打捆贷款问题研究

【作者】 赵蕊；

【导师】 王松奇；

【作者基本信息】 中国社会科学院研究生院 ， 金融学， 2011， 博士

【摘要】 在一国城市化的加速阶段,地方政府的融资难题必然与之相伴。自1994年中国分税制改革以来,采取何种融资方式来解决资金缺口难题就一直是中国地方政府反复考虑的核心问题。在诸种选择中,“打捆贷款”曾经备受地方政府青睐。不过,作为一种创新性融资方式,打捆贷款自始至终就备受争议,学界、实业界、地方政府和监管部门之间的观点迥异。迄今为止的争议大多聚焦于打捆贷款的特点、进程和背景,对其制度演进的逻辑以及风险性分析的论述较少,针对其历史合理性的系统化诠释更是少之又少。本文采用制度历史和比较分析的方法,在分析打捆贷款产生的积极意义的同时,也对打捆贷款产生的风险进行了深入地剖析。本文试图借助制度经济学理论和方法,在回顾、梳理打捆贷款产生、发展和叫停的历史的基础上,分析其存在的合理性,客观评价该模式的可取性和可改变性。对打捆贷款的风险进行分析是本文的另一个视角,依据风险管理的理论和方法,本文对打捆贷款的风险进行了定性分析并提出了相应的管理对策。本文还设专章对中国以及其他部分国家中作为打捆贷款的基础性融资平台即地方政府融资平台进行了分析和比较。本文由此认为,作为一种特殊历史条件下的特殊的融资方式,打捆贷款在推进我国城市化、推进市场信用体系建设、丰富金融创新路径等方面均有积极作用。最后本文就如何规范打捆贷款发展、防范打捆贷款的风险和推进地方政府融资平台的创新提出了一些对策性意见。全文包括绪论、主体四章和结论及政策建议。本文主要的创新之处在于:1.给出了一个关于打捆贷款的制度经济学分析框架。从新制度经济学关于制度与制度变迁的理论来看,中国1994年财政分税制改革、金融体系变革后国家开发银行的政策定位以及1998年东南亚金融危机后我国宏观调控政策的变化等方面都成为打捆贷款产生的制度基础。打捆贷款的产生是顺应当时我国经济发展需求的一种必然要求。而打捆贷款的叫停同样与21世纪初中国宏观形势和监管政策的转变有着密切的联系。2.明确肯定了打捆贷款的积极作用。政策性金融正作为一个不可或缺的组成部分存在于正在发展中的中国经济,成为政府调控与市场机制共同发挥作用的一个重要结合点,打捆贷款也正是兼具政策性与金融性双重特征的,具有资本市场融资、城投债、信托产品等其他政府融资平台融资方式不具备的优势。在存在与发展的数年内,打捆贷款支持地方进行基础设施建设进而推动当地经济发展的重要意义是不可磨灭的。3.对打捆贷款的风险进行了定性分析并提出了相应的管理策略。与地方政府关系密切的打捆贷款融资模式在微观领域信用风险较为突出,除了具有一般贷款借款人所具有的经营和财务风险、道德风险、政策和法律风险之外,还包括一些地方政府信用缺失的制度性风险以及地方财政风险等方面的特有风险。在宏观领域,打捆贷款产生的地方政府债务问题也值得我们警惕。4.对作为打捆贷款基础性运作平台的地方政府融资平台的作用和问题进行了客观分析和评价。由于我国地方政府融资平台设立的门槛和条件没有统一的规定和要求,运行缺乏有效的规范和约束,所以融资平台的发展出现了良莠不齐的现象,存在的问题也日趋突出。地方政府债务的非公开化,也为商业银行准确评估地方政府财力,测算地方政府融资平台企业的还款能力造成了很大的障碍。然而,作为破解地方政府融资瓶颈的一个手段和打捆贷款的重要载体,地方政府融资平台建立和发展的积极意义是不容置疑的,解决当前问题的关键在于通过完善地方政府债务统计制度,增加地方财政的透明度,进一步规范政府融资平台的发展。5.对打捆贷款的合理策略不是叫停而是规范和引导。打捆贷款作为一种金融创新在满足地方政府融资需求、推动我国城市化进程、构建市场信用体系、促进地方经济发展等方面发挥了巨大的作用。不能因为打捆贷款产生的风险而全面否定其存在的意义。立足中国当前的发展阶段,对打捆贷款的规范和引导,使之发挥更大的作用比将其全面禁止似乎更为重要。更多还原

