并以另外一种方式被实施,这是乡镇干部行为的隐秘机制。四、在大多数情况下,乡镇行政则呈现出冲突与矛盾的一面,当下乡镇干部正处于多种矛盾和冲突的情境之中,主要是“权”与“责”的冲突、“行”与“政”的冲突。其中,权责冲突主要表现在资源占有上的主体性缺失与乡镇干部超负荷的政务压力之间的矛盾。而“政治”与“行政”相互背离的现象,在本质上反应的则是乡镇政府“价值追求”与“效率追求”之间的冲突。一方面国家政治(政权)建设要求努力完善科层制度,试图通过完善科层制来加强对乡镇干部行为的约束,以争取更多的外部合法性,实现政府价值追求。但另一方面,乡镇政府作为基层行政机构,面对的是各种临时性任务和突发事件,以及高度复杂、高度不确定的乡土社会,这就要求乡镇干部不能过多的考虑科层制的制度性约束,相反却要打破科层制的运转规律,以实现乡镇政府的效率追求。反应在个体行为层面上就是,乡镇政府不得不通过背离正式规则,通过灵活变通、非正式运作的方式来实施乡镇行政活动。五、当前乡土社会自下而上的权威确立模式还不具有实质性意义,乡村政治仍未摆脱“行政吸纳政治”的现实,这是形塑乡镇干部行为的乡土性政治格局。在国家与社会层面上,则体现了“行政吸纳社会”的国家社会关系模式,而非有些学者所认为的公民社会或合作主义模式。这是因为,从现阶段看来,一方面,国家仍然试图通过基层政府及干部加强对乡土社会的“控制”。而另一方面,尽管国家在大力培植乡村自治组织的发展,但显然,这些所谓的自治组织仍然是在乡镇政府和乡镇干部的“可控”范围之内的,乡镇干部通过私人社会关系,影响着村一级自治组织的活动,自治组织要想获得更多的资金和项目支持,也必须求助于乡镇干部手中所掌握的政治资源,因而不管在经济上还是在政治上,乡村自治组织仍然是依附与乡镇政府的,这就是所谓的“功能替代”。而“控制”和“功能替代”正是“行政吸纳社会”的两个核心机制。试图在回归中国真实行政经验的基础上,丰富有关基层行政组织的知识,并推进本土化行政组织理论的研究是本研究的理论旨归。本文可能的创新点主要集中在以下几个方面：1、在批判性地借鉴帕森斯、布劳等学者有关个体行为理论成果的基础上初步提出了一个探索和解释中国基层干部行为现象的分析框架；2、使用田野调查的方法,系统研究了当前乡镇干部所面对的宏观情境以及政府内的正式和非正式规则,还在微观层面上呈现了乡镇干部的行为过程,这在研究方法和视角上是一个尝试；3、从“干部行为”这一新的角度向读者呈现了一个真实、生动的乡镇政府,为基层政府组织的本土化研究提供了实证材料。当然,本文所讨论的并不是乡镇干部行为的所有问题,所反应的现象也不能概括所有乡镇干部的整体性特征。因为,在中国,尤其不能忽略基层政府及其干部行为在空间上的差异。但是笔者相信,这些问题的探讨,对于认识当下的乡镇政府及其干部行为的若干特征能够提供重要参考。更多还原

【Abstract】 Through discussing the phenomenon of township cadres’behavior in order to help people understand the real administrative activities in China, this article will invigorate more scholars to think about whether the Western theories are suitable for China and promote Chinese public administration localization.There are two reasons for selecting this topic. The first reason is that there is a big gap between the theory and the township cadres’actual practice in daily life. Chinese public administration theory is based on foreign administration theories, especially the American public administration theory. During the period of rapid development of China, traditional public administration theory is criticized both by scholars and the public. The second reason is that the public have a wrong opinion that the central government is good but the local government is bad in China and government or the entire public administrative system has been seen as closed system. This view ignores the impact of external environment on the public administrative organizations and its members. From this perspective, it is difficult to understand the real local government in China.As a qualitative study, an in-depth field research has already been carried out in a township government in northern China from August 2009 to April 2010, while a large number of first-hand information on township cadre’s behaviors has been obtained using methods like participant observation, interviews and other tools. Methodologies like Static code analysis, narrative analysis, comparative analysis, process-Event Analysis and other methodologies have been used to analyze this information.Based on the voluntaristic theory of action from Parsons, this article presents a new framework for analysis township cadre’s behavior. Individual action in organizations will be broken down into four basic elements like context, actors, tools and results. In addition to this study, the "situation-rational man" and the "double structure" are two presuppositions at this research.In chapter three, the article presents the evolution of external environment of the township government in a transition period, which starts from closed homogeneity to open heterogeneous, and from ethical standard to interests Standard. The article also pays attention to the Chinese political system which directly affects the township cadre’s behavior. The "pressure-type" political system and farmers’non-institutionalized political participation are the basic features of local political environment. In addition, the article focuses on the "relationship capital" and the imbalance of resource allocation. In the first section of chapter four, we discuss the formal rules, which consists of "article" and "block" rule, "Party "and "political" rule, "indicators" rule and "central task" rule, and their consequences, named "required behavior" which includes pre-set task-based organizations, conferences and notification, inspection and should check, appraisal and summary. Then, we describes the informal rules related with "human law", "face", "promotion capital", and "relationship art" and their consequences, named "strategic behavior", which includes institutional lying, responsibility avoidance and relationships work in the second section of Chapter four.In the chapter five, this paper analyzes the process of cadres’behavior in areas of internalization and social exchange. In area of internalization, a new framework which is divided into three sub-processes, such as initial recognition, correction and maintenance for answering the question of "How does the situation been internalized by township cadres? " is set up in perspective of micro-sociology. In area of social exchange, this paper builds a new model, which includes demand awareness, supply-side search, exchange capacity display, access and return, based on the Blau’s social exchange process model.The central conclusions of this study are the following.Firstly, as the result of integration of "Locality" and "Bureaucratic", township cadres often operate on formal power in an informal way which is the general characteristic of the township cadres’behavior. Being farmers before entering the bureaucracy, most of the township cadres highly