【作者】 周群华；

【导师】 陈金龙；

【作者基本信息】 华侨大学 ， 企业管理， 2011， 博士

【摘要】 20世纪90年代以来,内部资本市场与公司治理一直是公司财务(金融)的两大研究热点。对前者的研究主要集中于内部资本市场的资金配置效率方面,但众多学者的意见并不一致,也缺少有显著说服力的结论。实际上,导致内部资本市场无效的实质是公司治理问题。以美国企业为代表的股权结构分散的特点决定了投资者与管理者之间的利益冲突是公司治理的核心问题,企业集团内部资本市场的双层代理模式,则使管理者有更大的谋取私人利益的空间。类似地,包括我国在内的广大发展中国家内部资本市场所呈现的控股股东掠夺外部投资者利益等负面效应也是公司治理问题所致。之所以主张企业集团内部资本市场的协同治理,首先在于引发企业集团内部资本市场利益冲突的因素错综复杂,各利益相关层级之间的利益冲突已成为企业内部主要矛盾的情况下,单纯依靠“头痛医头,脚疼医脚”式的分析和研究不仅不能从根本上解决问题,而且很可能陷入“只见树木,不见森林”的误区;其次就是要使内部资本市场成为企业集团灵活运用各种公司治理机制的一个有利场所,并借助内部资本市场的良好运作推动企业集团建立一套相互制衡的监管体系,使集团母、子公司之间和子公司与子公司之间能透过内部资本市场的交叉监督,吸引各利益相关者适当而有效地参与公司治理,发挥其内部间接监控、利益利益相关者协同行动的作用,进而提高企业集团的整体治理水平。本文在借鉴吸收公司治理、公司财务、金融经济学、企业组织理论、协同论和博弈论等专业化研究成果的基础上,对企业集团内部资本市场的协同治理问题进行了系统性研究。重点内容包括:影响内部资本市场治理的因素和不同股权结构下内部资本市场治理面临的问题分析;我国企业集团内部资本市场治理效应和融资约束缓解效应以及两者相互作用效应的实证研究;内部资本市场协同治理与演化博弈分析;内部资本市场协同治理的实现与评价。研究的主要特色与可能的创新如下:(1)将内部资本市场与集团公司治理置于一个统一的分析框架内,从协同学、演化经济学视角构建了企业集团内部资本市场协同治理的演化路径,对于解决企业集团复杂的公司治理问题,发挥企业集团的整体优势提供了有益的启示,研究视角新颖。(2)运用大样本研究证实了我国内部资本市场发挥着缓解成员企业融资约束与掠夺中小投资者的功能,检验了我国内部资本市场的存在性、内部资本市场治理效应与融资约束缓解效应,克服了现有研究侧重内部资本市场某个单一方面、样本数量偏小、代表性不足的缺陷,为企业集团内部资本市场的协同治理提供了经验证据。(3)运用博弈论方法系统研究了内部资本市场协同治理的演化路径,基于价值生成机制,构建了内部资本市场协同治理能力成熟度(ICMSG-CMM)评价模型和协同效应的模糊定量评价模型,为内部资本市场的协同治理提供了综合评价体系和信息反馈机制。研究得到的基本结论是:(1)中国企业集团内部资本市场面临的治理问题是,在股权相对集中的所有权结构下,控股股东可能会通过金字塔、交叉持股等结构,联合搭建起一个复杂的企业集团,然后凭借现金流权与控制权的分离,通过非常隐蔽的手段剥夺外部投资者。其剥夺动机和强度与其持有的上市子公司股权比例、非上市子公司业绩、惩罚成本以及上市子公司承担的社会目标(员工就业、社会稳定等)有关。(2)我国法律制度的不健全和金融环境的欠发达,使母公司至少有两个依赖子公司内部资本市场的理由:①掠夺子公司中小股东利益的需要;②缓解面对不稳定的外部融资来源时的融资约束的需要。内部资本市场发挥的两种作用中,哪种作用占主导地位,取决于公司治理的确切环境和公司面临的融资约束情况。(3)在与集团内部资本市场治理有关的内、外部治理机制中,多个协同主体之间协同治理行为演化的长期均衡结构可能完全协同,也可能完全不协同,演化的路径及最终演化结果受到博弈双方的初始状态影响。在内部资本市场治理协同的实际运作中,协同主体之间协同资源的互补性、协同方式的适宜性、协同意愿及合作能力等是影响协同主体最大纯收益获得的各种因素,从而决定了博弈双方的策略演化路径。这些因素在协同治理行为的动态演化过程中起到了至关重要的作用,直接影响着长期性协同主体之间协同关系的建立和稳定。更多还原

