【作者】 郭军华；

【导师】 李帮义；

【作者基本信息】 南京航空航天大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2012， 博士

【摘要】 随着社会和经济的发展，环境污染和资源紧缺越来越严重。再制造正是在此背景下诞生的一种循环经济发展模式。所谓再制造是指以产品全寿命周期理论为指导，以回收产品性能实现价值恢复为目标，以优质、高效、节能、节材、环保为准则，以先进技术和产业化生产为手段，对回收产品进行修复和价值恢复的一系列技术措施或工程活动的总称。由于再制造为新生事物，消费者对再制造产品的认知较为模糊，这导致再制造产品市场需求的不确定；并且再制造品销售时必须标注再制造标志，这使得消费者对新产品及再制造产品的支付意愿存在一定的差异。因此，在不确定需求及产品消费者支付意愿差异环境下，研究再制造系统的运作机制，具有一定的理论及现实意义。本文综合运用博弈论、运筹学、不确定优化理论等工具，在不确定需求背景下，引入产品的WTP差异，对制造商进入再制造的决策边界、再制造系统的回收模式选择、再制造产品的定价、再制造闭环供应链的协调、再制造系统的延伸责任分担机制等进行深入研究，本文研究的主要内容如下：论文第一章介绍了不确定需求及WTP差异下再制造系统运作机制的研究意义和发展现状。第二章介绍了不确定需求及WTP差异下再制造系统运作机制的理论基础，为后续研究提供理论依据。论文第三章首先对WTP差异条件下制造商的再制造进入决策边界条件进行了研究，研究结果表明，满足边界条件时，虽然再制造产品对新产品的市场产生了蚕食效应，但再制造产品的获利性能弥补这种损失，使得制造商进入再制造能获取更多的利润。进一步，运用演化博弈模型分析了WTP差异条件下制造商再制造进入决策的演化均衡，发现系统演化的均衡结果受再制造品附加值与新产品附加值比值的影响；该比值存在边界条件，在不同边界条件下，系统将演化至不同的均衡。通过适当的政府补贴机制，可促使系统演化至制造商均选择进入再制造策略的均衡。论文第四章在不确定需求环境下，考虑了产品的WTP差异性，建立了制造商回收、零售商回收及第三方回收三种不同回收模式下的再制造闭环供应链模型，通过比较分析发现，制造商利润在第三方回收模式下达到最大，但制造商回收模式下两种产品的零售价最低。因此，从制造商利润最大化角度出发，第三方回收模式最优；而从消费者受益角度出发，制造商回收模式最优。论文第五章以单一制造商为研究对象，在需求不确定及WTP差异环境下，引入了替代性两产品报童模型，对新产品及再制造产品的联合定价决策进行了研究。首先构建了基于利润最大化的两产品定价模型，在证明目标函数凹性的基础上，给出求解的Karush-Kuhn-Tucker优化条件；然后通过数值仿真对模型进行求解，并分析了再制造产品的消费者支付意愿对制造商定价、产量决策及利润的影响。结果表明，随着再制造产品消费者支付意愿的增加，新产品价格有所下降，再制造产品价格逐渐增加，新产品及再制造产品产量均有所下降，制造商利润随之增长。论文第六章基于消费者对新产品及再制造产品支付意愿的不一致，考虑两种产品的替代性，研究了再制造闭环供应链的协调机制。结果表明，集中式决策相对分散式决策而言，新产品及再制造产品的零售价更低，而市场需求更高，且供应链系统利润更高；并设计了收益共享契约对再制造闭环供应链进行协调。再制造闭环供应链系统利润随着再制造产品消费者支付意愿的增加而出现增长，再制造产品零售价也随之增加；这说明增强消费者对再制造产品的认知程度，无论是对制造商与零售商，还是对供应链系统而言都是有利的。论文第七章在不确定需求和WTP差异环境下构建了基于再制造产品批发价协议的生产者延伸责任分担机制，在该分担机制下，再制造产品批发价表现为回收系统投资的函数。在通过这种定价方式，制造商能有效地将延伸责任传导至零售商，而零售商随之通过对新产品和再制造产品零售价进行调整，进一步将延伸责任传导至消费者，使得供应链成员及消费者均进行延伸责任的分担，从而保证生产者责任延伸机制的有效实施。本项研究的创新之处表现为：(1)确定了制造商进入再制造的决策边界，指出了动态演化路径，并给出了决策路线图；确定再制造系统演化至不同均衡状态的边界条件，给出促进制造商进入再制造的政府补贴机制有效的条件。(2)将再制造闭环供应链的回收模式选择、新产品及再制造产品的定价及协调等再制造系统的运作问题拓展到不确定需求及WTP差异环境下。在此情形下的研究使理论更加符合实际情形，具有现实的指导意义。(3)提出了再制造闭环供应链中基于再制造产品批发价协议的生产者延伸责任分担机制，分析了制造商愿意承担生产者延伸责任所满足的条件，为生产者责任延伸机制的有效实施提供理论依据。更多还原

