【作者】 蔡晓珊；

【导师】 张耀辉；

【作者基本信息】 暨南大学 ， 产业经济学， 2012， 博士

【摘要】 在知识经济时代，创业主体由传统的物质资本密集型企业转化为人力资本密集型企业。在传统的物质资本密集型企业中，物资资本所有者是企业的中心签约人，是创业的主导者，企业大多采用“资本雇佣劳动”的契约安排；而在新兴的人力资本密集型企业中，企业中心签约人转变为人力资本，由人力资本来主导创业并安排企业契约，“人力资本雇佣资本”的现象相当普遍。创业主导者即中心签约人的变化也带来了企业创业特性、创业条件和治理特性等一系列差异。本文首先从创业主导者即中心签约人的问题入手，回顾了“资本雇佣劳动”和“劳动雇佣资本”的文献观点，分析了人力资本成为人力资本密集型企业创业中心签约人的合理性和必然性。在此基础上，通过进一步详细比较传统物资资本密集企业和新兴人力资本密集型企业的企业特性，归纳得出人力资本密集型企业在创业关键性资源、创业融资、行业进入壁垒、创业风险和创业成长的关键因素等方面与传统物资资本密集型企业存在差异；探讨了人力资本密集型企业创业的本质，指出人力资本密集型企业创业的本质是以人力资本为中心签约人的创新过程，并基于创新理论研究了人力资本密集型企业的五种创业模式。正因为中心签约人与传统物质资本密集型企业有所不同，新兴人力资本密集型企业创业也需要特定的外部环境。本文通过理论和实证证明了教育、资本市场和知识产权制度是人力资本密集型企业创业的三大保障。其中，教育为人力资本密集型企业创业提供人力资本、创新源泉和创业机会，资本市场提供融资渠道和创业激励，知识产权制度则保护创业成果并激励创新。理论和实证皆表明，教育、资本市场和知识产权制度是人力资本密集型企业创业的异质性环境条件，离开了这三个环境要素，人力资本密集型企业的创业便失去了实现条件和保障。基于中心签约人及企业特性和创业特性的不同，新创人力资本密集型企业面临着创业者、关键性人力资本和投资者之间权益的平衡问题。本文重点分析人力资本密集型企业创业过程中创业者与投资者、创业团队成员之间的权益平衡关系。在创业融资过程中，创业者所拥有的企业关键性资源的特殊性以及风险投资资金的专用性使得风险投资者面临被创业者“敲竹杠”的威胁；而随着创业过程的推进，创业者人力资本专用性的增强也引发了风险投资者向创业者“敲竹杠”的问题。通过建立模型，本文分析了创业者与风险投资者之间的“敲竹杠”行为，并提出可转换证券能够有效克服人力资本密集型企业创业过程中的“敲竹杠”问题，实现对创业者和投资者的最佳激励。同时，基于创业团队人力资本的专用性、异质性和团队生产等特征，运用合作博弈模型考察了创业团队内部的权利安排问题，提出了剩余索取权分配、“基本工资+团队绩效”的奖励计划、风险基金的激励模式、SMT创新授权机制以及构建团队心理契约的设想。本文最后给出结论以及研究展望，并提出了促进我国人力资本密集型企业创业的相关政策建议。更多还原

【Abstract】 In the knowledge economy era, the subject of entrepreneurship turns from thetraditional physical-capital-intensive firms into human-capital-intensive firms. Thetraditional physical-capital-intensive firms, in which the physical capital owner isboth the centralized contractual agent of the firm and the leader of entrepreneurship,mostly adapted the contractual arrangement of “capital employ labor”. But theemerging human-capital-intensive firms, in which the centralized contractual agenthas changed into human capital and becomes the leader of entrepreneurship and theenterprise contract arranger, are familiar with the phenomenon of “human capitalemploy capital”. The entrepreneurship leader is also the centralized contractualagent, whose change leads to a series of diversity in the enterprise’sentrepreneurship characteristics, business conditions and managementcharacteristics, etc.This text first starts with the issue that the entrepreneurship leader is the centralizedcontractual agent, and in retrospect of the view of papers, that is,“capital employlabor” and “labor employ capital”, analyses the rationality and necessity that thehuman capital becomes the centralized contractual agent of human-capital-intensivefirms. On that basis, by proceeding with comparing the characteristics of traditionalphysical-capital-intensive firms’ and emerging human-capital-intensive firms, thispaper concludes that the two kind of firms differ in several aspects such as keyresources of entrepreneurship, entrepreneurial financing, trade entering barriers,entrepreneurship risk and crucial factors of entrepreneurship growth. What’s more,this paper discusses the essence of the entrepreneurship of human-capital-intensivefirms, that is, the innovation process in which centralized contractual agent ishuman-capital-oriented. Based on innovation theories, this paper studieshuman-capital-intensive firms’ five entrepreneurial models.Just because centralized contractual agent is different from the traditional physical-capital-intensive firms, emerging human-capital-intensive firms do needspecific external entrepreneurship environment. Through theory and practice, the textproves that education, capital market, intellectual property institution are the threeindemnities of the entrepreneurship of human-capital-intensive firms. Among which,education offers human capital, innovation resources and entrepreneurialopportunities, the capital market provides financing channels and entrepreneurialmotivation, and the intellectual property institution protects the entrepreneurshipresults and stimulates innovation. Theory and Practice show, education, capital marketand intellectual property institution are the heterogeneity environmental factors,without which the entrepreneurship of human-capital-intensive firms will not realizeand suceed.On account of the difference between centralized contractual agent andcharacteristics of both enterprises and entrepreneurship, human-capital-intensive firmsface the rights’ equilibrium problem among entrepreneurs, critical human capital andinvestors. This paper emphasizes equity relationship among the entrepreneurs,investors and entrepreneurial teammates in the entrepreneurship of thehuman-capital-intensive firms. In the process of entrepreneurial financing, the venturecapitalists were threatened by the “hold-up” of the entrepreneurs because of thedistinctiveness of enterprises’ critical resources and specificity of the ventureinvestment capital. Nevertheless, with propulsion of the entrepreneurship, theimproving of specificity of entrepreneurs’ human capital has aroused the matter thatventure capitalists hold up entrepreneurs. By modeling, the text analyses the“hold-up” between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists, and comes up with the ideathat converting securities can effectively overcome the “hold-up” problem in theprocess of human-capital-intensive firms’ entrepreneurship, which can achieve thebest incentive to entrepreneurs and investors. In the meanwhile, on the basis of thecharacteristics of entrepreneur team’s human capital, such as highly specificity,heterogeneity and teamwork production, this paper uses the cooperative game modeto investigate the issue of rights arrangement in the entrepreneurial team, andproposes distribution of residual claim,“basic salary and team performance” incentive plan, venture capital incentive model, SMT innovation authorization mechanisms, andthe idea of s building the team’s psychological contract.This paper finally gives a conclusion and research prospect, providing relativepolicy recommendations promoting Chinese human-capital-intensive firms’entrepreneurship.更多还原