关于人民币汇率政策的双层博弈分析：2002-2011

【作者】 曾雄军；

【导师】 江瑞平；

【作者基本信息】 外交学院 ， 国际关系， 2012， 博士

【摘要】 本文以双层博弈理论为分析框架，从国内政治与国际政治互动角度，分析了2002年以来中美两国政府在人民币汇率政策博弈中的合作与竞争行为。本文包括七个部分。导论部分主要通过文献综述表明，纯粹经济学理论难以解释人民币汇率问题，运用双层博弈理论是研究这一主题的一个比较新颖的视角，并在前人研究基础上提出本文的创新点和研究难点。第一、二章为本文理论阐述部分。第一章主要是在普特南双层博弈理论基础上，构建一个分析国际合作的双层博弈理论模型，它包括静态和动态两种分析模型。第二章主要是将国际合作的双层博弈理论模型引入汇率政策合作议题中，构建一个分析国际汇率政策合作的双层博弈理论模型，它也包括静态和动态两种分析模型。第三、四、五章为本文案例验证部分，主要是用双层博弈动态模型来解释中美两国在人民币汇率政策博弈中的合作行为。第三章主要描述了在美国国内政治中，改变现状政策利益集团如何利用国内政治制度，来表达其人民币汇率政策偏好，分析了在无外来压力条件下，布什政府时期（2002-2008）和奥巴马政府执政以来（2009-2011），美国政府在人民币汇率政策上的获胜集合。第四章主要研究中国国内制造业企业行为体，如何利用国内政治制度表达其汇率政策偏好，在无外来压力条件下，中国政府如何根据进、出口企业集团的汇率政策需求，以及自身宏观经济政策目标，决定了2002-2008年和2009-2011年的人民币汇率政策获胜集合。第五章主要分析了布什政府时期和奥巴马政府执政以来，面对双方在人民币汇率政策中的分歧，两国政府如何运用中美战略经济对话或中美战略与经济对话解决分歧，双方谈判代表如何运用边缘支付、议题联系和预期收益战略，调整双方获胜集合并使之产生交集。结语部分主要包括论文的主要结论、政策建议和后续研究方向。通过本文的研究可以发现，共有利益是国际合作达成的基础。与静态模型相比，双层博弈动态分析模型更加适用于分析中美两国在人民币汇率政策上的博弈实践。在静态分析模型中，边缘支付和议题联系战略是谈判代表对获胜集合施加影响的重要手段。要理解中美两国的人民币汇率政策博弈均衡结果何以产生，还必须引入预期收益战略这一变量，即行为体未来收益考量也是影响两国在人民币汇率政策博弈中合作达成的重要解释变量。更多还原

【Abstract】 The dissertation is based on the theory of two-level games to analyze thecompetition and cooperation between China and the United States on China’sexchange rate policy since the year of2002, both from domestic and internationalperspectives.The dissertation contains seven parts. The introduction part presents that since thepure economic theory can’t explain the RMB exchange rate problems, to research thisitem by using the two-level games is a comparatively new approach. Based upon theformer research, this part introduces the approach and methodology of the dissertation.Chapter one and chapter two are the interpretation of the theory. Chapter one, throughanalyzing the main opinions of two-level game theory, establishes a new two-levelgames model on international cooperation between two countries, which includes twotypes: single game and repeated games. Chapter two applies the two-level gamesmodel on international cooperation to exchange rate policy between China and UnitedStates, which includes two types: single game and repeated games. Chapter three,chapter four and chapter five are case studies. Chapter three interprets how the interestgroups who wanted to change China’s RMB exchange rate policy expressed itspreference through the domestic political system of U.S, and analyzes the win-sets ofBush Administration (2002-2008) and Obama Administration (2009-2011) withoutexternal pressure. Chapter four describes how the manufacturing enterprises deliveredits preference through the domestic political system of China, and how Chinesegovernment made decision on its win-sets influenced by domestic political andeconomic factors during the period of2002to2008and the period of2009to2011without external pressure. Chapter five explains that how China and United Statesestablished cooperation on China’s exchange rate policy during Bush administration(2002-2008) and Obama administration (2009-2011) through Sino-US StrategicEconomic Dialogue and U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, and interpretshow the negotiation representatives of China and United States made use of suchstrategies as side-payments, issue linkage, and future benefits to adjust its win-set inorder to build cooperation. The last part includes main conclusion, policy suggestionsand future research direction.From the research above we can conclude that common benefit is the foundation ofinternational cooperation. Compared with the single game model, the repeated gamesmodel is much applicable to explain the game practice of China’s exchange rate policy between U.S. and China during the period of2002to2011. Under the singlegame model the win-sets can mainly be adjusted by side-payments and issue linkage.In order to understand how China and United States established cooperation onChina’s exchange rate policy, the variable of future benefit must be considered. Thatis to say the calculation of future benefit is one of the most important factors ofSino-U.S. cooperation in the process of game practice on China’s exchange ratepolicy.更多还原