【Abstract】 The environmental pollution and resource shortage is getting worse with the development ofsocial and economic development. Remanufacturing is a circular economy model proposed on thebasis. Remanufacturing is a series of technical measures or engineering activities which take-bakethe EOL products and restores the value guided by the product life cycle theory. The standard ofremanufacturing is quality, efficiency, energy, materials and environmental protection, and themeans of it is advanced technology and industrial production.Since remanufacturing is a new thing,the awareness of consumers to remanufactured product is less clear, which led to the uncertaintydemand of remanufactured product. Then, the remanufactured product must be remarked the signsof remanufacturing on sales which makes the willingness to pay of new and remanufacturedproduct have some differences. Therefore, there has some theoretical and practical significance onresearch the operating mechanism of the remanufacturing system in uncertain demand and WTPdifferentiation.With the game theory, operations research and uncertainty optimization theory, this thesisresearches on the boundary conditions of the OEM remanufacturing decision-making, themanufacturer’s selection of take-back model and the pricing of remanufacturing systems based onuncertain demand and WTP differentiation. The main contents are as follows:In chapter one we will introduces the significance and present situation of the operationmechanism of remanufacturing system. Then in chapter two we will introduces some basictheories about the operation mechanism of remanufacturing system so as to provide a theoreticalframe work for the following studies.In chapter three we will discusses the boundary conditions of the OEM remanufacturingdecision-making. The results show that OEM will obtain more profit in entering remanufacturingwhile boundary conditions are satisfied. It is because the remanufactured products’ profitabilitycan be makes up the canalization effect of remanufactured products to new products. Meanwhile,this chapter analyses the dynamic evolution process of the remanufacturing entry decision ofmanufacturer with evolutionary game model. The results show that the evolutionary stablestrategy affected by the ratio of remanufactured products’ added value to new products’. Moreover,the ratio exist boundary conditions which facilitate the system evolving to different equilibriumunder different values. Furthermore, appropriate government subsidy could promote the formationof the equilibrium of both remanufacturing.In chapter four we will researches on the selection of take-back model under three models:manufacturer take-back, retail take-back, third party take-back based on uncertain demand andWTP differentiation. Then the comparative analysis is implemented on the solution of the threerecovery models by numerical simulation. The results show that the manufacturer’s profit ishighest in manufacturer take-back model and the new product and remanufactured products’ retailprice is lowest in manufacturer take-back model. Therefore, the third-party take-back model is thebest from the perspective to maximize the profits of manufacturer, and the manufacturer take-backmodel is the best from the consumer point of view.In chapter five we will set forth the jointed pricing decision of remanufacturing system underuncertain demand from the perspective of solo manufacturer. Firstly, the two-item newsvendor model is built based on profit maximization. Then, the concavity of objective function is provedand the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimal conditions are given. Moreover, the solutions of the modeland the influence of remanufacturing products’ WTP to pricing, productivity and profit areanalyzed numerically. The results show that the new products’ pricing and two products’productivity will decrease while the new products’ pricing and manufacturer’s profit will increasewith the increasing of remanufacturing products’ WTP.In chapter six we will mainly researches on coordination mechanism of remanufacturingclosed-loop supply chain. The results show that the retail prices of new and remanufacturedproducts are lower while the demand and the total profit of supply chain system are higher inmodel of centralized decision. Then, a benefit-sharing contract is designed to coordinate theremanufacturing closed-loop supply chain. The profit of remanufacturing closed-loop supplychain system is increased by WTP, and the retail prices of remanufactured products have increasedtoo. This shows that the elevation of WTP to remanufactured products is benefit to themanufacturers, retailers and supply chain system.In chapter seven we will researches on the extended producer responsibility sharingmechanism of remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain. The extended producer responsibilitysharing mechanism is designed based on the wholesale price protocol of remanufactured products.In this sharing mechanism, the remanufactured products’ wholesale price is the function of fixedinvestment of recovery system. In the pricing, manufacturer will transfer the extended producerresponsibility to retailer effectively. Then, the retailer will adjust the retail price of new andremanufactured products. So the extended producer responsibility will be transferred to thecustomer. Supply chain members and consumers share the extended responsibility each whichensures the implementation of extended producer responsibility effective.The innovations of this study are as follows:(1) The decision bounder of manufacturer enter the remanufacturing is determined. Then, thedynamic evolution path and decision-making road are introduced. Moreover, the boundaryconditions of different equilibrium and effective government subsidies mechanism are proposed.(2) The problem of take-back model selection, remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain, thejointed pricing strategy of remanufacturing system and coordination mechanism are extended touncertain demand and WTP differences environments. Under such circumstances the theoryresearch will accorded with the realistic problem which has practical significance.(3) Based on uncertain demand and WTP Differentiation, the extended producerresponsibility sharing mechanism is designed based on the wholesale price protocol ofremanufactured products. Then, the conditions of manufacturers are willing to take on extendedproducer responsibility are dissucessed which provide a theoretical basis on implementation ofextended producer responsibility effective.更多还原