【作者】 沈娜利；

【导师】 张旭梅；

【作者基本信息】 重庆大学 ， 企业管理， 2011， 博士

【摘要】 当前,随着知识经济的发展,知识日益成为企业保持可持续发展和获得竞争优势的重要资源。从知识管理的角度看,供应链不仅是物流以及与物流密切相关的信息流、资金流的供应链,而且还是知识的供应链。客户知识作为供应链中的一种不可或缺的资源,对各节点企业乃至供应链保持客户、进行创新、提高核心竞争力具有重要作用。然而,供应链环境下如何有效进行客户知识协同成为问题的关键。由于这一问题的恰当解决关系到相关节点企业间知识流动的畅通性和及时获取足够新知识并加以有效应用的效率。因此,本文从如何促进制造商与销售商之间的客户知识协同出发,研究供应链环境下客户知识协同获取的激励问题。首先,针对客户知识协同获取问题,考虑参与双方不同知识需求,建立数学模型对制造商主动模式及销售商主动模式下的客户知识协同进行了对比研究。当客户知识引致系数及努力弹性系数满足一定条件时,销售商主动模式优于制造商主动模式。接下来进一步考虑了参与双方不同决策行为下的合作模式问题,定性分析了双方参与协同的层次模型及其对应的行为选择,并建立博弈模型讨论了制造商单独获取客户知识的模型、制造商与销售商部分参与即半协同下的合作模型以及全协同情况下的合作模型,并对模型进行了对比分析。销售商的参与促使制造商提高对产品创新的投资,销售商的参与程度不仅受自身成本的影响,而且受制造商投入的影响。制造商与销售商的合作模式选择依赖于客户知识协同的定价临界条件。其次,基于前文对客户知识协同获取合作模式的研究,进一步考虑影响合作成功的道德风险问题。在考虑客户知识获取不同于实物产品的特殊性的前提下,设计了一种激励机制来解决制造商与销售商协同获取客户知识中的双边道德风险问题。运用委托代理模型论证了客户知识协同获取的收益共享激励系数与制造商、销售商的努力和努力成本系数无直接关系,但与双方的努力弹性系数密切相关;收益共享激励系数随制造商的努力弹性系数的增加而递减,随销售商的努力弹性系数的增加而递增;固定支付与制造商的努力弹性系数正相关,与销售商的努力弹性系数负相关;由激励系数与固定支付构成的契约可以激励双方合作,降低双边道德风险。最后通过算例验证了激励机制的有效性。再次,在前面研究的基础上,考虑客户知识获取中知识粘性特点,引入关系契约,建立数学模型对制造商与销售商合作中的努力、激励以及效率问题进行了研究。对比分析了制造商与销售商在正式契约与关系契约下的客户知识协同获取激励机制。最优正式契约下的激励不能使双方在合作过程中投入的努力水平及知识粘性系数达到系统最优,导致了系统利润受损。而从长远合作关系出发设计的关系契约激励机制对制造商与销售商的知识协同具有正向激励作用,能够降低知识合作获取的难度,提高知识获取效率。其中,当收益贴现因子足够大达到一定临界值时,关系契约能够有效激励制造商与销售商付出最优努力,从而实现系统利润最优。更多还原

【Abstract】 At present, with the development of knowledge-based economy, knowledge is increasingly becoming important resource of enterprises to maintain a competitive advantage and sustainable development. From the perspective of knowledge management, supply chain is not only closely related to information flow, capital flow supply chain, but also supply chain of knowledge. Customer knowledge, as an important resource in supply chain, is vital to hold customers, innovation and improving core competitive advantage for member enterprises even supply chain. However, customer knowledge flow smoothly between member corporations and its acquisition efficiency have been damaged by moral hazard caused by information asymmetry within cooperation mode. From above perspective, incentive problems of customer knowledge cooperative acquisition under supply chain are researched in this paper.Firstly, to research cooperative problem in customer knowledge collaborative acquisition for manufacturer and retailer, the characteristics of customer knowledge collaborative acquisition were analyzed and dynamic game models were constructed to research collaborative relationship and efficiency of customer knowledge acquisition in the manufacturer initiative mode and in the retailer initiative case. Important influence on the manufacturer’s return and the retailer’s return and the system return change with variety of the incurred coefficients of customer knowledge acquired and the effort elasticity coefficients. When the rigid conditions is satisfied, the optimal profits of manufacturer and retailer in the retailer initiative case are better than the manufacturer initiative case, as well as gains for the entire system. Furtherly, considering the participations’decising behaviors, analyzed the the dgree of involvement and its cressponding behaviors. Then, three game models such as manufacturer decision-making alone, semi-collaboration and centric decisiton-making were compared. The degree of distributor participation is not only affected by its own cost for the collaborative innovation, but also the investment of manufacturer. The boundary condition of different decision selection was obtained for manufacturer and its distributor.Secondly, based on above cooperative mode, double-sided moral hazard problem had been researched. Considering the difference characteristics of customer knowledge from other tangible products, an incentive mechanism was designed to smooth the moral hazard. In the process of customer knowledge collaborative acquisition information asymmetry between manufacturer and retailer leads to double-sided hazard problem that result in the decrease of their collaborative efficiency and customer knowledge acquisition performance. Therefore, we focus on contractual arrangements to solve this problem. First, based on double-sided moral hazard effects of different efforts and their coefficients of elasticity were considered to construct customer knowledge performance function. Then, cooperation contract was designed through building mathematic model with principle-agent theory. The results showed that the optimal revenue sharing rate of customer knowledge collaborative acquisition was not relative with the efforts and the cost-of-effort coefficient, while relative with effort-elasticity and exponents of cost-of-effort functions. The results also explored that the contract can give an incentive mechanism to decrease the double-sided moral hazard from manufacturer and retailer. A numerical example illuminated further the contract design and relationships between its variables.Tirdly, considering characteristics of customer knowledge acquisition to introduce knowledge stickness coeffients, incentive and efficiency between cooperative manufacturer and retailer are researched with the relational contract under double moral hazard. Based on the problem that the formal contract cannot incent simultaneously the effort of manufacturer and retailer, a relational cooperative contract is designed with principal-agent theory, then the incentive effect of the relational contract is analyzed. The conclusions indicate that manufacturer’revenue and system profit under the relational contract are not less than that under the formal contract for all discount rate; the incentive effect of the relational contract increases with the discount rate increasing. When the discount rate is large enough, the first best outcome can be achieved through the relational contract.更多还原