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美国投资银行诚信义务研究

Research on the Fiduciary Duty of American Investment Banks

【作者】 卢青

【导师】 张庆麟;

【作者基本信息】 武汉大学 , 国际法学, 2012, 博士

【摘要】 投资银行业是现代资本市场的重要组成部分。作为金融史上的重要创新,投资银行业务主要随着各国股票市场和债券市场的发展而不断扩展其范围。投资银行,尤其是美国投资银行的迅猛发展,对美国资本市场的发展壮大产生了极大的促进作用,同时为美国企业的国际化提供了强大支持。投资银行的业务特征决定了其带有一定的公共服务职能,而且行业内多年以来的高收入、高地位又为投资银行积聚了一批最高端的金融人才。这些精英们通过其大胆的想象能力将各种最新的数学模型和技术运用到创造新产品和新服务的过程当中,因此多年以来华尔街投资银行一直能够以高利润、善于创新、积极开拓等正面形象示人。华尔街有一句名言“花别人的钱是不会心疼的”。资本市场是一个以诚信为基础的市场,而投资银行所从事的是信用业务,是花别人的钱的业务。因此,诚信对于资本市场特别重要。诚信义务也是投资银行重要的义务,尽管它与作为民商法基本原则的诚信原则有着一脉相承的特性,但同时也有着区别于民事行为和其他商事行为的内涵。我国证券市场正处于前所未有的变革之中。这在给我们的资本市场带来流动性和竞争的同时,也对我们的监管体制和法律制度提出了更新和更高的要求。我国投资银行(即证券公司)发展起步晚、立法滞后,为适应经济全球化的发展,也为应对来自于国外投资银行的巨大挑战,要求我们必须结合投资银行相关业务,深入探讨投资银行诚信义务相关问题,促进我国投资银行业的健康发展并保障投资者和资本市场其他参与方的合法利益。作为资本市场最为发达的美国,其对于投资银行的监管及法律规制自成一套体系,高盛和摩根士丹利的转型还远远不能成为美国监管模式失败的实证;即使退一万步来说,美国独立投资银行就此走到了末路,也不能抹杀其在资本市场曾经起到的划时代的作用,而这一切都对我们深入研究、消化和借鉴美国投资银行监管模式和法律制度具有重大意义。投资银行的诚信义务是一个很大的范畴,除本文研究的投资银行诚信义务外,还包括投资银行进行自营交易中应遵守的行为规范,也包括投资银行作为一个市场主体而对投资者、债权人、雇员等利益相关方承担的诚信义务,以及对国家、政府、社区承担的社会性义务等。为了避免重蹈已有研究泛泛而谈的覆辙,本文将把研究重点放在投资银行诚信义务的基本理论、具体业务类型及其法律监管之上,探讨以美国为代表的西方国家投行业务诚信义务的演进趋势,并在此基础上尝试提出改进我国有关法律规则的建议。本文在引言部分对目前投资银行对资本市场做出的贡献以及资本市场对于一国的经济发展的作用进行了肯定。但同时也指出了投资银行由于其天生的中介特性,使得其不得不在夹缝中寻找自己生存的空间,而其业务本身带有一定的投机性以及很可能依靠信息不对称来获得不正当收益。而投资银行又通过其对资本市场的重要作用将不当行为的后果加以放大。也就是说,由于投资银行与其客户之间天生存在包括技术上的、信息上的各种不平等,导致投资银行可能滥用其优势地位侵害客户利益,并损害资本市场的健康发展。由于投资银行侵害客户利益的行为可能非常隐蔽和专业,仅仅通过外部的监管不能够完全达到遏止其侵害客户利益行为的效果。