【作者】 朱四明；

【导师】 朱晓明；

【作者基本信息】 上海交通大学 ， 产业经济学， 2011， 博士

【摘要】 服务外包是有利于企业核心竞争力建设的一种现代化的管理方式,具有广泛适用性。但是服务外包的成功有着独特的前提条件,是在外包业务、市场环境、各个参与企业等一系列影响因素共同作用下实现的。实际研究结果表明,服务外包的成功率并不是很高,60%的公司对外包结果不满意,而40%的公司试图主动地终止外包合同。之所以出现这种情形,很重要的一个原因是发包方和接包方之间存在信息不对称,从而造成发包方不能选择出合适的接包方并对其进行有效监管。本论文站在服务外包发包方的角度,对接包方选择和监管阶段的风险因素进行识别,确定其对总风险的影响权重,并针对两阶段的风险设计相应的规避机制。论文目的在于尝试在理论和实践上有所创新,指导企业提高服务外包的管理水平。基于所构建的综合性理论分析框架,论文系统地探讨了服务外包供应商选择和监管的风险控制问题。文章主要分为五个部分,包括以下内容:第一部分,首先对近年来服务外包的定义和相关研究做了归纳和总结,并指出了服务外包的研究发展趋势。然后对服务外包风险进行定义,总结了服务外包面临的主要风险,介绍了服务外包风险因素的相关研究。由于信息不对称是造成服务外包供应商选择和监管风险的主要原因,本文对信息不对称理论以及逆向选择和道德风险的相关研究及进展也做了简要总结。第二部分,基于服务外包两阶段风险特点,抽取了客户专业性、业务标准化程度、业务可测量性、交流沟通、合同完整性、协同合作等风险因素,研究其对服务外包风险的影响大小,构建了服务外包两阶段风险因素模型,并以问卷调查的方式进行实证研究,借助结构方程分析模型内涵式的检验了各个风险因素对服务外包风险的影响效力。研究发现业务标准化程度、客户专业性、交流与沟通和合同的完整性与服务外包风险直接相关;同时,业务标准化程度、客户专业性和业务的可测量性还通过影响合同的完整性间接作用于服务外包风险。第三部分,通过建立基于服务质量的供应商选择模型,本文发现由于发包方不能观察到服务本身的质量,而只能观察到其分布情况,所以推断市场上的服务水准不会高于期望价格对应的服务,从而导致提供高于期望价格服务的接包方纷纷退出市场,市场上的服务质量逐渐下降。于是,本文提出了由第三方提供能力认证的方式传递接包方的服务质量信息,从而避免信息不对称带来的风险。不同于传统理论模型,本文认为接包方可能无法正确评估自身能力,从而选择了错误的认证水平。于是本文在持有错误信念的接包方参与的情况下,构建博弈模型。结果表明能力认证机制的作用体现在传递有关接包方能力信号和提高接包方能力两方面;但随着持有错误信念的接包方占比增加,不同能力接包方在选择认证水平和报酬水平上不断接近,最终使得能力认证的信号传递功能失效。第四部分,发包方在对接包方进行监管的过程中,需要设计合理的激励和监督机制以确保接包方按照其期望的方式完成服务外包任务。通过构建最优激励模型和监控模型,本文指出,在信息不对称的条件下,激励机制与监控机制都将发生作用,并指出在合同报酬支付的设计中,将激励机制和监控机制一并纳入进来考虑,对解决发包方与接包方之间的利益冲突问题有着非常重要的作用。发包方在设计报酬合同时一并将激励机制与监控机制考虑进来不仅可以大大提高对信息的依赖程度,而且可以使报酬合同中产出份额与监控信号相互关联;在服务外包交易风险管理中,接包方付出努力的多少与发包方支付的固定报酬无关;发包方如果对接包方采取过多的监控手段,会对接包方产生负面影响。第五部分,从管理角度针对风险因素提出具体应对策略。包括提高服务外包业务标准化程度和业务可测量性,不断提高自身的专业性,加强服务外包中的交流和沟通以及签订完善的外包合同。围绕论文的主要研究内容,作者在如下三个方面做出了创新的尝试:(1)定量得出了风险因素对风险的影响大小:基于文献梳理和定性分析,抽取服务外包风险因素,构建服务外包两阶段风险因素模型,对服务外包选择阶段和监管阶段的风险因素及其关系进行实证研究,找到了各风险因素对风险的影响大小。(2)对传统“逆向选择”模型进行了延伸和丰富:在假定接包方完全信息、发包方只具有分布信息的基础上,构建了基于服务质量服从正态分布的接包方选择模型,通过模型分析了信息不对称对服务外包市场交易效率的影响;不同于传统模型,在提出由第三方提供能力认证来传递服务质量信息的前提下,考虑了接包方可能无法正确评估自身能力的情况情形,并对持错误信念参与者对市场的影响进行了分析。(3)对“道德风险”模型进行了创新:针对服务外包接包方监管阶段存在的信息不对称,从服务外包市场的特点出发,构建了最优激励模型和监控模型,首次从激励和监控两个维度对风险控制机制作了分析,发现发包方在设计报酬合同时一并将激励机制与监控机制考虑进来不仅可以大大提高对信息的依赖程度,而且可以使报酬合同中产出份额与监控信号相互关联。更多还原

