跨越工程保险技术障碍途径与风险管理模式的研究

【作者】 李杰；

【导师】 王全凤；

【作者基本信息】 华侨大学 ， 结构工程， 2011， 博士

【摘要】 项目风险管理是学术界研究的一个热点问题,工程保险作为一种工程建设风险转移的途径在实践中也得到了应用,但是近年来我国一些基本建设项目在实施过程中由于风险管理不到位,出现意外事故或灾害,造成巨大的生命和财产损失。由于保险公司不是传统意义上的工程建设参与方,在项目实施过程中没有着力点,对承保风险的控制处于被动的地位,多数情况下只是在灾害发生后才介入了理赔环节的管理,承担了巨额的损失赔偿,一些保险公司公开声称其工程保险业务处于亏损状态,导致保险公司在主观上不愿意承保工程保险;而投保人又因为自身风险得不到充分的保障,也不愿意投保。工程保险这一风险转移方式在发展中遇到了一些障碍,业界将之归结为体制障碍、环境障碍和技术障碍,对于工程风险转嫁后的承担者——保险公司而言,体制障碍和环境障碍是外部因素,跨越这两种障碍需要政府的政策引导和整个社会的通力协作,而这一过程比较漫长,社会涉及面也比较广,在短时间内单纯依靠保险公司自身的力量是无法改变的,但是技术障碍可以通过自身的努力加以克服或适当地减少其影响。本文通过分析和研究提出保险公司委托建设单位已经通过招标选定的监理机构提供技术服务跨越工程保险技术障碍的途径,并运用经济学模型对这一共同代理模式下的相关问题进行了研究。首先在查阅、思考、消化和吸收国内外有关建设项目风险管理和相关经济学理论研究的基础上,从影响工程保险业务开展技术障碍的主要内容入手,利用约束理论分析跨越技术障碍的突破口和途径。在此基础上,分析工程保险技术服务的主要内容。其次,根据目前监理机构业务开展情况,提出监理机构提供技术服务参与项目风险管理也可以作为今后业务拓展的渠道之一。为了做好这方面研究的基础工作,本文通过问卷调查了解监理机构履行项目监督管理职责的基本情况,分析建设单位和保险公司分别委托任务之间的关系,监理机构履行职责内容与跨越工程保险技术障碍之间的关系,分析本文提出的跨越工程保险技术障碍共同代理模式的合法性。接着,本文通过建立经济学模型对共同代理和序贯共同代理模式下两个委托人与代理人之间的博弈行为进行了分析,对共同代理框架下监理机构的道德风险、两委托人的道德风险和委托人合作时的道德风险进行了研究,提出序贯共同代理框架下工程保险技术服务的模型,建设单位和保险公司委托的任务呈互补性关系,应当在委托监理机构时加强合作,共同做好项目目标控制和风险管理工作。本文还研究了通过激励和监督机制抑制监理机构的道德风险、弱化两委托人合作道德风险的经济学模型,提出建设单位和保险公司通过真心合作使得项目目标控制和风险管理达到整体效用最优化。最后,根据研究提出跨越工程保险技术障碍的途径,借鉴上海市试行的风险管理全委托模式总结出基于工程保险项目风险管理的模式,并针对福州地铁1号线建设项目的实践,提出加强福州地铁1号线工程风险管理的政策建议。更多还原

【Abstract】 Now,project risk management is one of the hottest issues in research, engineering insurance,as a transference channel of construction risk,had been applied in the field of risk management.In recent years, accidents or disasters occurred in some infrastructure projects,which had got great loss of life and property due to the inappropriate risk management.Insurance companies could not do their best in the project risk management because of the passive position,and always took part in the stages of settlement of claims and bore a huge amount of damages.Some insurance companies proclaimed that they had lost lots of money in the engineering insurance business,in the case,insurance companies did not want to cover engineering insurance.On the other hand,applicants did not want insurance too,because they thought their risks were not fully protected.Engineering insurance met with several obstacles on the way of development,which including system,environment and technical obstacles. As for insurance companies,system and environment obstacles were external factors, the two barriers could not be solved by insurance companies alone in a short time,and should be settled by government’s policy guidance and community collaboration in a long time and community widely involved. As for technical obstacles,which could be overcomed or reduce its impact through insurance companies efforts.This article suggested that insurance companies should entrust the supervision agencies,which had been signed a contract with owners,provided services so as to overcome the technical obstacles,and studied common agency issues by the way of setting economic model.In the first place,this article started at the technical obstacles,which had impact of the development of engineering insurance, by the way of studing the knowledge about project risk management and economic theory,analyzed breach and approach of overcoming the technical obstacles by the way of the theory of constraints,and discussed the main contents of technical services engineering insurance.Second,this article advanced that the supervision agencies could offer technical services as a new business to take park in project risk management. in order to do the basic work in the research.This article considered the situation about the supervision’s duties by the way of survey,and studied the relationship between the tasks,which were entrusted separately by the owners and the insurance companies , connections between the supervision’s duties and the technical obstacles.Then,this article discussed the legitimacy the model of proposed common agency.The third,this article studied the game behavior between the two principals and agent in the environment of common agency or sequential common agency by the way of establishing economic model,and set up the model of engineering insurance technical services under the framework of sequential common agency to restrain the moral hazard of the supervision agencies,decrease the moral hazard of two principals and eliminate the cooperation moral hazard between the two principals. This article also accounted that the relationship of the tasks entrusted separately by the two principals showed complementary in the environment of common agency. So the owners and the insurance companies should strengthen their cooperation in the commission acts,do well in the project target control and risk management,restrain the moral hazard of supervisory agencies through incentives and monitoring measures,decrease the moral hazard of The two co-principals,and optimize the overall effectiveness of project supervision and risk management through sincere cooperation.Finally,this article put forward approachs which insurance companies overcome the technical obstacles of engineering insurance,summarized the model of risk management in view of engineering insurance which based on risk management of the entire commission , and proposed policy recommendations and suggested that the MTR Corporation and the insurance companies should strengthen cooperation of risk management for the practice of Fuzhou Metro Line 1 construction project.更多还原