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博弈与规制:中国风电产业发展中的政府行为研究

【作者】 王成仁

【导师】 邹东涛;

【作者基本信息】 中国社会科学院研究生院 , 国民经济学, 2011, 博士

【摘要】 同世界其他国家一样,我国风电产业也是可再生能源发展战略的重点。经过多年的发展,我国风电产业装机规模已居世界首位,新增装机连年保持高速增长。在快速发展的同时,风电并网难、技术突破难等问题一直存在。本文运用政府经济理论、制度经济学、公共选择理论与规制经济学等理论工具,对风电产业中的地方政府行为、央地政府博弈以及企业行为等进行了深入分析,试图以政府行为分析的角度为解决风电问题提供良好建议。本文分析从供给与需求两方面展开。从供给来看,一方面,地方政府为套取补贴,铺开地区经济规模,赚取财税收入,争先占领风电产业。其深层次原因包括以GDP为核心的政绩考核机制、官员晋升机制和财政分权体制。另一方面,对于主要由国有企业构成的风机制造企业和发电商而言,发展风电这一国家号召的能源产业,可扩大企业规模、增加经济利润、提高未来收益、积累政治资本。加之国有企业存在软预算约束的情形,其投资行为更加注重政治利益而非经济效益。多种利益的合力促使国有企业纷纷投资风电,这也反映了企业对风电行业的良好预期。从需求来看,电网企业作为风电的直接需求者,决定着风电上网电量。相对于规模扩张迅速的风电来说,落后的电网建设条件制约着风电发展。一方面,风电具有间歇性、波动性和随机性的特点,对电网安全危害很大。若强制上网则需要在调峰、调度管理等方面做出大幅调整,给电网企业带来巨大成本,这些都使电网收购风电的积级性不高;另一方面,电网企业属自然垄断企业,同时具有社会公益性。电网在利用垄断优势获取双边垄断利润的同时,还追求着政治利益。通过扩大企业规模、提高电网覆盖面、提升电网垄断程度等方式,增加企业的政治话语权和垄断能力。对于风电这一国家大力支持的清洁能源,电网企业虽不积极但也表示支持,这里不排除企业有借发展风电之机谋求其他目标的机会主义倾向。为此,必须要求电网企业在支持风电发展过程中,体现其公益性质,主动承担相关成本,减轻广大民众的负担。从世界主要风电发达国家的发展经验来看,各国政府均是可再生能源产业发展的主要推动者。一是对技术研发的大力支持,以技术作为产业发展的源动力;二是为可再生能源发展提供持续的政策优惠和税收减免等财政支持;三是通过市场机制解决电力消纳、交易和配额等问题,有效提升了电网对风电的吸纳能力;四是采用强制上网政策,要求电网企业收购可再生能源电力。这些措施均值得我国借鉴。最后,本文提出要由中央政府这一强制力量来规制地方政府和国有企业行为,以求得风电等可再生能源科学发展的战略对策。首先,地方政府要明确自己是规则制定者、监督者和仲裁者的角色,考核地方风电上网电量,协调风电供需双方利益,促进本地风电技术的发展。其次,要强化国有企业的预算约束,提高企业投资效率,引入市场竞争,打破垄断。再次,中央政府要从中国能源战略的整体出发,制定风电等可再生能源的具体发展规划,走以技术研发为动力,以政策支持为保障,以科学、有序发展为目标的风电发展路线。

【Abstract】 Like other countries in the world, China’s wind power industry is the key factor of renewable energy development strategy. After years of development, China’s installed capacity of wind power has become the lagest in the world, taking high-speed growth of new installed capacity. Beyond the rapid development, there are still difficulties in wind power’s parallel in grid and technological breakthroughs. The paper, taking the angle of government behavior, basing on the theory tools including the government economic theory, institutional economics, public choice theory and economics of regulation, will conduct in-depth analysis and conclude meaningful advice of wind power development, considering the behavior of local governments, central-local government game and corporation behavior in wind power industry.This article analyzes both the supply and demand aspects. From the supply point of view, on the one hand, factors such as cash in subsidies, regional economic scale and to earn tax revenue, will stimulate local goverments to give the highest priority to wind power industry. The deep-seated reasons include GDP based performance evaluation mechanism, official promotion mechanism and fiscal decentralization. On the other hand, the major part of the wind turbine manufacturers and power suppliers are state-owned enterprises, which promote the development of wind energy industry, this national call, aiming at the increase of enterprise scale, profits, future earnings and political capital. Meanwhile, with the soft budget constraint, the investment behaviors of state-owned enterprises pay more attention to political interests rather than economic benefits. Variety of interests promote the investment behavior of the state-owned enterprises in wind power, reflecting their wonderful expectations on wind power industry.From the demand perspective, power grid enterprise as the immediate demander of wind power, determines the wind power’s combination to the grid. Relative to the rapid size expansion of wind power, the backward condition of power grid construction restricts the development of wind power. On the one hand, due to intermittent, volatility and randomness characteristics, wind power means a great power safety hazard. It needs substantial adjustments to the grid peaking, scheduling and management system, adding enormous cost to the grid company, which reduces its positiveness; On the other hand, the power grid enterprise is natural monopoly and public welfare company. While using the monopoly power to obtain a bilateral monopoly profits, the company also pursues political interests. By expanding the enterprise’s scale, improving the network coverage, enhancing the power grid monopoly, the company pursues to increase their political voice and monopoly power. As for wind power, a national support clean energy, the grid enterprise takes an active attitude, though not positive so much, not ruling out its opportunistic behavior to seek other objectives under the name of developing wind power. For this reason, we must require power grid company to amplify its public welfare nature, while developing wind power, to take the relevant costs and ease the burden of the general public.Learning the world’s leading countries’development experience of wind power, government is the major contributor to the development of the renewable energy industry. First, the strong support of R & D is the driving force of industrial development; Secondly, government provides continuous tax relief, incentives and financial support to the development of renewable energy; Thirdly, through the market mechanism to solve the power consumption, transaction, quotas and other issues, the government effectively enhances the grid’s absorptive capacity of wind power; Fourthly, the government uses mandatory access policy to force power grid enterprise to purchase renewable power. These measures are worthy of reference.Finally, the paper proposes to use the coercive power of the central government to regulate the behaviors of local governments and state owned corporations, to obtain the scientific development strategy and countermeasures of wind power and other renewable energys. First, local governments must clear their roles of rules developer, monitor and arbiter, assessing the amount of combined wind power, coordinating the interests of both the wind power supply and demand, promoting the development of local wind power technology. Second, the central government should strengthen the budget constraints of state-owned enterprises, improve their investment efficiency, and introduce market competition to break the monopoly. Again, the central government needs to develop wind power and other renewable energys basing on overall energy strategy of China and make specific development plans, taking R & D as a driving force, policy support as the protection, scientifically and orderly development as the objective.

  • 【分类号】F426.6;F224.32
  • 【被引频次】18
  • 【下载频次】2624
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