【Abstract】 Since the 1990s, Internal capital markets and corporate governance have become two main research subjects of corporate finance. The first subject’s research mainly focused on internal capital markets’capital allocation efficiency. But the scholars’ opinions do not concur and also are lack of significant convincing conclusions. In fact, the essence of internal capital market inefficiencies was resulted from corporate governance problems. As the representative of the scattered shareholding structure characteristics, which decides the interest conflict between investors and managers is the core problem of corporate governance in the U.S firms, The double agent model of business group’s internal capital markets enables the managers have greater space to pursue their private benefits. Similarly, internal capital markets in developing countries have present the negative effects which caused by corporate governance problem is the controlling shareholders’robbing the outside investors’interests. Relying solely on partial and simple analysis type and research method would not solve the problem fundamentally, but also fail into the misunderstanding of seeing the minute details but missing the major issues.Secondly, it is essential to make internal capital markets become a favourable pattern of the business groups making use of various corporate governance mechanism and promote business group to establish a good supervision system, enhance the business groups’governance level eventually.Based on corporate governance and corporate finance, financial economics and enterprise organization theory, synergy theory and game theory’s specialized research achievements, This dissertation has conducted the systematic research on internal capital market’s synergetic governance questions in the business groups. The key content includes: what the the factors which affect internal capital market governance are; what the internal capital market governance problems under different ownership structure are; empirical study on the internal capital markets governance effect and their financing restraint alleviation effect as well as both interaction effect in the country’s business group; analysis of the internal capital markets synergetic governance and evolutionary game between the internal and external governance system; how to evaluate internal capital markets synergetic governance effect,etc.This dissertation applies the corporate governance, corporate finance, evolutionary ecnomics and game theory to make the study on internal capital markets governance of business groups in a creative way, which includes:(1)Internal capital markets governance and business group are placed into a unified analysis framework, the evolutionary paths of synergetic governance to solve the business groups’complex corporate governance issues are constructed from the perspective of evolutionary economics, which provide new thought for improving the overall advantage of business groups in China.(2) Using a large sample, the study confirmes the internal capital markets play the role of both alleviating member firms’financing constraints and robbing the minority investors in Chinese business group, examines the existence of internal capital market, internal capital market governance effect and financing constraints alleviating effect, which provides empirical evidence for internal capital markets synergetic governance. (3) Utilizing the game theory method, the author also researchs the internal capital markets evolution paths of synergetic governance Systematically, based on value generating mechanism, constructs the internal capital market synergetic governance capability maturity evaluation model (ICMSG - CMM) and the fuzzy quantitative evaluation model of synergy effect ,which provide a comprehensive evaluation system of control and information feedback mechanism for internal capital market synergetic governance.The basic conclusions from the study are:(1) Controlling shareholders may extract the outside investor through the very covert method which based on the separation between cash flow rights and voting rights,the extracting motive depends on the controlling shareholders’shares in the listed subsidiaries and the non-listed subsidiaries’performance and the listed subsidiaries’social responsibility targets,such as employment, social stability and so on.(2) Chinese business group has two reasons to rely on its subsidiaries internal capital market at least because of the imperfect legal regme and the underdeveloped financial system:one is the need of robbing outside investors and another is alleviating its financial constraints.What kind of need is more important depends on the exact of corporate governance environment and financial constraint conditions which the group faces.(3)In the internal and external governance mechanism which related to internal capital market governance, the long-term equilibrium structures of multiple collaborative principal participants’coordination behavior evolution may completely synergetic or not, the evolution paths and the final evolution result are affected by initial state of the both parties in the games. In actual operation of internal capital market synergetic governance,The complementarity of the resources , the suitability of the synergy modes, collaboration intention, and the ability to cooperate are the major factors which affect the net income of the principal participants acquired. These factors decide the relevant bilateral strategy evolution paths in the games. These factors play very important role in synergetic governance behavior’s dynamic evolutionary process and have direct influence on the establishment and stability of long-term collaborative relations among the multiple collaborative principal participants.更多还原