我们必须在监管之外寻找更加有效的途径,在促进资本市场发展的同时促使投资银行专注其本源业务。因此,合理界定并大力促进投资银行的诚信义务建设是一个较为有效的手段。目前对于投资银行的研究大多仅限于具体业务的研究,而对于投资银行的诚信义务则很少有系统性的研究,这也凸显了本文的重要意义。前言部分还对目前投资银行诚信义务研究的现状进行了概括的研究并提出了本文的研究视角和研究方法本文的第一章奠定了写作的理论基础。从经济学、法学等角度对诚信的起源、发展以及作用等进行解读。具体到法律领域,诚信反映了一种以诚实信用为核心、以契约为载体的社会关系并成为民商事行为的基本原则。本章还对投资银行的定义及其业务进行了分析。指出对投资银行“最好、最概括的定义就是投资银行所从事的任何业务”。①其次,对投资银行的运营模式与主营业务进行介绍,投资银行的主营业务主要包括证券发行与承销、证券交易、企业并购、私募发行、资产管理、直接投资、理财顾问和咨询业务、金融创新业务。随后,本章以美国法为视角对诚信义务进行理论分析,通过对诚信义务在普通法、尤其是美国法背景下演进发展的过程以及其间产生的有关理论和规则的梳理可见,诚信义务是受信人基于诚信义务关系而对受益人负有的义务。诚信义务是指特定当事人之间一种不对等的法律关系,义务人或受信人因其所拥有的权力而处于一种优势地位,可以通过自己的行为改变他人的法律地位,而受益人或委托人则处于弱势地位,他们必须承受其法律地位被受信人改变的后果且无法对其实施直接控制。第二章分析了美国法上投资银行对零售客户的诚信义务。主要是从投资银行基于其基本业务而产生的两种身份——投资顾问和经纪-交易商来分别进行探讨。本部分结合了美国的成文法和判例法,通过研究,笔者认为,在大多数情况下,投资顾问需要承担诚信义务;而尽管判例法中经纪-交易商承担诚信义务并不常见,但是,可以预见在《华尔街消费者保护法案》出台后两者的诚信义务将有趋同的趋势,即经纪-交易商也将被要求对其零售客户承担诚信义务。第三章主要研究了投资银行对其机构客户的诚信义务。与第二章类似,本文选取了投资银行服务机构客户最具有代表性的两项业务:并购和IPO进行研究。讨论在这两种业务中投资银行对其客户所应当承担的诚信义务。通过研究相关的案例及成文法,笔者认为,在美国法上,投资银行与其机构客户的义务权利义务大部分均通过合同进行规范,因此,一般而言,在这两项业务中,投资银行一般都不对其客户承担诚信义务。尽管有判例要求投资银行对其客户承担诚信义务,但是笔者认为,这并非美国法的主流。最后,本文在第四章中讨论美国相关制度对我国的启示。在对我国投资银行诚信义务立法体系与美国的相关制度进行了对比之后,该部分就我国应当如何借鉴美国的制度以完善我国证券公司的诚信义务建设。笔者认为,在研究我国证券公司对客户承担的诚信义务时,应当以诚信义务的本质属性为基础,区分不同业务种类和相关实际情况来讨论证券公司是否应当对特定客户承担诚信义务。通过研究诚信义务的理论内涵,借鉴美国法中有关投资银行对客户承担诚信义务的有关规定,笔者认为应结合诚信义务的本质与证券法的宗旨,正确解读、修改和适用我国现行法中证券公司作为并购顾问、承销商、保荐人、经纪商所承担的义务。另外,我国相关立法应区分零售客户和机构客户、区分法律关系,细化证券公司对客户承担的诚信义务的内涵,使证券立法真正起到加强对投资者保护的作用,促进我国证券市场健康发展。