【Abstract】 Service outsourcing is a modern and workable way to improve company’s core competence. However the success of service outsourcing needs unique preconditions which involve outsourcing business, market environment and corporations participating into the business. The practical researches disclose that the success rate of service outsourcing is not high. 60% companies are not satisfied with outsourcing results and 40% companies want to terminate outsourcing contracts. These phenomena arise from asymmetric information between clients and vendors which result clients couldn’t select out suitable vendors and supervise them effectively.This Thesis identifies the risk factors located in vendor selection and supervision process, confirms their weight and designs risk aversion mechanism aiming at vendor selection and supervision process. The thesis explores innovation both on theory and practice to guide company improving outsourcing management level. Based on the comprehensive theory frame the thesis including 5 parts, studies how to control outsourcing risks lied in vendor selection and supervision process.Part 1. Firstly we conclude and summarize the definition and related researches about service outsourcing and point out its future research trend. Then we define service outsourcing risk and sum up the main risks faced by outsourcing as well as introduce main studies about service outsourcing risk factor. Finally we summarize related researches about asymmetric information as it is the main reason resulting unsuccessful vendor selection and supervision.Part 2. According to the characters of outsourcing two-stage risks we draw out 6 risk factors, professional level of client, outsourcing business standardization, business scalability, communication, contract integrity, collaboration, to study their impacts on outsourcing risk and relationship among themselves through empirical survey research methods and structural equation model. The results testify that professional level of client, outsourcing business standardization, communication and contract integrity have direct impacts on service outsourcing risks while professional level of client, outsourcing business standardization and business scalability have indirect impacts on service outsourcing risks through contract integrity.Part 3. Through establishing vendor selection model based on service quality we find that client couldn’t distinguish exact quality of service but its distribution. Then client infer that the service level will not exceed that corresponding to expect price, which results escaping of high level vendors thus debases service quality in the market. To avoid the risks arising from asymmetric information we bring out capability certification method provided by third party. Not like traditional theory model we make the assumption that vendor may not judge their abilities properly thus results choosing unsuitable certification level. Based on this assumption we establish game model which proves two finding. Firstly the role of capability certification has two aspects, transferring signal about vendor ability and improving vendor ability. Secondly with the increase of vendors who possess unsuitable judgement about their abilities the certification level and payment level between different vendors become closer and closer and finally the effect of certification disappears.Part 4. In the process of supervising vendors clients need to design reasonable incentive and supervision mechanism to ensure vendors fulfilling service outsourcing in accordance with client’s requirements. Through establishing prime incentive model and supervision model this thesis points out that incentive mechanism and supervision mechanism will work together under asymmetric information. In designing contract payment if both incentive mechanism and supervision mechanism are taken into account the conflict between client and vendor could be overcome to a great extent. Moreover through this way the reliance on information will be enhanced and the output percent of payment contract could be interlinked with supervision signal. In managing service outsourcing risks the effort level of vendors have nothing to do with fixed payment and client overdue supervision will produce negative effect on vendors.Part 5. We provide management measures aiming at controlling risk factors in the process of vendor selection and supervision. These management measures include improving business standardization and business scalability, improving professional level of client, enhancing communication and signing perfect outsourcing contract. Around the main content the thesis tries to innovate in below 3 aspects.(1) Based on literatures trimming and qualitative analysis we draw out service outsourcing factors and establish service outsourcing two-stage rick models to do empirical study on risk factors located in service outsourcing vendor selection and supervision process. Though this method we get the loaded weights on risks by risk factors and the weights between pairs of risk factors.(2) Differing from traditional quality asymmetric information model in service outsourcing vendor selection we assume service quality meeting normal distribution and establish vendor selection model accordingly. With the assumption that vendor possessing complete information while client only possessing part information we analyze the effect of asymmetric information on service outsourcing market efficiency. Not like traditional model, under the premise that third party providing capability certification to pass service quality information we take the condition into account that vendors couldn’t judge their abilities properly and analyze the effect on market coming from participants with wrong beliefs.(3) Aiming at asymmetric information in service outsourcing market we start from the characters of service outsourcing market and establish prime incentive model and supervision model. It’s the first time that risk control mechanism is analyzed from two opposite dimensions.We find that in designing contract payment if both incentive mechanism and supervision mechanism are taken into account the reliance on information could be enhanced greatly and the output percent of payment contract could be interlinked with supervision signal.更多还原