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利益冲突视野下我国企业年金分配法律制度研究

On the Legel Mechanism of China Enterprise Annuity Distribution

【作者】 刘强

【导师】 高晋康;

【作者基本信息】 西南财经大学 , 人口学, 2010, 博士

【副题名】From the Perspective the Conflict of Interest

【摘要】 企业年金分配是企业年金制度的一个重要组成部分。在年金制度中,计划参加者的养老保障水平,在一定程度上取决于企业分配给其的配套供款。文章以企业年金分配的利益冲突为分析基础,详细分析了现行企业年金分配制度中存在的不足,并借鉴国外的有益经验,提出了解决我国企业年金分配中利益冲突的法律构造机制。企业年金分配中的利益冲突主要类型分为三类。其一是由于目标不一致导致的利益冲突,第二是由于信息不对称导致的利益冲突,第三是由于道德风险导致的利益冲突。这三种利益冲突的存在,使得在企业年金分配中处于弱势地位的企业员工在企业年金的分配中得不到有效的保护。致使在企业年金实践中出现受益群体小、覆盖面窄、计划参加者权益受到侵犯等问题。这成为了我们研究企业年金分配法律制度的逻辑起点。针对企业年金分配中可能出现的问题,现行企业年金制度实际上已经做出了集体协商及备案审查两个制度安排。但由于制度本身的缺陷以及制度环境的制约,现行企业年金分配法律制度不能有效平衡企业年金分配中的利益冲突。就集体协商制度论,由于劳资双方特别是资方并未具有切实履行义务的思想基础,也就难以有对集体协商制度的充分尊重。而劳动者团体即工会组织的地位在事实上并未对资方形成有效制约。代表普通劳动者的协商代表本身并非是由劳动者按照自己意志选举产生的真正意义上的劳动者利益的代表者,其亦未能充分发挥作用。同时,保障集体协商顺利进行并有效履行义务的法律责任的不完善,也成为该制度不能有效发挥作用的缺陷。就登记备案制度论,由于登记备案机关主要是对年金方案进行形式审查,对其中涉及分配的内容,则由于缺失具体的明确的标准,而没有合法的实质审查权,难以确保分配的公正。同时,作为接受委托从事行政管理的公共机关,根据委托代理理论,其审查行为由于缺少法律的制约而具有较大的自由裁量权,使得其审查结果依赖于权力行使者的公平公正意识,而这同样是难以保证的。通过考察国外比较成熟的企业年金制度,我们发现,不论是采取自愿型、强制型、准强制型企业年金制度的国家,国家都介入了年金分配。差异仅仅在于介入的程度和力度。有的是直接规定分配的要求,有的是对于达到一定分配标准的才给予税收优惠待遇等等。根据利益相关者理论和法律控制论,企业年金已经从单纯的企业经济权利转变为企业所承担的一种社会责任,我国企业年金分配法律制度的构造就应当综合考虑国家、企业、个人三方面的利益,采取准强制性的企业年金分配制度,对分配中涉及各方利益的关键内容,由法律直接作出强制性的制度安排,并通过赋予企业高级管理人员相关义务,细化分配的法律责任,促成企业年金分配实现公平正义。

【Abstract】 Annuity distribution is an important component of enterprise annuity system. In annuity system, pension of the plan participants, to a certain degree, depends on the matching distribution allocated to them. Based on a study of the interest conflicts in enterprise annuity system, this thesis analyzes the flaws of the present enterprise annuity system, and proposes legal mechanism to solve the interest conflicts with reference to valuable foreign experience.Interest conflicts can be classified into three types, the first type of which is caused by inconsistent objectives; the second type asymmetric information; the third ethical hazard. Those conflicts make it impossible for the employees who are in a weak position to be protected by the annuity system. As a result, it poses problems for the practice of the annuity system, such as limited beneficiaries, narrow coverage and infringement of the plan participants’rights, which become the logical starting point for my study on the legal system of the enterprise annuity system.To solve the potential problems in annuity distribution, the present annuity system has created two institutional arrangements:collective bargaining and record review. However, due to its inherent flaws and the constraints of the institutional environment, the present legal system of the annuity distribution cannot effectively settle the interest conflicts in the enterprise annuity distribution. The problem of the collective bargaining consists in the fact that both labor and capital are not ideologically prepared to fulfill their obligations earnestly, especially the capital side; consequently, they show little respect for the collective bargaining. In fact, trade unions, the organization for the labor, don’t effectively constrain the capital. Moreover, bargaining representatives who are supposed to represent the labor are actually not elected by the labor according to their own opinions, so they fail to faithfully perform their duty. Meanwhile, legal responsibility that guarantees collective bargaining to be carried out smoothly and to fulfill its duty is not clearly stipulated, which prevents the system from being effective. On the other hand, the registration authority only has formal reviews on annuity plan, and when it comes to how to distribute the annuity, it doesn’t have legitimate right to review owing to the absence of the specific standard. Therefore, it’s hard to ensure a fair distribution. At the same time, the registration authority is simply an agency commissioned to administrate. Based on principal-agent theory, its review lacks enough legal restriction and has greater discretion. To some extend, its review depends on the administrators’sense of fairness and justice which is difficult to ensure.By examining some sophisticated foreign enterprise annuity systems, we find that no matter the country adopts voluntary enterprise annuity system, compulsory enterprise annuity system or quasi-compulsory enterprise annuity system, the government will intervene in annuity distribution. The only difference lies in the extent and intensity of the intervention. Some country stipulates distinctly requirements of distribution, while others provide tax incentives for those enterprises which meet certain allocation standard.According to stakeholder theory and law and order theory, enterprise annuity has changed from pure economic rights of an enterprise into social responsibility shouldered by an enterprise. Therefore, the legal mechanism for the enterprise annuity distribution in our country should take into account the interests of the country, enterprise and individual, adopt quasi-compulsory enterprise annuity system, stipulate mandatory institutional arrangements when interests of all parties are involved, and specify legal liability by requiring obligations of the executives so as to achieve fairness in annuity distribution.

  • 【分类号】D922.291.91;F842.6
  • 【下载频次】293
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