【Abstract】 As an important innovation in financial history, investment banking business hasbeen developing its scope together with the development of stock markets and bondmarkets. Development of investment banks, especially that of the U.S. investmentbanks had played a great role in the booming of the U.S. capital markets. It provided apowerful support to the internationalization of the U.S. enterprises at themeantime. Investment banking business has certain public services functions andattracts many talents with a high income and high social status. These elites, with theirbold imagination, combined various mathematical models, technologies and skills tocreate new products and services. Over the years, Wall Street investment banks haveenjoyed the positive reputation as profitable, aggressive and innovative.Capital market is developed based on trust and investment banks are engaging inthe trust business in which they are spending others’ money. Therefore, trust is crucialto the capital market as well as to investment banks. Though the trust for investmentbanks shall be in consistent with the trust as the principle of civil law, it has differentfeature which is different from the civil law activities and other commercial activities.China is undergoing an unprecedented process of reform. This brings us liquidityand competition and meanwhile, sets a higher standard to the regulatory andlegislative system. Investment banks and relevant legislation developed only for thepast two decades. Facing the globalization of economy and challenges from foreigninvestment banks, we have to deeply look at the issues relating trust for the sake ofensuring a healthy development of investment banking industry as well as protectinglawful rights and interests of the rest of capital market participants. The U.S. isreputable for its well-established capital market with its unique regulatory system oninvestment banks. The transformation of Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley did notprove the failure of the regulatory model. Even if we shall draw the conclusion thatsuch transformation is the end of independent investment banks, such conclusion shallnot erase the epoch-making impact the U.S. experience left. All this mean a lot whenwe study, digest and learn from the U.S. investment bank regulation and legislationpractices.Trust of investment banks has a broad meaning, ranging from the fiduciary duty,which is the topic of this paper, to the rules that the investments shall obey during its proprietary trading business, to the fiduciary duties the investment banks owe to itsinvestors, debtors, employees and other stake-holder and to the social responsibilitiesthe investment banks shall shoulder for the nations, governments and communities.This paper is focusing on the basic theory of the investment banks’ fiduciary duties,business and regulations and discussing the fiduciary evolution in the U.S. Based onthe study, this paper proposes recommendations and suggestions for China to improveits legislation and regulatory system on the fiduciary duties of investment banks.In the Introduction, this article confirms the positive functions that theinvestment banks have been playing during the development of the capital markets.Meanwhile, it is pointed out that the nature of investment banking business isbrokering. Investment banks grew from very narrow business scope and naturally,investment banking business is speculative and the banks will gain extra and unfairprofits by taking advantage of the information asymmetry. Furthermore results fromsuch misconduct will be amplified through the key roles that investment banks play inthe capital markets. That is to say, investment banks enjoys the born informationasymmetry and unfairness in technology and skills which leaves the possibilities thatinvestment banks will abuse such advantageous position to impair the interests oftheir clients and consequently impair the healthy development of the capital markets.The impairing behaviors of the investment banks could be very professional andtricky, external regulation and supervision are not very effective in preventing theinvestment banks from infringing their clients’ interests. Therefore, we shall seek formore effective means to encourage investment banks to focus on its business withbrokering nature. To define and construct the fiduciary duties of the investment banksis an effective way. However, what have been done in this area is superficial andtherefore, this paper can have some significance.Chapter one of this paper sets the academic base for this paper. Origination anddevelopment of fiduciary duties are discussed from the point view of economics, legaland other perspectives. This chapter also briefly talks about the definition and detailsbusiness scope of investment bank. Meanwhile, this chapter also touches the fiduciaryduties under the U.S. law.Chapter two analyses the fiduciary duties of investment banks to its retail client.The analysis is conducted from the two basic roles for investment banks: investmentadvisor and broker-dealer. Statute laws and case laws are combined; the writer drawsthe conclusion that under most circumstances the investment advisors are requested to undertake fiduciary duties. Though it was rare that the cases laws put fiduciary dutieson broker-dealers, we expect that such duties will be put on them together with thepromulgation of the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.Chapter three talks about the fiduciary duties of the investment banks owe to itsinstitutional clients. Similar to Chapter2, this chapter chooses two typical investmentbanking businesses: mergers and acquisitions and IPO underwriting as the targets.According to the study, the writer thinks most rights and obligations betweeninvestment banks and their institutional clients are pretty much set out in relevantcontracts and agreements. Regularly, investment banks will not undertake fiduciaryduties to their institutional clients though there are few cases request them do so.Lastly, Chapter four discusses the inspiration we can draw from the study at theU.S. experience. After a systematic comparison between the U.S. and China practice,the writer makes relevant suggestions and recommendations. The writer thinks weshall also distinguish the fiduciary duties of the securities firms according to thefeatures of their clients.Based on the study at the U.S. practices, the writer deems it is necessary toamend the existing regulations after proper interpretation of the Securities Law andthe nature of fiduciary duties. Meanwhile, we shall ensure the investor’ lawfulinterests be protected by differentiating the responsibilities of individual frominstitutional clients.

  • 【网络出版投稿人】 武汉大学
  • 【网络出版年期】2012年 09期
  • 【分类号】D971.2;DD912.28
  • 【被引频次】4
  • 【下载频次】858
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