【作者】 Ryvelino Dudael Mounanga Mabiala（莫友林）；

【导师】 杨成钢；

【作者基本信息】 西南财经大学 ， 人口、资源与环境经济学， 2011， 博士

【摘要】 不可再生资源的开采经常涉及到矿产拥有者-政府和矿产开采公司-跨国矿产开采公司之间的双边或多边谈判。更确切地说,谈判的相关模式就是签署特许权合同,其中矿产拥有者以支付作为回报将矿产的开采授权给一个或多个矿产开采公司。此外,发展中国家政府与跨国矿产开采公司的合同经常是秘密签署的,其中还包括保密条款,其目的是阻止公众确切地知道政府得到的收益和矿产开采公司获得的权利与特权。在过去的几年中,有关特许权合同的研究主要关注：由于双边或多边关系导致的矿产拥有者-东道主国与矿产开采公司-买方之间的信息不对称问题。显然,跨国矿产开采公司因为他们的专业开采技能而被选中,但是矿产拥有者不完全了解他们的这些能力；跨国矿产开采公司在评估地下潜在的储量,矿床的质量以及与开采活动相关的营运支出方面有更多的经验。换句话说,矿产开采公司有私有信息。本文就如何改善存在逆向选择的矿产开采权谈判问题提出新的见解,并给出最优策略。在静态双边信息不对称条件下的矿产开采权谈判中,我们分析了一个贫穷国家和一个跨国矿产开采公司关于矿产开采权合同谈判的一个可能的最优结果。据证明,当合同条款是基于错误信息制定的时候,所签署的合同是无效率的；然而,当矿产所有者和矿产开采公司在交易的时候都拥有私人信息,并且当合同各方有连续的严格正的密度函数的时候,所签署的合同也是无效率的。然而,为了降低无效率,代理人的估值应该以拍卖的方式进行交易,或是以仲裁的方式进行。在这样的情况下,作为次优契约,简单的双向拍卖或是最终的仲裁报价都是最好的策略。因为这两种策略下得到的平均租金水平是谈判所能得到的最优结果。在静态多边信息不对称条件下的矿产开采权谈判中,我们研究了一个发展中国家的政府和多个跨国矿产开采公司进行谈判时,如何提高自己的租金份额。为了最大化自己的期望净盈余,政府可能会把矿藏的开采权转让给矿产开采公司,这样的方式面临的问题是：矿产开采公司拥有关于矿产开采技术的私人信息(逆向选择)。使用对称拍卖策略,并假设矿产开采公司的数量不断增加、,我们证明政府可以从这个交易中攫取所有的利益。因为矿产储备开采的产权会授予给估值较高的矿产开采公司,所以矿产所有者希望期望净收入趋于它的最大值。这个值由政府先验判断,矿产开采公司的议价能力以及矿产开采公司相对机会成本的大小决定。更多还原

【Abstract】 Nonrenewable resource extraction often involves a bilateral or multilateral exchange between government-mining owner-and multinational mining companies-mining operators. More precisely, the relevant modality is a concession contract in which the owner delegates the extraction of the resource to one or several mining firms in return for payment.In addition, contracts between developing countries governments and multinational mining companies are often performed in secrecy, with confidentiality clauses that prevent the public from knowing exactly what revenues are given to the State and what rights and privileges have been awarded to the mining companies.For the last years, concession contract analysis has focused on the aspects of bilateral and multilateral relations raising the problem of asymmetric information between the mining owner-the principal-and the mining operator-the buyer.Clearly, multinational mining firms are selected for their specialized performance which is not completely apparent for the owner; they have greater experience in evaluating the in-ground reserve potential, the quality of deposits, and thus the operating expenditures related their mining activity. In other words, mining operators have private information.This thesis brings insights on how.to improve negotiations over mineral extraction titles with adverse selection phenomena; by proposing optimal strategies.In the case of negotiations over mineral extraction titles with static bilateral asymmetric information; we analyze a possible best outcome from negotiations between a poor country and a multinational mining company over a mineral extraction contract.While showing that, when the terms of contract are prepared on the basis of erroneous information, the resulting contract is inefficient; when both the mine owner and the mine operator have private information at the time of trading, and when each contracting party has a continuous distribution of types, with strictly positive density function.However, to reduce the inefficiency the agents’valuations should be traded at auction, or resort to arbitration.In this case, as second-best optimal contract, the simple double auction or the final offer arbitration are the best strategies; because, the average rent amount is the optimal result of the negotiation, for both strategies.In the case of negotiations over mineral extraction titles with static multilateral asymmetric information; we examine how a developing country government may improve his rent share while negotiating with several multinational mining companies.In maximizing the expected net surplus that government may take by granting the extraction rights of a mineral deposit; this one faces the problem that extraction companies possess private information about extraction capacities (adverse selection).Using a symmetric auction strategy, and assuming that the mining operators number increases, we show that the government is able to extract all the gains from the trade.Since the property right to extract the mineral deposit is allocated to the high-valuation mining company, the mining owner expected net revenue will converges to its highest value; and this value depends on the government prior belief, the agent bargaining strength, and on the agents’relative weak or strong opportunity costs.更多还原