appreciate the rules of local society. But after entering the bureaucracy, they start to accept constraints from the rules of bureaucracy and gradually recognize their "cadre identity ", though they cannot completely get rid of local social identities.Secondly, the way township cadres understand and weigh the situation influences the action they choose. They can clearly recognize relations between the situation and their future situation, and have a strong intrinsic motivation to know it for adjusting their behaviors. These situations which include the external environment and internal rules have brought great pressures on the township cadres who do not have sufficient legal authority and capacity to alleviate those pressures. Fortunately, the unique local culture and informal rules in the township government provide enough space for township cadres to choose their behavior strategically.Thirdly, "Rules Alternative" is a Common phenomenon within township government. We found that the informal rules, not the formal rules, play a major role in regulating the township cadres’behavior. These informal rules are invisible and essentially the principle of social relations instead of rules of public bureaucracy.As the direct consequence of the "Rules Alternative", "dual administration" is the other common phenomenon and the secret mechanism of township cadre’s behavior within township government. On the one hand, considering the formal organizational system, township cadres present a formal specification for the public administrative activities which are the rational constructions of national power on the local community. On the other hand, the informal operation shows a huge power space which is created and maintained by township cadres as a hidden text. It is another perspective for people understanding the township government and its cadres.Fourthly, township cadres are being in a complex situation with many contradictions and conflicts currently which mainly manifest in the form of conflicts between "rights "and "Responsibility", the "Administration" and "Political". The first major conflict comes from the far more pressure than the resources township which township cadres have. The phenomenon of "political" and "Administration" departing from each other, in essence, is the second major conflict between township government’s "value pursuit" and "efficiency pursuit". On the one hand, improving the bureaucratic system is the need of national politics. Central government is trying to further control the township cadre’s behavior through the improvement of bureaucracy in order to obtain the external legitimacy and achieve the value pursuit. On the other hand, as the primary administrative body, the township government should respond to a variety of ad hoc task, unexpected events, local community with a high degree of complexity and uncertainty. Township cadres have to break the bureaucracy’s operating rules and achieve the Efficiency Pursuit. Obviously, these behaviors have deviated from the formal rules.Fifthly, township cadres’ behavior reflect the "administrative absorption of society" rather than the model of civil society or corporatism. This is because, on the one hand, the central government is still trying to strengthen the control of local community by the township government and cadres. On the other hand, although more and more rural self-government organizations are established, they still under the control by township government. For example, township cadres participate in the activities of these self-government organizations through private social relations. For more funding and project support, self-government organizations should resort to political resources which are held by township cadres. Therefore, whether on economic or political, rural self-government organizations are still depending on the township government, which is called "function alternative". "Control" and "function alternative" are two core mechanisms of "administrative absorption of society".Contributions of this paper are following. Firstly, based on the theory of individual behavior from Parsons, Blau and other scholars, this paper builds a new framework for analysis and interpretation of township cadre’s behavior. Secondly, this study improves Chinese public administration research. For example, this paper studies the external environment and internal formal or informal rules in the township government, and studies how these situations affect the cadre’s behavior and presents the process of internalization of environmental and social exchange. The article also explains the theoretical logic behind the township cadres’behavior. Thirdly, this thesis studies on the relationship between "structure" and "behavior" in essence. Therefore, it has enriched the study in area of Chinese public administration. Finally, it presents a real, lively township government through researching cadres’behavior, and provides a wealth of empirical material for the study of Chinese governmental organizations.Since the difference between cadres’behavior and spaces cannot be ignored, especially in China, this article does not address all the issues on township cadres’ behaviors while does not cover all the integrated features of township cadres. The author believes, however, that this research provides an important reference for understanding certain features of the present township government and its cadre’s behavior.更多还原