【作者】 韩江波；

【导师】 龚唯平；

【作者基本信息】 暨南大学 ， 政治经济学， 2012， 博士

【摘要】 我国农地商业化配置的基本途径是国家首先征用农村集体土地，实现土地所有权向国有转变，然后再由地方政府──土地产权的实际控制者和管理者代表国家以招标、拍卖或挂牌方式在土地市场上将土地使用权转让给商业地产开发商，由此完成农地商业化配置的主要过程。由于转型时期土地市场的外部性及土地市场机制自身缺陷的存在、征地和转让制度不成熟或不合理或操作途径不适当或不正当，尤其是地方政府利用其在农地征收过程中作为唯一合法需求方的买方垄断地位对征地价格的“强制”低价制定和依靠其在商业用地出让过程中作为唯一合法供给方的卖方垄断地位对商业用地出让价格的“变相”高价干预，我国农地商业化配置过程不仅存在市场失灵，更会产生政府失灵。市场失灵和政府失灵的存在导致转型期的农地商业化配置过程偏离完全竞争时期的最优路径，期间一般通过土地“价格差”表现出来，而“价格差”中的土地资源属于公共资源，即为土地租值。土地租值的形成虽有市场失灵方面的因素，但更重要的原因在于：集体在地方政府依法强制征收土地的情况下，将完整或全部的产权束即土地所有权“廉价给予”政府，而地方政府在商业用地出让过程中却只出让给商业地产商国有土地相对的产权束即土地的使用权，进而产生土地流转中集体土地所有权与国有土地使用权极不平等、不对等及不对称的产权经济关系。在此情况下，地方政府往往凭借法律“给予”的土地买方垄断和土地卖方垄断的市场势力以极低价格从集体手中征得土地，之后便在土地市场上以几倍、十倍甚至几十倍的价格转让给商业地产开发商，这二者之间的差额收益即为土地租值，几乎全部归地方政府获取。由于政府本身既是“经济人”，又是“政府人”，其不仅不可能对自身行为进行有效监督和强制约束，反而会刺激其低价征地的动机，而地方政府的征地价格越低，其在商业用地出让价格不下降的前提下所获取的土地租值就越大。当然，土地租值具有多种产生形态，不仅体现在农地征收市场上，而且也表现在商业用地出让市场上，更呈现在农地征收—商业用地出让联动市场上。土地租值的存在会诱使相关经济利益主体通过各种合法或非法途径（主要指设租、寻租、串谋等）对其进行争夺，期间所费成本需从待分割的土地租值中“扣除”，这必然造成土地租值被分割、转移及消散，进而引致土地资源的严重浪费与社会福利损失。土地租值消散是指政府在转型期的土地市场上干预或阻碍分配产品或资源的价格机制而造成的效益、利益甚至福利损失，这是因为在政府对土地价格机制进行干预甚至控制的情况下，经济主体会通过各种途径寻找其他分配资源的标准并把其作为经济交易的替代机制，期间将付出、花费或损失一定成本，因为其他分配资源的标准不可能完全免费，这个成本便是消散的土地租值。在土地市场上，农地商业化配置过程中相关经济主体争夺土地租值的行为虽会造成土地租值消散现象发生，但土地租值常常不会消散至零，其直接原因是：寻租者从事寻租活动的预期利润取决于土地寻租的边际成本与土地的边际租值，而根本原因是：相关经济主体一般会在约束条件下通过各种努力使土地租值的消散降低到最低程度。更多还原

【Abstract】 The basic way of china’s farmland commercial allocation is that the country first levy ruralcollective land, transforming land ownership into state-owned, and then the local government—theactual controllers of land ownership will transfer land use right to commercial real estate developersin the bidding, auction or listing way,thus to complete the process of farmland commercial allocation.Due to the existence of externalities and own defects、the immature or inadequacy ways of landexpropriation and transfer system，especially the local government to use its the only legal statu ofbuyer monopoly position of demand-side to control land expropriation price in the process of ruralland expropriation,and rely on its the only legal status of seller monopoly position of supply–side tointervene commercial land transfer price in the process of commercial land transfer,our countryfarmland commercial allocation process exists not only market failure, and government failure there.The existence of market failure and government failure completely emerge deviation betweenfarmland commercial allocation of transformation period and the optimal path of completelycompetitive period,This is seen through “the price difference” expression,and the land resources " of“the price difference” belong to the public resources, namely for land rent value. The formation ofland rent has the market failure factors, but the more important reason is that:the collective "cheapprovide " the government its land ownership (whole property right bundle) under the situationcompulsively collected land according to law, and the government in the land for commercial use,only transfer state-owned land use (relative property right bundle)to commercial real estatedevelopers,and then produce unequal economic relations of property right bewteen the collective landownership and the state-owned land use right in land circulation.In this unequal economic relations ofproperty right, the government often use a very low price collective with privileges t to collectcollective land, and then times over commercial real estate developers with several times even dozensof times, and the price difference between the two is the land rent value, almost all government owned.As the government itself is not only the "economic man" and "the government",they won’t forcerestricting their own actions,the more exciting its low motivation of land expropriation, and the lowerthe price of the government land expropriation,and the greater the local government get land rentvalue under the condition of commercial land transfer prices nvariabilityOf course, the land rent valuehas a variety of produce forms, reflected not only in the tax on farmland market, and is also present incommercial land on the market, the more present in between the linkage market rural landexpropriation and commercial land transfer.The existence of land rent value will lure related economic benefit main body tostrive for it through the various legal or illegal means (mainly refers to the set rent、rent-seeking、collusion,etc),and the cost need deduction from the land rent value ofStaying segmentation, and this will cause that the land rent value is divided, transfer andincreased, and and cause serious waste of land resources and social welfare loss. Landrent value dissipation is that the government in the market period of lift intervene orprevent the price mechanism of the product or resources distribution so that cause thebenefit of the loss,this is because that the economic subject will be looking for otherresources allocation standard,and as a substitute mechanism in the land price system ofgovernment intervention.This cause a cost, this is because that other resources distribution can not totally free, and the cost is the land rent dissipation value. In theprocess of farmland commercial allocation, related economic subject strive for land rentvalue behavior can cause land rent value dissipationg,but often not dissipate to zero, thedirect cause is: the rent-seeking expected profit of rent seekers depends on the marginalcost of land rent with the marginal rent value of land, and the root cause is: relatedeconomic subject will minimize land rent value dissipationg through all sorts of efforts inthe constraint conditions更多还原