【Abstract】 In the urbanization accelerated stage, one country inevitably faces the problem of local government’s financing. From the fiscal tax-sharing system reform in 1994, which financing style is proper for dealing with the difficulty of capital gap is an important problem for local government to consider. In the kinds of financing styles of local government used in China,“Chinese bundling loans”is once time a very popular financing style. However, as an innovated financing type,“Chinese bundling loans”has been in the dispute discussion, researchers, local government and regulators have different views about it. Until now, the dispute mainly focused on the characters, process and background of“China bundling loans”, there is few research on the institutional process and risk management, and monographs about the historical rationality.This paper analyzes the positive significance of“Chinese bundling loans”and researches the various risks of it by using institutional, historical and comparative analysis method. The paper tries to review the history of appearance, development and prohibition of“Chinese bundling loans”with institutional theory and method, and analyzes the existence rationality, objectively evaluates its advantage and variability. Discussing the risk of“Chinese bundling loans”is another view of the paper. Based on the theory and methods of risk management the paper estimates the risk and supply the manage suggestions. This paper also has one chapter to analyze and compare the differences about the local government financing platform between China and foreign countries. Therefore, this paper considers that as a financial innovation in the specific history period,“Chinese bundling loans”has positive significance not only on promoting the country’s urbanization process and building market credit system, but also on enriching financial creation paths. In the end, the paper supplies some suggestion on how to standardize the development of“Chinese bundling loans”, keep away its risk and promot local government platform’s creation.This paper includes introduction, four subject contents chapters, conclusion and suggestions. The main contributions of this paper are as following five aspects:Firstly, this paper sets an institutional economic analysis framework about“Chinese bundling loans”. Based on the theory of new institutional economics about the institution and institution change, the tax-sharing system reform ,China Development Bank’s political positioning after China’s financial system reform, China’s macro-control policies’adjustment after Southeast Asia financial risk in 1998 are all the institutional foundation of appearance of“Chinese bundling loans”. The appearance is an inevitable demand to conform to China economic development. Also, the prohibition of“Chinese bundling loans”is corresponding with the change of China macro situation and supervision policy in the early 21st century.Secondly, the paper definitely affirms the positive significance of“Chinese bundling loans”. As an important combination of government regulation and market mechanism, policy finance is an indispensable part in developing China economic. Because of its policy and financial characters,“Chinese bundling loans”has many advantages which other financing tools such as the capital market financing, city construction investment bond, trust tools and etc. do not have. The importance of“Chinese bundling loans”on promoting local economic development is indelible.Thirdly, the paper estimates the risk of“Chinese bundling loans”and supplies the management suggestions. Because of close relation with local government,“Chinese bundling loans”has prominent credit risk in micro filed, and has specific risk as institutional risk caused by government credit and local fiscal risk except the general risk as business and financial risk, moral risk, policy and legal risks and etc. In macro filed, the local debts caused by“Chinese bundling loans”also should be noted.Furthermore, the paper discusses the function and problems of local government financing platform objectively. For there are no unified standards of establishment, lacking effective norms and constraints, China local government financing platform’s development appears many problems. Materials about local government’s total financing liability scale can not be fully grasp, this also caused great difficulties for commercial banks to accurate evaluation of local governments, and forecast the local government financing platform’s real reimbursement ability. However, as a important means to break government financing bottleneck, and a carrier of“Chinese bundling loans”, it is no doubt that local government financing platform’s establishment and development have lots of positive meaning. The key to solve current problems should be improving the local government debt statistics system, increasing the local fiscal transparency; and further standardizing government financing platform development. At last, the paper indicates that the reasonable strategy to deal with the problem of“Chinese bundling loan”is standardizing and inducting not prohibiting.“Chinese bundling loans”as a kind of financial innovation, it plays a tremendous role in meeting local government financing needs, promoting the country’s urbanization process and building market credit system, promoting local economic development, so we cannot comprehensively negate the meaning of its existence. Based on China’s current development stage, it seems more important that standardizing and inducting“Chinese bundling loans”to play a bigger role than prohibiting it.更多还原