【作者】 张婉君；

【导师】 刘伟；

【作者基本信息】 重庆大学 ， 技术经济及管理， 2011， 博士

【摘要】 自20世纪90年代以来,学术界和实务界开始关注到,控制性股权的普遍存在以及控股股东与中小股东之间的代理问题。我国在一股独大的制度背景下,呈现出公司的内部治理机制如董事会监督、监事会、独立董事不能充分发挥功效,外部治理机制如经理人市场、控制权市场机制不健全等特点。与此同时,在成熟的欧美国家公司治理舞台上,机构投资者已经成为资本市场上的主角,机构投资者股东积极主义这一新兴的公司治理机制发挥了显著的治理作用。我国监管层对于机构投资者改善公司治理以及稳定促进资本市场的发展寄予厚望,并出台了一系列的政策法规超常规、创造性地培育和发展机构投资者。在我国,在政府的大力支持下,随着资本市场的迅速发展,机构投资者在数量和规模上得到了飞速发展。截至2008年底,我国53.4万户机构投资者持股市值占股票流通市值的54.62%,已经形成了以证券投资基金为主导,辅以社保基金、保险基金、企业年金、合格境外机构投资者、券商资金(包括证券公司自营资金以及集合理财资金)等在内的机构投资者格局。发展机构投资者会产生什么经济后果?机构投资者治理机制的经济后果在何种制度条件下产生作用?本文首先对机构投资者参与公司治理的理论基础和相关文献进行了回顾,并分析了机构投资者发挥治理效应的机理。在此基础上,结合我国上市公司所处的的制度背景以及机构投资者发展的现状和约束条件,以机构投资者的治理效应为研究主题,采用规范与实证相结合的研究方法,对我国上市公司机构投资者的治理效应和作用机理进行了理论分析和实证检验。文章共分九章。第一章绪论,提出了文章所要研究的问题、研究意义以及研究内容与方法,并对文章所涉及到的关键概念进行界定;第二章理论基础与文献述评,分析了机构投资者参与公司治理的相关理论基础;阐释和评价了机构投资者与公司治理的相关文献,并在此基础上对机构投资者的经济后果从中小投资者利益保护视角和企业价值视角做了探讨。第三章制度背景,回顾和分析了与研究主题相关的制度背景,并结合制度背景,分析了中国机构投资者的发展历程和制约条件。第四章通过理论分析,对机构投资者参与公司治理的动因、作用方式、影响因素进行了阐述,指出了机构投资者参与公司治理的作用机理。第五章和第六章对机构投资者影响企业的经营决策行为进行实证检验和分析,发现机构投资者在一定程度上抑制了控股股东剥夺中小投资者利益的行为;第七章,实证研究中国上市公司机构投资者股东积极治理机制是否会对其股权融资成本产生影响,进而保护中小投资者利益。还进一步考察控股股东性质、治理环境等制度环境因素对机构投资者机制经济后果的影响。第八章,实证检验了中国上市公司机构投资者机制是否会对其企业价值产生影响。在此基础上,还进一步考察控股股东性质对机构投资者价值效应的影响。第九章总结文章的主要研究成果,并提出文章的研究不足和未来进一步研究的方向。本文存在如下三个方面的创新:①利用机构投资者参与公司治理的股数效应模型和公司数效应模型,明晰了机构投资者参与公司治理的前提条件。揭示了机构投资者通过内外部治理机制影响公司战略和经营决策、抑制控股股东的寻租行为、降低股权融资成本,从而提升公司价值的内在机理,丰富了现有机构投资者治理效应的理论研究,并通过实证研究验证了我国机构投资者参与公司治理的有效性。②本文采用非平衡面板模型对机构投资者持股与股权融资成本的关系进行计量分析,研究进一步证实了我国机构投资者能发挥积极股东作用,降低了公司股权融资成本。与现有研究的估计方法采用普通最小二乘法相比,本文所构建的非平衡面板模型有助于提高研究结果的可信度。③考虑了我国上市公司运行的制度因素对公司治理效应的影响,将控股股东性质、市场化指数、法制指数与政府干预指数的变量引入实证研究。研究表明控股股东性质、我国差异化的市场发展程度、法治水平和政府干预程度等因素影响下机构投资者的治理效应存在显著差异:国有控股抑制了机构投资者作用的发挥,相对于中央控股公司,地方控股公司进一步降低了机构投资者的积极作用;市场化程度对机构投资者的公司治理效应能够产生重要影响,市场化程度越高,机构投资者参与公司治理的效果越好。法治水平越高,公司治理效应越强。更多还原

【Abstract】 Since 1990s, academics and practitioners have noticed the universal existence of controlling shareholders and the principle-agent relationship of controlling shareholders’entrenchment on minority shareholders. Under the system background , the company’s internal governance mechanisms such as independent directors,board of Supervisors and the external governance mechanisms such as manager market , takeover mechanism can not act effectively. Meanwhile, in mature market of European countries and America, institutional investors have become the protagonist in capital market , and investors shareholder activism has become the main governance mechanism. Chinese regulators put forward a series of policies and regulations to develop and cultivate the institutional investors for the hope of improving corporate governance and promoting the development of capital market .In China , because of the government’s support , along with the rapid development of the capital market, institutional investors have been developing rapidly both in the number and in the scale. By the end of 2008, institutional investors held 53.4 million shares of stock market in the current market which comprises 54.62% of the circulative share. Could institutional investors weaken the controlling shareholder“tunnelling behavior”? Is it possible to protect the interests of minority shareholders? What are the economic consequences of developing institutional investors? Based on the above consideration, based on the existing systems in China, this paper explores the economic consequences of the institutional investors through theoretical analysis and empirical research.This paper includes nine chapters. Chapter one puts forward the research question, the research significance, the research content and the method, and the key conception definition involved in the paper; Chapter two discusses on theoretic basis of institutional investors’participation in corporate governance and review on representative literature. Then it explores the economic consequence of institutional investors from two threads, one is the result on minor investors protection, the other is the result on enterprise value. The third chapter is about system background, reviewing and analyzing the research background and system factors related to the theme, and analyzing the process of institutional investors development and formal constraints. The fourth chapter indicates the mechanism of institutional investors’ participation in corporate governance through theoretic analysis. The fifth and sixth chapters empirically test the effect of institutional investors on corporate operating decision, and find that institutional investors can weaken controlling shareholder’s tunnelling behavior. The seventh chapter empirically tests the effect of institutional investors on corporate cost of equity. The eighth chapter empirically tests the effect of institutional investors on corporate value. Finally in chapter nine, we summarize the main results, and put forward the weakness and further research points of research. The main contributions are embodied in the followings:Firstly, based on highly equity centralized and big shareholder control system background of the listed companies in China, this paper discusses institutional investors’weakening controlling shareholders tunnelling behavior. And find out institutional investors play an active role and curb controlling shareholders’deprive of the interests of minority shareholders and promote enterprise’s value.Secondly , it extends the economic consequences research of developing institutional investors. Different from the previous research discussing the influence of institution investors mechanism from value angle only, this paper studies the economic consequences based on the controlling shareholder and small investors of agency problems background from equity financing cost angle as well as value angle using the unbalanced panel data .It reveals that the Chinese institutional investors affect the strategy and business decisions of company and protect minority investors interests’.And it also discovers a path about how institutional investor participate in corporate governance.Thirdly, the empirical test results, in given system background, provide evidence of institutional investors economic consequence, which has policy meaning on how to develop and regulate institutional investors.更多还原