【作者】 唐国锋；

【导师】 但斌；

【作者基本信息】 重庆大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2011， 博士

【摘要】 近年来,以应用服务提供商(Application Service Provider, ASP)服务模式为代表的应用服务外包逐渐成为中小企业解决信息化建设中资金短缺、人才匮乏等问题的有效手段之一。然而,现实交易环境中的信息不对称给由应用基础设施提供商(Application Infrastucture Provider,AIP)、ASP以及客户企业所组成的应用服务供应链带来很多风险,各节点企业的过度风险规避行为导致应用服务供应链运作绩效较低,以致严重阻碍了ASP服务模式的发展。对此,本文研究不对称信息下如何通过应用服务外包合同及应用服务供应链风险分担合同的设计以激励ASP显示真实的服务能力信息、成本信息以及付出所期望的努力水平,并在竞争与市场需求不确定环境下实现ASP与上游供应商之间关于市场风险的合理分担。首先,针对服务能力信息不对称下客户企业选择ASP的逆向选择问题,建立了应用服务外包委托代理模型,通过模型求解得到了应用服务外包最优招标合同菜单,并对该合同的相关性质进行了分析。不对称信息下客户企业主要根据服务能力、经济成本选择ASP,而与服务报价无关;客户企业向ASP支付的服务报酬主要由服务成本及信息租金两部分组成;ASP中标的服务能力较完全信息下中标的服务能力低。其次,在考虑外界网络条件影响客户企业服务收益的情况下研究ASP的道德风险问题,设计了对称信息及不对称信息条件下的应用服务外包激励合同,并分析了最优外包合同的性质。对称信息条件下,客户企业将承担外界网络条件不确定所带来的全部风险;不对称信息条件下,最优合同不能以无差异合同形式存在,且最优合同在网络条件较好时能实现帕累托最优,而在网络条件较差时发生扭曲,存在效率损失。随后,在前面研究的基础上,针对客户企业如何平衡激励ASP在硬件及软件建设的多任务投入问题设计了应用服务外包正式合同、关系合同,并分析了贴现率及成本替代强度对合同激励效果的影响。贴现率较低时,客户企业应选择正式合同对ASP进行激励;随着贴现率的增加,关系合同的激励效果增加;关系合同中,不同任务之间的激励效果具有互补性,且随成本替代性逐渐增强。再次,针对ASP成本效率参数及努力水平信息不对称下的应用服务外包合同设计问题进行研究。在ASP所拥有的成本效率参数及努力水平均不可观测下研究客户企业如何通过外包合同设计以激励ASP显示其所拥有的成本信息及付出最优的努力水平。收益共享系数是成本效率参数、风险规避度、产出方差的减函数;客户企业向ASP支付的期望服务报酬除了补偿保留效用与服务生产成本还将额外支付风险成本、信息租金;风险成本随风险规避度、产出方差递增,随成本效率参数递减;信息租金随风险规避度、产出方差、成本效率参数递减。最后,针对应用服务供应链上游节点企业ISV(Independent Software Vendor,独立软件开发商)与ASP面临市场竞争与需求不确定下的市场风险分担问题,建立了随机需求下的Stackelberg博弈模型,研究了ASP承担风险及ISV承担风险两种风险分担合同,并运用算例对外生变量进行了参数敏感性分析。当由ISV承担风险时,ASP将向ISV定购其所分配服务需求的上限;ASP承担风险时,ISV将向ASP提供一个软件许可销售计划,并通过提高软件开发质量及维护升级服务水平来提高ASP订购软件许可的积极性;ASP作为盟主的风险分担合同较ISV作为盟主的风险分担合同对应用服务供应链的协调效果好。更多还原

【Abstract】 In recent years, ASP (Application Service Provider) mode has gradually been an effective means for SMEs to solve the problems of shortage of funds and talents. However, the asymmetric information of real trading environment brings risk to the application service supply chain which is composed of AIP (Application Infrastructure Provider), ASP, and customer enterprise. The excessive risk averse behavior of node enterprise leads to lower performance of application service supply chain, and even hinders the development of ASP mode. Thus, the problems about how to make application service outsourcing contract and risk-sharing contract of application service supply chain under asymmetric information to incent ASP to reveal true information of service capacity and cost, pay expected effort level, and share market risk with upstream supplier reasonably are studied.Firstly, under the assumption that the service capabilities of ASP cannot be clearly known by customer enterprise, the principle-agent model of application service outsourcing is established. The contract menu of optimal bidding contract is obtained after solving the model, and the related properties of the contract are analyzed finally. Studies have shown that customer enterprise chooses the appropriate ASP mainly based on its service capabilities and economic costs under asymmetric information; the service payment is composed of service costs and information rent; the service capabilities which lead to the successful bid under incomplete information is less than under complete information.Secondly, the moral hazard issue of ASP is studied considering the service revenue of customer enterprise affected by the external network condition. The optimal outsourcing contracts are designed under the symmetric information and the asymmetric information, and the properties of the optimal outsourcing contracts are analyzed. Studies have shown that customer enterprise will take all the risk arising from the uncertainty of external network condition under symmetric information; the indifferent contract cannot be the optimal contract under the asymmetric information; the optimal contract can achieve the Pareto optimality under good network condition, and occurs distortion under poor network conditions when the information is asymmetric. Then, on the base of the former study, the formal contract and relational contract are established to solve the problem about how to balance the incentive between hardware construction and software construction, and the impacts of discount rate and cost alternative degree to the contract are analyzed finally. The formal contract should be chosen by the customer enterprise when the discount rate is lower; the incentive effect of relational contract will increase with the discount rate; the incentive effect between the tasks under relational contract are complementary, and will increase with the cost alternative degree.Thirdly, the application service outsourcing contract is established to incent ASP to show the true cost information and pay the optimal effort level under the circumstance of cost-effectiveness parameter and effort level owned by ASP cannot be observed by the customer enterprise. The conclusions imply that revenue-sharing proportion is the decreasing function of cost-effectiveness parameter, degree of risk aversion, and the variance of output; the reward which customer enterprise pays to ASP will be used not only to compensate reservation utility, service cost, but also to compensate the risk cost and information rent; the risk cost is decreasing with the degree of risk aversion, the variance of output, and increasing with the cost-effectiveness parameter; the information rent is decreasing with degree of risk aversion, the variance of output and cost- effectiveness parameter.Finally, a Stackelberg game model is developed to study the market risk sharing problem caused by demand uncertainty and service competition between ASP and ISV (Independent Software Vendor). Two different kinds of risk sharing contracts, ASP taking the risk and ISV taking the risk, are studied, and then the parameter sensitivity analysis of exogenous variable is carried out. ASP will order the maximal amount of the allocated service demand when ISV takes the risk; a software license sales plan is provided by ISV when the ASP takes the risk, and ISV will incent ASP to order more software license quantity by improving the software quality and service level of upgrading the software; the risk sharing contract of ASP takes the risk is better than the contract of ISV takes the risk from the perspective of the performance of application service supply chain.更多还原