【作者】 吕凡；

【导师】 余玉苗；

【作者基本信息】 武汉大学 ， 会计学， 2011， 博士

【摘要】 制约我国证券市场进一步健康发展的核心问题是上市公司规范运作不够,违规行为频频发生。一系列严重违规事件的发生沉重打击了投资者信心,破坏了证券市场的正常运行秩序。为维护证券市场秩序,保护投资者合法权益,作为上市公司监管机构的中国证监会及其下属证券交易所依据《公司法》、《证券法》等相关法规和国务院的授权,对上市公司的违规行为立案调查,并向证券市场公开发布违规处罚公告。这些公开发布的违规处罚公告包含了上市公司违规行为涉及的法律条款、违规行为持续时间、被处罚对象及金额等丰富的信息含量,充分揭示了上市公司违规行为及其严重程度,有助于上市公司的利益相关者识别相关风险并进而做出适当的决策。以较为典型的“科龙案”为例,证监会在2006年专门为此案发布了证监字[2006]4号、[2006]15号、[2006]16号和[2006]30号四份文件,四种违规行为累计违规时间10年,共计处罚公司管理层40人；而同年被处罚的“古井贡”(证监罚字[2006]9号)违规持续时间2年,处罚公司管理层1人。我们认为,利益相关者对“科龙”和“古井贡”的违规处罚公告所感知的风险不应该等同,由此而带来的利益相关者的行为反应上的差异值得我们进行深入研究。上市公司的利益相关者包括投资者、独立审计师、政府监管机构、债权人、供应商、客户、员工等,上市公司的违规行为将对利益相关者造成潜在的损失,潜在损失的大小与违规行为及其严重程度直接相关。囿于数据的可获得性,我们选择了投资者和独立审计师两个不同视角来研究利益相关者对违规处罚公告的反应。投资者和独立审计师对上市公司有着不同的利益诉求。例如,作为理性“经济人”的投资者希望获取最大的投资收益,避免投资风险。违规公告发布后,投资者做出买入或卖出公司股票的决定,因此上市公司的违规行为及其严重程度将会影响其股价的市场表现。独立审计师通过对风险的感知来决定可承受的风险水平,希望能在获取合理审计服务收费的同时将审计风险控制在可接受的范围内,因此上市公司违规行为及其严重程度会影响独立审计师的审计定价行为和对财务报表发表审计意见的类型。本文以2005-2009年中国证券市场上监管机构发布的违规处罚公告为研究对象,从违规处罚公告中手工整理出违规处罚单位、违规持续时间、董事长是否违规、违规的独立董事数量、违规的独立董事比例五个反映违规严重程度的指标,检验独立审计师和证券市场对违规变量的反应。通过实证研究,本文得出以下结论：第一,独立审计师的审计定价与监管机构级别、董事长是否被处罚、董事被处罚比例和独立董事被罚比例呈显著正相关关系,说明独立审计师在审计定价时考虑到了违规处罚公告中的相关信息；独立审计师在对违规公司出具审计意见时,董事被处罚比例和独立董事被处罚比例与违规公司获得非标意见的可能性存在显著正相关关系,说明与审计定价相比,独立审计师在出具审计意见时更为审慎,董事被处罚比例和独立董事被处罚比例高往往预示着公司内部控制方面存在较为严重的问题,这样的公司容易收到独立审计师的非标意见。第二,公司违规行为对于公司股票价格有负面影响,但本文的检验结果发现不具有显著性,可能是投资者对于不同性质的违规行为的反应不一样。进一步的研究发现,投资者对于公司董事长是否被监管机构处罚较为敏感,表现为董事长被处罚的公司超额累计收益率(CAR)均值和超额收益率(AR)均值都显著低于董事长未被处罚公司；但投资者对于处罚公司的证券监管级别不敏感,证监会处罚公司的CAR均值和AR均值虽低于交易所处罚公司,但不显著；独立董事被处罚公司的CAR均值显著低于独立董事未被处罚公司,但是独立董事被处罚公司的AR均值与独立董事未被处罚公司的AR均值无显著差异。更多还原

【Abstract】 The restriction of healthy development of Chinese stock market is that the listed companies’ operations are not standardized and always violate regulations. A series of violations are a heavy blow to investors’confidence and destroy the normal order of stock market. In order to maintain the normal order of stock market and protect investors’ rights, China securities regulatory commission and it’s subsidiary stock exchange investigate the violation companies based on securities law, company law and the authority of state council, and announce the punishment bulletins to stock market. The punishment bulletins contains information content such as the law clause violated, the duration of violation behavior and the object of penalty which reveal the severity of the violation behavior. Taking "kelong event" as an example, China securities regulatory commission announced four copies of files which indicated that accumulative time of kelong’s violation behavior was up to 10 years, and 40 of it’s management layer were punished. On the other hand, in the same year, "Gujingong event" broke, whose violation behavior cumulated to 2 yeas and one of its management layer was punished.The listed company’s interest-relevant groups contains investors, CPA, government’s supervision department, creditor, supplier, customer and it’s employees. The violation behavior will lead to potential loss which is positive correlation to the severity of the violation behavior. We choose two perspectives from investors and cpa to study the reaction to punishment bulletins. Investors and cpa has different interests demand. As a rational economic man, investors hope to obtain maximum investment income and avoid risk. After the announcement of punishment bulletins, investors decide to buy or sale stocks, so the severity of the violation behavior will affect the stock price. Cpa decides the receivable risk premium through risk assessment, and hopes to obtain maximum profit and control the risk to a reasonable range. So a company’s violation behavior will affect cpa’s audit price and and audit opinion.This dissertation studies the punishment bulletins and quantify the information in it such as supervision institution, accumulative time of violation behavior, chairman’s violation behavior, the ratio of director punished, the ratio of independent director punished. We test the reaction of investor and cpa to these variables, and we draw following conclusionsFirstly, Cpa’s audit pricing is positive correlation to supervision institution, accumulative time of violation behavior, the ratio of director punished and the ratio of independent director punished, which indicates that Cpa take the information in the punishment bulletins into consideration. The probability of receive modified opinion is positive correlation to the ratio of director punished, the ratio of independent director punished when Cpa express audit opinion. Comparing with audit pricing, auditors are more prudent when they express audit opinion. The more director and independent director are punished, the more serious the problem of internal control exist which leads to receive modified opinion.Secondly, the listed companies’ violation behavior has negative influence on its stock price, but this dissertation does not find this effect is significant. The reason is maybe that investors’ reaction to violation behavior is not the same. Further study shows that investors are sensitive to the fact if chairman involved in the violation behavior, because CAR and AR of the companies whose chairman is involved in violation behavior is significantly lower than other companies’. But investors do not sensitive to supervision institution, because CAR and AR of these companies’which is punished by China securities regulatory commission is not significantly lower than other companies’. CAR of companies whose independent directors are punished is significantly lower than other companies, but we do not find the same effect of AR.更多还原